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The recent developments in negotiations to reduce nuclear 
weapons in Europe mark a watershed in attitudes towards 
nuclear deterrence and security. On the one side lie all 
the old beliefs and assumptions about nuclear defence and 
security that have been common parlance for the last forty 
years and more. On the other side lies a unique 
opportunity to develop a new relationship of increased 
mutual trust between East and West that could ultimately 
lead to substantial reductions in the world's nuclear 
arsenal. 
The object of this thesis is to establish how much 
information already exists about attitudes towards nuclear 
deterrence and the processes of attitude change. From 
there, to extend these boundaries of knowledge in the 
belief that if we are able to understand more exactly what 
people think about nuclear deterrence, why they hold these 
attitudes and how attitudes change then we will be in a 
better position to ease the transitional stage between one 
set of attitudes and another. The first three chapters 
examine the extent of existing knowledge about attitudes 
towards nuclear defence and theoretical work on attitude 
change at the individual, psychological and social. level. 
Chapter one analyses the opinion polls over the last forty 
years in order to place the present findings into some 
iii 
sort of perspective- and determine whether the present 
attitudes towards arms reduction are part of a growing 
trend or a minor aberration. Chapters Two and Three 
examine attitude change at the social level in terms of 
broad patterns of change, and in more detail at an 
individual level in order to understand the possible 
processes taking place. A wide variety of theories are 
reviewed and these are considered in terms of examples of 
actual attitude change that has taken place amongst 
individuals outside the confines of laboratory 
experimentation. 
A series of interviews with a sample of US elites who have 
undergone varying degrees of attitude change towards 
nuclear defence provide the empirical basis for a model of 
attitude change that is developed in Chapter Four. 
In the fifth chapter the content of pro- and anti-nuclear 
belief systems are def ined in terms of sets of arguments 
that are currently used to express these two opposing 
views. These help to assess the use of structural models 
and mathematical equations in understanding these belief 
systems, in Chapter Six. 
S Ory\p- eXampleS of attitude change amongst British non- 
elites are examined in Chapter Seven and the processes of 
change taking place here are compared with the American 
sample. From this comparision modifications are made to 
iv 
the model of attitude change and distinctions are drawn 
between elites and non-elites. 
Once again the opinion polls are used, in the second half 
of this chapter, but this time using specific questions on 
attitude change which are subject to detailed analysis 
using crosstabulations. Used in conjunction with the 
qualititive research in the previous chapters a deeper 
understanding of the development of attitudes and the 
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Recently, and with increasing frequency, we have witnessed the direct 
expression of public feeling in the form of protests, sit-ins, marches and many 
other actions both non-violent and violent against what are seen to be an 
increasing number of legislative injustices. As an expression of public opinion 
these protests provide tangible evidence of the awareness, involvement and 
strength of feeling that exists as regards many current and controversial issues. 
But as a means of quantifying this opinion in a systematic way public opinion 
polls are still the main tool in the hands of the policy makers. There is no doubt 
that the production of figures and percentages provide a certain authority and 
credibility which can give credence to arguments and policies across the whole 
political, spectrum - but just. how justified is this legitimacy? What do the polls 
really tell us about the nature of public opinion on the nuclear weapons issue? 
And what do these opinion polls mean in terms of public acquiescence to 
government policy? These are some of the questions that will be considered in 
this opening chapter. 
1.2 WHAT IS AN OPINION POLL? 
Polling procedure 
Public opinion is largely an unknown amorphous entity that is sampled from 
time to time by agencies interested in eliciting the public's opinion on chosen 
issues. This sample is taken to be representative of the total population and 
from these results percentages of Yes, No and Don't Know's are calculated for 
the population as a whole. 
-2- 
Although public opinion polls are said to represent the opinions of the general 
public as a whole they do in fact constitute the opinions of a very small 
percentage of that public. The actual number may vary but is generally 
between 1,000 and 2POO. This number balances the cost of carrying out the poll 
against the level of accuracy required to make the whole operation worthwhile. 
A well-chosen sample of 2,000 for example, would provide accuracy within 2% 
in 95 out of a 100 cases; this would mean that if a poll indicated 46% of those 
polled were against the siting of cruise missiles, one can be 95% sure that the 
actual percentage lies somewhere between 44% and 48%. In order to interview 
a representative cross-section of the population the sampling method has 
become fairly standardised among polling agencies. There are two accepted 
methods of sampling in this country - Random and Quota. 
Random sampling 
To be a true random sample the names of every single adult in the country 
would have to be put into a hat and the required number picked out at random. 
Of course this is out of the question, therefore the accepted random probability 
sample is usually based on electoral registers and entails, if the sample required 
is 1,000 for example, dividing the 40 million or so names on the registers by 
1,000 and taking out every 4,000th name (starting of course with a randomly 
selected starting point). This gives a good approximation of a random sample 
although it is unlikely that all those selected will be either available or willing 
at the time of interview to participate. It must also be remembered that the 
electoral register is biased against non-English speaking residents, against 
illiterate people, against the sick and against those who do not have a fixed 
address. 
I It is therefore not a 100% accurate representation of people living in 
Britain nor even of those entitled to vote. 
-3- 
Quota sampling 
This method of sampling is based on the broad demographic characteristics of 
the British population, i. e., how many of each age, sex, social class, working or 
non-working, etc. Each interviewer is given a "quota" of respondents to find in 
each category; so many women aged between 18 and 30 in a given occupation, 
so many men aged between 25 and 40 in a given social class and so om When 
the quota of respondents is achieved in each required category, this will then be 
a demographically representative cross-section of the population. However, 
this method is not perfect either as the people selected for interview are at the 
discretion of the interviewer and it is possible that unconscious biases (e. g. 
appearance, colour) may preclude some members of the public from inclusion in 
the sample. 
Although random probability samples are accepted by pollsters, market 
researchers and academics as the best means of sampling, quota sampling is the 
predominant mode used because it is ý both less expensive and simpler to 
administer. - 
We have dealt here with the validity of the sampling process as regards 
representation of the public. We must next ask 'Are the polls representative of 
public 22Lnion? l This can by no means be assumed by accepting the validity of 
the former and depends very much on one's definition of public opinion. We 
shall consider briefly the debate; for more detailed reading see H. Childs 
2, D. 
Katz 3, S. Oskamp 4, I Bryce 5, W. Albig 6, H. Spier 7, J. Hodder-Williams 8. 
1.3 VALIDITY OF POLLING METHOD 
Whether public opinion polls are considered to be truly representative of public 
opinion or not depends largely on whether one is willing to consider eveyone's 
-4- 
opinion as equally valid. Consider: If an individual who pays no attention to 
world affairs or East-West relations is accosted in the street and asked if they 
approve or disapprove of the role the USNUSSR are playing in world affairs, 
how valid would this 'unconsidered, off-the-cuff opinion be compared to 
someone who follows world and current affairs and is actually informed about 
each nation's role in world affairs? The former respondent may merely be 
answering to please the interviewer or reluctant to show his ignorance or lack 
of interest, whereas the latter may strongly disapprove of one country's role 
and could put up a good argument to support his attitude. It is perhaps an 
inherent paradox of the scientific method that we change a phenomenon by 
measuring it - an interviewer acts as a catalyst. "The confrontation of an 
interviewer with a respondent forces the crystallisation and expression of 
opinions where they were no more than chaotic swirls of thought. "9 
It is this vast difference in degrees of opinion that raises fundamental doubts in 
some quarters as to the ultimate comparability of opinions held by individuals 
of "varying intelligence, interest and influence" (sic). 
10 To sample the 
electorate in this random fashion is to give equal weight to all opinions even if 
someone has no opinion on the issue. To those commentators who consider this 
as unrepresentative, all opinions are not of equal weight: 
" "Public opinion polls 
by ascribing positive views of equal weight to many who are in fact 
uncommitted, distort the true balance of opinion and may therefore affect the 
acceptable consensus which conflicting pressure groups attempt to ensure. " 
12 
But what do these critics of the polls advocate - the ultimate 
disenfranchisement of probably what would be 70% of the electorate at the 
next general election on the grounds that they were not members of a political 
party?! The fact remains, however, that opinions, as stated in polls, cannot be 
-5- 
tested by actions in the way that political polls can be. These may ask voting 
intentions before an election and then be verified by actual voting behaviour. 
Opinion polls require no special commitment - if at all it is likely to be 
trivialised by many "to the level of performance for a brand of pears or sun-tan 
lotion". 13 Can you imagine a pollster bothering to pursue a questionnaire on 
the possible merits/effectiveness of a sun-tan lotion if the person being 
questioned had not heard of the product and never used sun-tan lotions anyway? 
14. 
The question of what people think about public issues' L. Bogart suggests, is 
really secondary to the question of whether they think about them at all. 
To only direct opinion polls towards the elite, the informed - even ignoring the 
implication of such dark overtones - would not f ulf il the desire to elicit a "true" 
informed opinion because as one pollster points out: 
any researcher who has, conducted surveys amongst elites, knows 
that, outside their speciality, elites are normally neither better 
informed, nor more knowledgeable than randomly selected members 
of the public. 15 
Surely the object of public opinion polls, he continues, is: 
to represent the view of the total public (or large and carefully 
defined sections of that public) on issues that affect them. The 
individual respondent does not need to have a detailed knowledge of 
the subject or to have considered it carefully. In the search for 
consensus view it is important that polls are deliberately not 
restricted to quasi-experts. 
Obviously though it would be better if the respondents were informed on the 
subject. 
For the purpose of this chapter public opinion will be defined as "the opinions of 
all members of a def ined universe, such as the electorate, as measured by 
means of standard questions presented to an appropriate sample" 
16 
_ be they 
informed or not. It may comfort those who object to this sort of consensus that 
-6- 
when it actually comes down to policy-making it is in fact the elite, the 
informed public, to whom policy makers attend - and this I feel must include to 
some extent pressure - groups -ý whom many of these critics consider to 
represent the true consensus of public opinion. The relevance of this will be 
discussed at a later stage. 
Once we come to accept the authenticity of the polls as regards the public and 
public opinion, two further details of procedure remain. First, how can we be 
sure that those polled have expressed their true opinion and secondly, we must 
come to grips with the final analysis and reporting of the polls because on both 
counts we encounter valid criticism. 
Validity of findings 
Besides the possibility of interviewer bias acting as af ilter on those who are 
approached for interview (this of course will only occur in the quota sampling 
method) further procedural difficulties arise when we consider the 
questionnaire itself. Although we may derive some comfort from a leading 
pollster's reassurance that "most media-commissioned polls are properly 
designed, well-conducted surveys carried out by reputable research 
companies" 
17 
, there is no doubt that respondents may still be influenced either 
intentionally or through incompetence by leading questions that encourage a 
particular response, or by the order of the questions (previous questions setting 
the order of response for subsequent questions). Besides these possibilities 
there is the whole question of whether the respondent has even understood the 
question - 11. ... it is a basic methodological problem - asking one question but 
getting the answer to another - it is endernic". 
18 In one study of a Gallup survey 
question presented according to a standard format it was found that only 60% 
of the respondents interpreted the question as it was apparently intended. 
19 
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Under normal circumstances this sort of information does not come to light. It 
is only through deeper probing of the respondent that this ambiguity becomes 
evident. To what extent this happens today remains a matter for conjecture 
until further studies are carried out. It is in fact in the polling agencies' 
interests to provide a reliable service to their clients, although Hodder-Williams 
(op. cit. ) suggests that pollsters may indeed falsify a questionnaire or two and 
that polling agencies themselves may search for statistics that will gladden 
their clients' hearts. It may also be all too possible to cast doubt on the 
authenticity of a poll when its findings are contrary to a critic's dogma. This 
may be a slightly unfair criticism, but to give an example, E. Noelle- 
Newmann 20 makes it obvious where her allegiance lies in her paper "The Art of 
Putting Ambivalent Questions", although it cannot be denied some of her 
criticisms are justified. 
Dick Crossman was obviously being ruthlessly honest when he admitted: "I am 
only completely convinced by the findings of the Gallup poll when they confirm 
1,21 my impression of what the public is thinking. 
This leads us to the final aspect of the polling procedure - the final analysis and 
reporting of the results. 
1.4 ANALYSIS AND REPORTING 
Roiser 22 points out that newspaper and television companies who commission 
most polls want simple results from which headlines can easily be written. This 
becomes abundantly obvious when we pause to digest the headlines. Through 
selective emphasis poll results can be entirely distorted. A headline, for 
example, that says 8 out of 10 want to bring back hanging is rather different 
from a headline that says 1180% support the death penalty for terrorist murder" 
-8- 
- although it may not be entirely dishonest, it is certainly misleading. Although 
a more subtle means of manipulating poll findings, it is probably more 
widespread in Britain than the more obvious forms of poll fiddling that have 
occurred elsewhere. 
One particular case that achieved notoriety was reported in Le Canard 
23 
and 
later in The Economist. 24 This involved the French equivalent of Gallup - IFOP 
(Institut Francals d'Opinion Publique) - which, it was reported, admitted to 
doctoring the number who were favourable to government plans to encourage a 
reduction in the number of immigrant workers from 77% to 57% because they 
felt the poll "was not plausible". The whole affair was a miserable catalogue of 
incompetence and an attempt to cover up procedural short-cuts rather than 
deliberate chicanery for the benefit of their client, the French government. 
Press coverage of the event however, which accused the agency of deliberately 
cooking the books, no doubt acted as a salutary warning to pollsters to keep 
their house in order. 
No such totally unethical practice has ever come to light as regards British 
polling agencies - which may be partly due to a code of conduct drawn up by 
pollsters some years ago to which, it would seem, they adhere. 
When all is asked, recorded, analysed and reported it must be always born in 
mind that despite frequent assertion by polling agencies and media headlines: 
"The people have not spoken, their thoughts have merely been sampled". 
25 
1.5 WHAT DO THE POLLS TELL US? 
Once the procedural and analytical difficulties of the polling process are 
appreciated the next question is : 'What exactly do the polls tell us about public 
-9- 
opinion on the defence debateT To answer this question with any degree of 
thoroughness it is essential to see them in some sort of perspective. A single 
poll can be seen as the equivalent of a single frame of a film, it has no 
continuity or context and is entirely static. Public opinion in reality is liquidt 
multi-faceted and may reflect theInfluence of many different pressures both 
explicit and implicit. 
However, when we come to a comparative, longtitudinal study of the polls 
further difficulties are encountered. 
Primarily it, must be appreciated that much of the data is fragmentary; certain 
questions, for example, may have been asked back in 1947 which were no longer 
asked in later years. Other questions may have been put to respondents 
continuously over a number of years, then there may be an hiatus for ten years 
after which the questions may re-occur. These breaks in continuity leave great 
gaps in our knowledge of public opinion that cannot be filled. In yet other cases 
the wording of a question may change over the years until it becomes no longer 
comparable with the original question. There are questions that only occur at a 
certain period because they were only relevant at that time ý- questions on the 
Vietnam War or the Cruise Missile debate. Some questions may be asked only 
at long intervals and then they may occur more frequently for a period, like a 
nervous rash. 
Of course the very questions themselves and when they were asked may provide 
hints as to the state of the political climate at the time. Even changes of 
question on the same subject can suggest nuances of changing policy. Take for 
example the questions relating to the Soviet Union. During the 1930s and 1940s 
questions relating to the Soviet Union were along the lines: "Would you like to 
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see Great Britain and Soviet Russia being more friendly to each other? " (Gallup, 
March 1937), "Would you like to see Great Britain and Russia continuing to work 
together after the war? " (Gallup, January 1942), "Are your feelings towards 
Russia more friendly or less friendly than they were a year ago? " (Gallup, 
September 1945). In April 1948 however the tone changed dramatically and 
Gallup were asking "Do you think government policy towards Russia is too firm, 
not f irm enough, or about right? ", and come February 1968: "Do you think 
Russia does or does not pose a threat to Britain and other European countries in 
the political/economic/scientif ic/military field? " 
The questions themselves may be just as important as the responses. It 
becomes apparent however that questions on particular issues are only asked at 
particular times, i. e. when the subject is deemed to be of sufficient public 
concern, such as: the subject of nuclear weapons during the late 150s/early 160s 
and again during the 1980s. Does the fact that the public was questioned on the 
issue at these times reflect the inconsistency of public concern or does it 
merely focus on a continuing public concern at that specific time? Are we to 
assume that the public were unconcerned during periods when they were not 
being asked about the particular issue? These questions could only 
satisfactorily be answered if the same questions were asked at regular intervals 
irrespective of media focus. 
1.6 SOURCES 
A vast record of British public opinion exists, notably in the form of Gallup 
International opinion polls (1937-1975) and the Gallup political index (1975- 
present date). These, in conjunction with MORI (Market and Opinion Research 
International), Marplan and NOP (National Opinion Polls) provide the-basis for 
the following survey, with additional material coming from occasional polls 
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carried out on behalf of private organisations and other sporadic sources which 
are fully annotated in the text. 
In the past, little effort has been made to draw upon this mass of data save for 
a study carried out for an M. Sc. dissertation by G. Ganley25 and a brief 
summary by D. Capitanchick. 
26 This must in part be due to the difficulties 
already stated and partly to the nature of opinion polls - they tend to be of 
transitory interest, discarded once they have outlived their usefulness in 
highlighting some topical issue or scoring some political point or other. 
If we start with public opinion on government defence spending, we can attempt 
to unravel the tangled threads that the polls provide us'with. But defence 
spending, we soon find, is very much tied up with the perception of threat from 
outside which is illustrated by the "danger of war" polls., If we follow up these 
threads we encounterýthe concept of "deterrence"v the possibilities of surviving 
(nuclear) war and the whole question of disarmament, then more specific issues 
such as Cruise and Trident, which lead us in turn to attitudes towards the US 
and the USSR, until, in the final stages of this study, the public's perception of 
Britain's role in the world. 
1.7 DEFENCE SPENDING 
Opinion on defence spending can be best broken down into four phases: 
Phase 1 1948-1952) 12 polls in 20 year s Phasell 1956-1961) 
Phase 111 1966-1968) 12 polls in 9 years Phase IV 1975-1985) 
The first phase is characterised by majority public opinion in favour of 
increased defence expenditure which reached a peak - 78% in favour of 
increases in August 1950, declining to 47% in September 1952 (cut defence 
- 12- 
spending 36%). Majority public opinion during the second and third phase was 
easily in favour of defence cuts, although the introduction of an "hold at 
present level" option met with a corresponding decrease in both "cut" and 
"Increase" responses. The initial part of the fourth phase (1975-1985) was one, 
in broad terms, during which the public once more supported increased defence 
spending, with the exception of December 1979 when the position was briefly 
reversed. This may have been the result of the agreement in principle between 
the USA and USSR on the SALT treaty, causing a temporary bout of optimism 
about East-West relations. The last three polls of this phase however, are 
marked by a majority in favour of defence cuts. This follows the brief flush of 
chauvinism generated by the Falklands debate -ý in July 1982 support for 
increased defence spending rose to 40% (previous poll July 1980, increases 
equals 24%) but by the following poll carried out in February 1983 the 
electorate was restored to a more sober frame of mind - 14% in favour of 
increased defence spending and 49% in favour of cuts. We can see here how an 
issue such as the Falklands war momentarily influences public opinion. But 
how do we account for the other fluctuations of opinion during this period? 
First, the recent trend towards def ence cuts that was apparent bef ore the 
Falklands crisis must probably be linked with the rise of the anti-nuclear lobby 
in response to the Cruise missile programme and to a lesser degree Trident. 
There can be little doubt that the high percentage of the population against 
Cruise (see page 28) affected attitudes towards defence spending per se and the 
increasing cost of the proposed Trident system was not lost on the public either. 
A measure of saliency can be seen in the "most urgent problem" polls. 
Respondents are asked "What do you think is the most urgent problem facing 
the Government? " or a slight variation of this wording. In November 1980 
"defence" reappeared amongst the list of most urgent problems and remained, 
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although intermittently up to May 1987. Unemployment during this period has 
always been considered by the public to be the most urgent problem (between 
70% and 89% of respondents rated it so). It is significant also that when asked 
about the next most urgent problem "defence" has similarly been included on 
this list reaching as high as 34% of the respondents choice (December 1983). 
This reflects an enhanced public awareness of the nuclear issue that has not 
been apparent since the late 501s/early 601s. However, it is clear that defence 
is not generally considered as an important issue by the majority of the 
population - issues applying more personally to an individual's life always tend 
to dominate. A superficial interpretation of the polls during that first phase 
(1948-1952) could easily lead to the conclusion that the overwhelming support 
for increased defence spending (78% in favour, August 1950) during this phase 
was a direct result of the outbreak of war in Korea because at the same time 
there was also a peak in "much danger of war" responses - 58% in January 1951. 
However, cross-referencing with parallel polls suggests this was not the case. 
Four months after the outbreak of war, in October 1950, only 14% believed the 
f ighting in Korea would lead to a third world war. Polls in June 1950 and 
January 1951 make it clear that it was Russia that was seen as the source of 
this threat. When asked of the 49% who thought there was danger of war 37% 
responded "Russia" in 1950, and 58% in 1951 when the whole sample was asked. 
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FIGURE: 1.1 
*Should a war come do you think it is likely to arise through 
America, or Russia or some other way? 
Russia America Both Other D. K. 
June 1950 76 10 644 
Should a war come do you think it is likely to arise through 
America, Russia, or some other way? 
January 1951 58 21 669 
Gallup 
*Asked of the 49% who thought there was danger of war 
In August 1950 when asked "In your opinion are there any nations which want to 
dominate the world? " 78% responded with "yes" and of these 63% thought 
Russia wanted to do so. Seen in this context, although war in Korea was the 
main focus of international unrest during this period, it was more probably the 
Soviet Union that was seen as the source of threat that encouraged public 
support for increased expenditure on defence. This basic post-war insecurity 
was compounded by the Communist reorganisation that took place in 
Czechoslovakia in February 1948, the blockade of Berlin in April the same year 
and perhaps the Fuchs spy incident of 1950 also. Following August 1950, public 
opinion moved decidedly in favour of defence spending cuts, from 14% in 1950 
in favour of cuts, 36% in September 1952,54% in March 1960, and in March 
1962 57% responded to a poll that asked "Do you think that, the party that gets 
your vote should support or oppose proposals to: - cut down on defence 
expenditure? " with "support". 
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This steady increase in support for cuts in defence spending was accompanied - 
up to 1960 - by a decline in the percentage of respondents believing there to be 
"much threat of war". This seems perfectly logical: 
perception of much danger of war = support for increased defence spending 
not much danger of war = support for cuts in defence spending. 
However, during the Cuban missile crisis when "much danger of war', was above 
40% for the whole of the period between August 1960 and December 1961, 
reaching 53% in April 1961, there was no corresponding support for increased 
defence spending. This is an interesting phenomenon-and tends to belie the 
logic of-our earlier premise. This apparent reversal of public support for 
defence spending during times of crisis can be interpreted in two ways - 
although the ambiguity of interpretation may be part and parcel of the whole 
nuclear deterrent debate which begins to impinge on the defence issues; this we 
shall be investigating next. 
As it is, this phenomenon may be explained in terms of the nature of the crisis 
which-leads the public to perceive "much danger of war". The post-war threat 
perceived by the public may have reflected a general feeling of 
threat/insecurity in which the nation itself felt threatened, whereas the Cuban 
missile crisis of the early 'sixties was one in which -Britain was not 
directly 
involved although there was the potential for a widespread war involving 
Britain. Increased defence spending in the former case is understandable but in 
the latter it would have made no difference to the external situation between 
the USA and USSR, which was not essentially a British defence issue. 
Secondly, this decrease in support for defence spending during these times of 
crisis may indicate a growing lack of confidence in developing defence policy - 
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'the significant development being the reliance on nuclear weapons as a 
deterrent. 
1.8, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 
The extent of optimism for world peace that was engendered by the invention 
of nuclear weapons back in 1945 seems incredible and so naive to cynics of 
today. In August of that year 52% of the respondents asked believed that the 
A-bomb made wars less likely. The atomic bomb was seen as the great saviour 
that would make war obsolete. Optimism was such that it was even suggested 
that every country should abolish its armed forces in favour of an international 
force - and 51% of the represented public agreed. To be'specific it was 
actually the West's possession of the atomic bomb that led to this new 
conf idence. With the Soviet deployment of a nuclear capability, the matter 
was seen in an entirely different light. 35% of the population thought. Soviet 
possession of the bomb made war more likely: 
FIGURE: 1.2 
August 1945 
"Do you think the A-Bomb makes wars more or less likely? " 
more likely less likely no difference don't know 
12 52 21 15 
October 1949 
"Do you think that Russia having the A-Bomb makes wars more or 
less likely? " 
more likely less likely no difference don't know 
35 22 25 18 
Gallup 
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Henceforth the nuclear weapons of both sides had to be included in the 
equation, and it becomes clear that the general public were becoming less 
convinced of their ability to deter war. By April 1954, although a large 
majority (52%) still believed the bomb made war less likely, 26% now believed 
the contrary. In March 1964 respondents were asked: "Sir Alec Douglas-Hume 
says that having the H-bomb rules out any likelihood of world war. Do you 
agree or disagree with this statement? " 35% presumed to disagree. This 
increased uncertainty is further illustrated by the public's increased belief in 
the likelihood of nuclear war. 
In April 1963 59% believed it was not likely that there was ever going to be a 
nuclear war (16% believed it was likely). When this question was next asked 
during the early 'eighties - when public awareness of the nuclear issue was once 
more aroused - there was quite a different picture altogether: 
FIGURE: 1.3 
"Do you think it is likely or not there is ever going to be a nuclear 
war? " 
likely 
April 1963 16 
September 1980 39 
November 1982 38 
February 1983 49 
July 1986 30 
December 1986 44 








July 1986 saw a brief drop in the percentage believing nuclear war was likely, 
but what had happened to the earlier confidence engendered by nuclear weapons 
when the majority thought they made war less likely? From a study of the polls 
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it becomes apparent that the general public are becoming more worried about 
the possibility of nuclear war: 
FIGURE: 1.4 
"How worried are you about the chances of a world-wide war 
breaking out in which A-bombs*/nuclear bombs will be used? " 
very worried fairly not at all don't know 
March 1964* 12 28 52 8 
November 1964* 9 31 55 5 
February 1983 28 33 38 1 
April 1983 25 31 42 2 
May 1983 23 30 46 1 
Gallup 
Again 1986 (December) showed a single alteration to the pattern with 52% 
saying they were not at all worried about the chance of war in which nuclear 
weapons would be used - once again we can see how a particular event can 
influence public opinion in quite a dramatic way - in this case the historic 
meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev at Reykjavik produced a peak in 
optimism. But the increased belief in the likelihood of nuclear war, and the 
growth in anxiety over the chance of this happening does not convert the early 
confidence in these weapons to a rejection of them. A majority of the public 
still believe they are "best for Britain's security". In November 1979-when 
asked "What do you think is best for Britain's security, that we do or do not 
have nuclear weapons here? " - 65% replied that it was best that we doýhave 
nuclear weapons. By February 1983, although 25% now thought it would be best 
for Britain's security if we do not have them, there was still 66% who felt more 
secure with Britain having these weapons. And yet at the same time Britain 
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having nuclear weapons is seen by quite a large percentage of the population to 
increase the risk of nuclear attack on this country: 
FIGURE: 1.5 
Do you think that Britain itself having nuclear weapons increases or 
decreases the risk of nuclear attack on this country? " 
increases decreases no effect don't know 
September 1980 26 37 27 10 
November 1982 31 36 23 10 
February 1983 28 41 24 7 
April 1983 35 41 17 7 
July 1986 33 39 21 6 
December 1986 29 44 20 7 
Gallup 
This apparent paradox accentuates the confusion over the whole question of 
nuclear weapons - do they make us more or less safe? The general public may 
believe it is best for Britain's security if we have them but at the same time 
they bring with them an increased threat of war, a possibility of attack on this 
country and increased anxiety into the bargain. But perhaps we can be more 
specific about these weapons. Is it perhaps the nuclear weapons belonging to 
other countries that the public are worried about? Not just those of the Soviet 
Union (which are the assumed reason why we must have our own) but those of 
the United States as well - and to be more accurate, American weapons on 
British soil. There is no doubt that the great objection to Cruise missiles lies in 
their American origin and power of control. A survey by British Social 
Attitudes in 1984 indicated that the majority of the population with an opinion - 
48% - felt that the siting of American missiles in Britain made it a less safe 
place to live. (Saf er = 38%, the majority 
_ 
of these being Conservative 
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supporters. ) 
Footnote I When asked about our independent nuclear missiles a 
large majority reported feeling safer: 
FIGURE: 1.6 
"Do you think that having our own independent nuclear missiles 
makes Britian a safer or less safe place to live? " 
safer less safe 
60 29 
Gallup 
And yet again this is not without paradox. Although there may have been 
overwhelming public opinion in support of building up a nuclear capability in 
1957 (52% supported this measure) with only 8% preferring conventional 
development, then 
Footnote 2- (this is not to argue that majority support is not 
still behind nuclear weapons). In September 1964 this movement was already 
being felt, 24% agreed with a proposal by Wilson to switch from nuclear 
weapons-spending to building up the navy (46% disagreed). In December 1981 
an NOP poll indicated that 31% were now in favour of spending more on non- 
nuclear forces (38% - maintain present balance; 17% - more on nuclear forces. ) 
And a more recent (May 1983) poll which asked "Would you prefer a defence 
policy that did not rely on nuclear weapons? " registered 62% public support for 
a non-nuclear defence policy. This latter question, however, raises some doubts 
as to whether it was merely suggesting an ideal state of af fairs or a 
commitment to unilateral disarmament , or for that matter, multilateralism. In 
the light of this ambiguity it shows a not surprisingly high percentage in favour. 
This confusion is further compounded by a question asked in May 1984: 
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FIGURE: 1.7 
Would you support or oppose a British defence policy which 
depends on the possible use of nuclear weapons? 
Support Oppose Don't know 
39 50 11 
Fifty per cent say they would oppose such a policy - how many people, we must 
ask, are aware that this is in fact British defence policy? 
1.9 DISARMAMENT 
There is no doubt that the general public, in an ideal world, would rather not 
have nuclear weapons at all. Even though 52% of the population in April 1954 
believed the bomb made war less likely, deep down they would rather live in a 
world where it did not exist. In March 1954 74% of the population thought an 
agreement to ban the bomb was desirable. It was not only the British 
population who were in favour of banning the atom bomb but France, West 
Germany and Italy also: 
FIGURE: 1.8 
Would you approve or disapprove of an East-West agreement prohibiting the 






France W- Germany Italy 










Merrit Puchala (30) 
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It is clear, reflecting on the polls, that people were generally more optimistic 
about disarmament during the 1950's and were thinking in terms of verification 
and inspection and were at least grappling with the means by which total 
disarmament could be achieved. During the 'fifties the type of question being 
asked was: 
Would you approve or disapprove of an East-West agreement 
prohibiting the manufacture of Atomic weapons? 
Do you think that agreement to ban the A-bomb is likely or unlikely 
in the next two years? 
Although at the time there was underlying unease on the question of inspection 
the mood was cautiously optimistic. By 1961 the changing mood is discernible 
in a series of questions in a single poll: 
Mr. Krushchev has said that he will agree to a ban on the testing of 
the H-bomb if that ban is part of a programme for total 
disarmament. Do you think the West should or should not agree to 
negotiate for total disarmament? 
Mr. Krushchev has said that he will agree to a ban on the testing of 
the H-bomb if that is part of a programme for total disarmament. 
Do you think he sincerely wants to totally disarm? 
If we should happen to get into an all-out nuclear war what do you 
think your chances would be of living through it? 
This poignantly illustrates the increasing pessimism about the chances of 
disarmament; the questions change from optimism to doubts about Soviet 
intentions and finally the effects of a nuclear war - assuming almost that the 
negotiations would fail. 
One of the main reasons for this increasing pessimism was the apparent failure 
of negotiations to reach any agreement and lack of faith in them ever reaching 




"Do you think there is likely to be an agreement about atomic 
disarmament wi thin approximately the next five or six years, or do you 
not think so? " 
February 1955 France W. Germany Italy Britain 
likely 31 26 20 31 
not likely 28 42 24 31 
don't know 41 32 56 35 
Merrit Puchala 29 
Majority opinion just did not know, or thought agreement was not likely. One of 
the main reasons why there had been no agreement reached between the Soviet 
Union and US was the American insistence on the necessity for checking by 
international inspectors on each other's soil - and the Soviet opposition to this 
on the grounds that it would lead to spying. Although initial support was easily 
on America's side on this issue it was by no means unequivocal. Polls carried 
out in 1956 and 1961 
30 indicated that both France and Italy were in If avour of 
banning nuclear weapons without inspection being a necessary prerequisite; a 
small majority in West Germany preferred an inspection agreement to precede 
the ban but Britain, more than any other of her European allies, supported the 
American line and was against a ban before an agreement on inspection was 
reached. 
Public loss of faith in the likelihood of negotiations to make positive progress 
towards disarmament is reflected in the formation of the CND. This rejection 
of nuclear weapons by a small but vociforous section of the general public 
introduced the whole question of Britain unilaterally giving up nuclear weapons. 
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The polls acknowledged this new development by introducing unilateralist 
versus multilateralist questions from 1958. 
Events since the General Summit in November 1985 between the US and Soviet 
heads of state have suddenly turned the tide in favour of an arms agreement 
between East and West. In these negotiations the Soviet Union are increasingly 
looking like the more credible party in the eyes of the general public. The 
Soviet moratorium on arms testing that lasted for eighteen months was 
unreciprocated by the US; the British public were unequivocal about how they 
felt the US should respond. 
FIGURE: 1.10 
The Soviet Union has not tested any nuclear weapons ý for 
eighteen months - but has announced that it will resume testing 
unless the US follows suit. Do you agree or disagree that the US 
should agree to stop testing now? 
January 1987 Agree Disagree Don't know 
72 16 12 
Gallup 
And on the question of the remaining medium range nuclear weapons from 
Western Europe which have been the focus of negotiations since Reykjavik, 
again there was agreement at first: 
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FIGURE: 1.11 
Do you agree or disagree that the US and the Soviet Union should 
both remove all their medium range nuclear weapons from 
Europe, without making the conditions or agreements about 
other weapons systems? 
January 1987 
- 
Agree Disagree Don't know 
64 22 15 
Gallup 
1.10 UNILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT? 
Majority public opinion has always been against any unilateralist action by 
Britain towards disarmament. This is not in dispute, but it is the ripples of 
dissent beneath this apparent concord that makes interesting study because 
these represent pressure groups that are more vociferous and perhaps more 
important than the mute percentages catalogued by pollsters. 
Polls concerned with the disarmament issue were carried out between February 
1958 and February 1963 after which the issue ceased to excite public interest 
(or the interest of the pollsters). The proposed introduction of the new Cruise 
missile system and Trident at the beginning of the 'eighties once again brought 
the question of disarmament to the forefront of media attention. 
In February 1958 22% of the population, represented by the polls, approved of 
the suggestion that Britain should give up her atomic weapons as a way of 
persuading other countries to stop making them. - By March 1959 30% said they 
would approve if Britain gave up her hydrogen bombs, even if other countries 
did not do so. (See Table: 1). 
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The most remarkable change has taken place in the last two years 1986 and 
1987-the most recent poll has indicated that 34% of the population agree that 
Britain should get rid of its nuclear weapons whatever other countries do. This 
marks the new surge in attitudes resulting from the ongoing negotiations to 
remove nuclear weapons in Europe. 
TABLE: I 
Would you approve if Britain gave up her hydrogen bombs, even if 
other countries did not do so? 
give up not give up don't know 
February 1958 22 58 20 
April 1958 25 61 14 
September 1958 30 47 13 
March 1959 30 50 20 
May 1960 33 51 16 
October 1961 21 62 17 
December 1961 31 55 14 
May/June 1962 22 64 14 
January/February 1963 29 54 17 
September 1980 21 67 12 
November 1982 29 61 10 
February 1983 2807) 65(78) 6(6) 
April 1983 27 66 7 
May 1983 20(16) 73(77) 10(6) 
November 1983 23 67 10 
December 1986 29 63 6 
January 1987 34 55 11 
Figures in brackets indicate comparable NOR polls 
Gallup 
Throughout the early sixties support for unilateral disarmament fluctuated 
between 21% (October 1961) and 31%, ending, in the last poll of 
January/February 1963 at 29%. The nature of those supporting the "not give 
up" anti-unilateralist stand can be better understood in the light of a parallel 
poll. We find that the support for not giving up our own weapons is due not so 
much to a deep commitment to NATO and the US Alliance as to the long- 
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standing commitment by the public to an independent nuclear force. When 
asked about the nuclear weapons policy Britain should follow and given the 
options "Continue to make our own", "Give up nuclear weapons entirely", "Pool 
all nuclear weapons with other NATO countries and rely mainly on American 
production" or "Don't know", a slight majority, with few exceptions, has always 
favoured the independent line (See Table: 2). 
TABLE: 2 
"What policy should Britain follow about nuclear weapons? " 
make our pool Nato 
own give up rely - US don't know 
April 1960 31 26 19 24 
May 1960 24 33 27 16 
July 1960 28 27 34 11 
September 1960 36 31 21 12 
October 1960 37 21 32 10 
April 1961 36 19 26 19 
June 1961 35 20 30 15 
September 1962 37 23 25 15 
Gallup 
When the question of an European nuclear force was suggested as an option, as 
opposed to relying on the US (no NATO option this time), "Continue to make our 
own" was easily the most popular choice, although the suggested European force 
was in itself considered preferable to a dependence on the US: 
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FIGURE: 1.12 
"What policy should Britain follow about nuclear weapons? " 
December May 
1962 1963 
continue to make our own 33 39 
set up European nuclear force 16 15 
rely on the US 8 12 
give up nuclear weapons 25 23 
don't know 18 11 
Gallup 
Giving up Britain's nuclear weapons was considered by up to a quarter of the 
respondents to be preferable to either the US or the European option. That a 
suggested dependence on the US, for our nuclear weaponry, was anathema to 
the British public is further illustrated by a question asked in June 1967: "A 
prominent American official has said in this country that we should give up our 
Atom bomb and rely on the USA for our defence. Would you approve or 
disapprove if we gave up our Atom bomb? " A resounding 69% disapproved of 
this suggestion. 
Despite the belief in some sort of "special relationship" with the US, the British 
public were unwilling to become totally dependent on America for nuclear 
defence. At the governmental level the rationale for this was expressed by 
Macmillan in 1955: 
Politically it surrenders our power to influence American policy and 
then, strategically and tactically it equally deprives us of any 
influence over the selection of targets and the use of our vital 
striking forces. The one therefore weakens our prestige and our 
influence in the world and the other might imperil our safety. 31 
At a more mundane level the general public saw the nature of this special 
relationship already as very unequal: 
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FIGURE: 1.13 
"Do you think Britain is treated as an equal partner by the US in 
affairs that concern them both, or don't you think so? " 
equal not don't 
partners equal know 
December 1962 22 59 19 
Gallup 
In the same year 65% believed it was true or at least partly true that Britain's 
foreign policy depended too much on the US. 
In a world where other countries possessed nuclear weapons Britain was not to 
be left out, or left in a position of poor relation to the United States. The high 
level of resistance to unilateral disarmament reflects these attitudes and 
indicates the public's commitment to the notion of an independent deterrent, 
which: 
had become something of a fixation - both among policy-makers and 
the mass public. It can be seen as a status symbol in a world 
situation where Britain's status was declining. 32 
1.11 SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP 
This question of a "special relationship" between the US and Britain needs to be 
looked at more closely; an implicit belief in such a relationship may help 
explain some contradictions that exist in public opinion on the question of 
defence policy. 
But what precisely is the nature of this perceived special relationship? It is 
clear that the British people have always considered themselves closer to the 
USA than their fellow Europeans. This is quite likely a deep-seated attitude 
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relating to Britain's shared ethnic and cultural ancestry with the US. But does 
this really have much relevance today? In real terms it may not, but as far as 
the British public is concerned it may form the basis of deep-seated opinions 
upon which perceived Anglo-US relations are based. And yet a study of the 
polls suggests a curious contradiction. The USA has always featured top of the 
popularity polls as far as "Britain's best friend" is concerned: 
FIGURE: 1.14 
"Which country do you regard as Britain's best friend? " 
Don't 
USA FRG Australia Canada France Other Know 
November 1956* 42 NA NA NA 23 is 17 
December 1967 45 3 14 61 12 23 
March 1984 36 95416 37 
question prefixed "Apart from the Commonwealth countries... " 
Gallup 
When specifically asked about this close relationship a high percentage of 
respondents - 47% - thought Britain did have a close relationship with America, 
although it must be noted that 44% thought the relationship was much the same 
as that with other leading European countries. 
Despite this feeling of great fraternity with the US, at the same time there has 
been a long-standing belief that Britain is not treated as an equal partner in this 
relationship. In November 1962 60% thought that Britain was not treated as an 
equal partner by the US in affairs that concerned them both. In 
January/February of the following year this figure was 70%. In January 1964 
59% perceived this inequality, and at the same time "don't know" rose to 20%. 
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By April 1984 77% of the public thought Britain was an unequal partner in this 
relationship. A majority, according to these polls, have always perceived the 
inequality of Britain's partnership with the US but this majority is increasing. 
Similarly a majority of those polled hold the belief that Britain's foreign policy 
is also unduly influenced by the US. In April 1954 56% agreed that "we are 
giving too much to the United States in our foreign policy". And more recently 
a similar response was elicited: 
FIGURE: 1.15 
"It is sometimes said that the foreign policy of Britain depends 
too much on the US. Do you think this is true or untrue? " 
partly don't 
true true untrue know 
April 1974 35 10 30 25 
April 1982 55 6 29 11 
June 1984 58 15 19 8 
Gallup 
Is the British public satisfied with this situation or is it considered too high a 
price to pay for a special relationship with the US? Just because the public 
perceives America dominating this relationship, that doesn't mean to say it 
disapproves. Although when the public were asked what advantages they could 
see in a suggested economic and political union with the United States in 
December 1960,49% could think of none, whereas 29% felt that "playing second 
fiddle to America" or "America would dominate", would be the main 
disadvantage. In the same poll 81% thought Britain should aim for greater 
independence from America. In more recent polls a greater increase is shown 




Do you think Britain should work more closely or less closely 
with the US in its political and military policies? 
more less no don't 
closely closely change know 
May 1965 31 31 20 18 
April 1984 34 43 16 7 
Gallup 
It would appear that the general public still hold dear the idea of a close special 
relationship with the US and are more inclined to look across the Atlantic than 
the North Sea when it comes to international friendship, but they are not happy 
to give up their independence as a nation for the sake of it. The general 
attitude and movement of opinion can be summed-up in the following polls: 
FIGURE: 1.17 
"Which of these statements do you agree with most on relations between 




We are natural allies and 
should stick together 22 
We should act together on most 
things but Britain should 
remain independent 29 
We can act together where our 
policy is the same but other- 
wise Britain should remain 
independent. 23 
Our relationship should be on 
the same footing as with other 
countries 21 
, Don't know 5 
March Dec Dec April 
1952 1960 1962 1984 
23 24 20 - 18 
53 29 27 35 
NA 29 20 30 
15 12 9 13 
9 6 24 4 
Gallup 
"Acting together on most things while retaining independence" has always 
received greatest support. British independence is paramount and agreement 
with the US is only permissible in the public's eyes if this independence is not 
jeopardised. All in all, however, the polls indicate increasing dissatisfaction 
with the nature of this "special relationship" with the US. Does it seem as 
though British independence is being questioned? Or is it possible that British 
public opinion regarding policy matters is divergent from that of the US? A 
single poll is certainly no proof of a general trend, but a question asked in 
March 1984 suggests that it may be the nature of US foreign policy that is the 
cause of the divergence: 
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FIGURE: 1.18 
"Some people say that the US is antagonising allies by her 
foreign policy. Others don't agree. Do you think that the US 
foreign policy is or is not losing her friendship among Western 
countries? " 
is is not don't know 
October 1959 48 22 30 
May 1984 66 18 16 
Gallup 
This poll shows a 22% increase in the percentage of respondents believing that 
US policy is antagonising important allies compared with when the question was 
last asked in 1958. Although it is clear that these opinions did not affect 
overall attitudes towards the US in the 1950's (in 1956 42% saw America as 
Britain's best friend) - it may be a wider and deeper disaffection that is being 
felt at present and one that can also be related to levels of confidence in the 
US to deal wisely with world problems. 
1.12 CONFIDENCE IN U. S. 
A standard question determining degrees of confidence in US ability to deal 
wisely with world problems has been asked regularly since October 1970. These 
catalogue substantial shifts in confidence over the years, reaching a low level 
of confidence during the eighties. (See Table 3. ) 
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TABLE: 3 
"How much confidence do you have in the ability of the United States 
to deal wisely with present world problems? " 
very consid- little very none don't 
great erable little know 
October 1970 7 22(29) 28 26 (54) 17 
March 1972 5 22(27) 22 21 12(65) 18 
May 1972 6 24(30) 24 22 9(55) 15 
June 1972 8 24(32) 25 24 10(59) 9 
January 1973 4 22(26) 27 23 9(59) 15 
February 1973 5 27(32) 27 16 12(55) 12 
May 1973 6 22(28) 23 21 13(57) 15 
August 1973 3 23(26) 23 24 11(58) 15 
1973 4 25(29) 26 24 9(59) 12 
April 1974 6 30(36) 26 20 6(52) 12 
June 1974 9 28(37) 22 23 9(54) 10 
July 1974 7 29(36) 23 23 9(55) 9 
August 1974 7 24(31) 24 22 13(59), 10 
September 1974 8 31(39) 22 15 9(46) 15 
November 1974 5 20(25) 26 23 11(60) 15 
February 1975 4 22(26) 25 25 10(60) 15 
April 1975 5 22(27) 26 24 10(60) 13 
May 1975 8 33(41) 26 17 7(50) 9 
July 1975 5 26(31) 28 19 8(55) 13 
December 1975 4 23(27) 23 22 10(55) 19 
December 1976 4 29(33) 27 19 7(53) 12 
June 1977 13 41(54) 20 13 5(38) 8 
September 1977 6 36(42) 23 17 8(48) 11 
January 1978 5 28(33) 22 20 9(51) 15 
October 1978 8 31(39) 24 19 7(50) 11 
January 1979 5 29(34) 26 19 8(53) 14 
June 1979 7 24(31) 22 26 14(52) 7 
July 1979 5 19(24) 26 28 10(64) 12 
October 1979 4 18(22) 24 27 '12(63) 16 
January 1980 9 31(40) 25 22 5(52) 8 
May 1980 6 28(34) 27 24 9(60) 6 
November 1980 4 15(19) 26 27 12(65) 7 
March 1981 8 25(33) 23 23 12(58) 8 
August 1981 6 25(31) 24 26 11(61) 8 
March 1982 4 17(21) 27 29 18(74) 6 
June 1982 6 26(32) 27 25 13(65) 4 
November 1982 3 22(25) 31 25 13(69) 7 
February 1983 3 21(24) 29 29 12(70) 6 
June 1983 5 18(23) 27 27 16(70) 7 
August 1983 3 20(23) 23 27 19(69) 8 
November 1983 4 1509) 22 31(52) 26(79) 7 
December 1983 5 21(26) 27 26(53) 18(71) 3 
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very consid- little very none don't 
great erable little know 
February 1984 5 22(27) 20 27(47) 23(70) 5 
April 1984 0 16(16) 26 32(56) 16(74) 7 
June 1984 4 18(22) 26 29 18(69) 6 
April 1985 3 17(20) 26 31 16(73) 7 
October 1985 6 22(28) 27 23 15(65) 7 
March 1986 5 25(30) 26 27, 12(65) 5 
March/ 
April 19761 4 17(21) 25 28 19(72) 7 
15116 April 8 21(29) 23 27 27(77) 15 
17/21 April 6 21(27) 21 29 29(69) 4 
24/28 April 8 21(29) 22 27 18(67) 4 
June 4 16(20) 26 31 18(75) 6 
October 6 22(26) 28 26 14(68) 4 
Figures in brackets are summations of the preceding relevant columns. 
April 1984 witnessed "little"/"very little" and "none" at 74% of the 
electorate. 
Footnote 3 These low levels of confidence in the US to deal with 
world problems characterises the whole era since Carter became President in 
1977. His inauguration was accompanied by a rise in confidence - 52% expressed 
very great/considerable confidence but was followed by ever-decreasing levels of 
confidence. The Reagan era has witnessed more increasing uncertainties in the 
British public as regards the US administration's ability to deal with the many 
problems facing the world. Those saying they have no confidence at all have 
steadily increased during Reagan's years in power. Shortly after Reagan's 
inauguration a poll indicated that the British electorate, from the very 
beginning, did not view his election with much relish, compared with a similar 
poll when Carter was elected: 
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FIGURE: 1.19 
"As you may know, Ronald Reagan (Jimmy Carter) has been elected 
President of the United States. Do you think this will be a good thing 
or a bad thing for: 
November 1980/1976 
Good Bad Don't know 
Reagan Carter Reagan Carter Reagan Carter 
1. America? 30 42 40 19 31 39 
2. America's relationship 46 44 22 16 32 39 
3. America's standing 32 40 35 18 34 42 
Gallup 
Compared with other European countries the British public, according to a 1982 
poll, has the least confidence (60% at "not very much"I"none at all") in the US 
after Switzerland (at 63%). Britain actually expressed greatest "no confidence 
at all" - 21% compared with other countries: 
FIGURE: 1.20 
"In general, how much confidence do you have in the US to deal wisely 
with world problems? " 
March 1982 GB France Germany Belgium Switzerland Denmark 
a great deal 6 4 16 7 4 5 
a fair amount 29 36 41 38 29 33 
not very much 39 35 33 20 51 30 
none at all 21 12 7 10 12 18 
don't know 5 13 2 25 4 14 
Gallup 
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1.13 CRUISE AND TRIDENT 
The Cruise missile issue (and to a lesser extent Trident) has attracted an 
unparalleled number of opinion polls over a very short period of time - in 1983 
alone twelve opinion polls asked questions on the subject. It was not really until 
Greenham Common and Molesworth Air Force bases had been announced as 
future Cruise missile sites that the whole issue hit the headlines, and the 
women's peace camp (more recently events at Molesworth too) has ensured 
extraordinary media and public attention. When Gallup first asked respondents 
if they had heard about the Cruise missile, 59% replied that they had and all but 
18% were able to give reasons why it was special - compared with other 
weapons. At the same time, September 1980, Marplan asked their respondents 
if they thought the British government was right or wrong to allow American 
nuclear-armed Cruise missiles to be based in this country. 49% thought they 
were right and 43% that they were wrong, this was almost the only time that a 
small majority favoured these weapons. From then on majority opinion - with 
the exception of two polls in June 1983 and September 1983 - has been against 
the stationing of these weapons. What are the reasons for the public rejecting 
or even accepting these weapons? We can only guess this from looking at 
parallel polls, because no polls actually ask who is for or against and follow up 
the reasons with deeper questioning. A poll, carried out on behalf of the 
television programme "Panorama" in September 1980 asked "In your opinion will 
Cruise missiles, based in Britain, make it more or less likely that we will be 
attacked in a future nuclear war? " 54% believed they would make attack more 
likely. It 
lis not nuclear weapons per se 
that make the public f eel more 
vulnerable -a poll commissioned at the same time by New Society and carried 
out by Gallup, posed the following question and came up with these results: 
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FIGURE: 1.21 
"Do you think the f act that Britain itself has nuclear weapons, 
increases or decreases the risk of nuclear attack on this country? 
increases decreases, no effect don't know 
September 1980 26 37 27 10 
Gallup 
The answer as to why the general public find Cruise specifically threatening 
may be not so much in their new strategic capacity but in the question of 
control over the launching of these weapons. In February 1983 an 
overwhelming 89% said they would prefer the key to fire the missiles to be 
held jointly by the USA and Britain, as opposed to the _USA 
alone. 
33 if it 
were held jointly, a follow-up question found that a further 37% would be 
more likely to accept the Cruise missiles. But even if the dual-key 
arrangement had been a deciding factoý the British public did not trust their 
powerful ally to honour this arrangement: 
FIGURE: 1.22 
"Would you trust or not trust the American government to ask 
the British government before launching American nuclear 
weapons from British soil? " 
would trust would not don't know 
April 1984 26 65 9 
May 1984 26 66 9 
Gallup 
Earlier I acknowledged that majority British public opinion has always been in 
favour of an independent nuclear deterrent. There can be little doubt that the 
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question over the control of these weapons raises fears for this continued 
independence. If they were indeed British weapons under complete British 
control it could well be a very different matter. It is this question of 
independence that perhaps helps to explain comparable lack of coverage of the 
new Trident missile system that is being built. It has neither been so well 
publicised nor has there been such a public outcry against Trident. Despite this 
the five polls between September 1980 and January 1983 showed a majority 
opposed to Trident. But from this last date up to September 1983 public opinion 
has switched to support for Trident - in all three polls pro-Trident opinion was 
between 4% and 7% more than the percentage opposing Trident: 
FIGURE: 1.23 
The British Government intends to acquire an American Trident 
nuclear weapons system. Do you approve or disapprove of this? * 
pro- anti- don't 
Trident Trident know 
September 1980 44 47 9 
November 1980 37 53 10 
April 1981 32 53 15 
October 1982 32 56 12 
January 1983 25 56 19 
May 1983 44 40 16 (NOP) 
June 1983 37 31 32 
September 1983 47 40 13 (NOP) 
*Question formation varied 
Gallup 
Up to January 1983 opinion towards Trident paralleled public opinion towards 
Cruise missiles, but whereas Cruise opposition picked up again in September 
1983 no similar increase in Trident opposition was evident. 
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Although public opinion may be opposed to the siting of American Cruise 
missiles on British soil this does not mean to say that they are against the 
presence of American bases in Britain, but, as with Cruise, they are more 
favourably disposed towards them if the missiles based here are under British 
control. In December 1957 when the question of American bases for atomic 
bombs was first raised, 55% of the population were opposed to the idea. If it 
was a question of these sites being under American control opposition was 63% 
against US bases, but if they were under British control 41% approved of them. 
When the Cruise missile issue was first raised in 1982 public objection to these 
American missiles was also expressed towards US bases as a whole, 46% said 
Britain should allow existing US bases to remain here, 44% that we should not. 
But since then the general public have seen Cruise missile bases and US bases 
per se as separate issues - whilst opposing the former there has been general 
tolerance towards the latter. Although by April 1984 polls indicated that 
opinions may have been moving towards a less favourable stance towards US 
bases as a whole: 
FIGURE: 1.24 
"Do you think Britain should/should not allow existing American nuclear 
bases in Britain to remain here? " 
should should not don't know 
October 1982 46 44 10 
February 1983 55 36 9 
May 1983 57 33 10 (MORI) 
June 1983 50 39 10 (NOP) 
November 1983 58 34 8 
April 1984 49 43 8 
Gallup 
Ambiguity in public opinion, as expressed by the polls, must partly be due to the 
nature of the polls which ask isolated questions on an issue like Cruise but fail 
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to probe the wider ramifications of that issue. Comparing polls asked at 
different times accentuates this ambiguity. To illustrate this we may note that 
in September 1980 respondents for a Panorama poll were asked "In your opinion 
will Cruise missiles, based in Britain, make it more or less likely that we 
will be attacked in a future war? " 54% answered "more likely", 36% "less 
likely". Considering this and the fact that majority opinion is against 
Cruise, the following question, asked in November 1981, makes public 
opinion on the matter very ambiguous: 
FIGURE: 1.25 
In your opinion, which represents the greater threat to the 
security of Britain? " 
The presence of Soviet missiles in 
Eastern Europe 43% 
The proposed installation of 
American missiles in Western Europe 29% 
Don't know 28% 
Gallup 
The spectre of the Soviet Union appears to have had an effect, and US 
weapons were almost welcomed in this poll when compared to the threat 
of Soviet weaponry. 
1.14 ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION 
Up to the end of the Second World War attitudes towards the Soviet Union 
were very friendly. In March 1939 a Gallup poll showed that 84% of the 
public said they would like to see Britain and Soviet Russia being more 
friendly towards each other. A year before the end of the war optimism 
was still quite high regarding the possibility of co-operation after the war, 
51% thought that Great Britain, Russia and the US would work together 
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after the war, 23% replied this was not possible. The comparatively high 
percentage of "don't know" - (26%) indicated a fair element of 
uncertainty. This circumspection was explained in a poll two years later, 
September 1946, in which 61% said that the friendship between the US, Britain 
and Russia that had existed during the war had disappeared. The main reasons 
for this, respondents believed, were mistrust, Russian unwillingness to co- 
operate, and the fact that the nations involved had very little in common. 
Attitudes towards the Soviet Union were changing, the spirit of friendship and 
co-operation was fading fast. Soviet foreign policy was seen to be not so much 
orientated towards its own security but "Imperialist expansion/aggression". 
This can be seen in early polls such as: 
FIGURE: 1: 26 
"Some people say that Russian foreign policy is concerned with making 
certain of their own security, others say it is imperialist 
expansion/aggression. "* 
security aggression don't know 
April 1946 42 26 32 
January 1951* 21 50 29 
May 1952* 22 48 30 
Gallup 
Public opinion towards the Soviet Union throughout the 1950's can be expressed 
as "hopeful but suspicious". During the 1960's public opinion was optimistic 
about reaching "a peaceful settlement with Russia"; December 1961 and 1962 
showed 57% believing in this possibility, in April 1965 62% were of this opinion. 
And majority opinion believed that it was possible for Britain and the Soviet 
Union to 11co-operate closely". By October 1963 67% of respondents thought 
they could. 
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Despite overwhelming public support for top-level talks with the Soviet Union 
during the 1960's optimism for a successful outcome of these talks began to 
wane, and during the 1970's and into the 1980's the public were expressing 
growing suspicion towards the Soviet Union's friendly advances. 
Perhaps this growing suspicion in British attitudes towards Soviet intentions was 
because they felt too distant from the Soviets to understand and evaluate the 
nature of their friendly advances. In January 1964 an overwhelming 76% were 
in favour of seeking a closer relationship with Russia and between 1977 and 
1981 there has been a gradual increase in the percentage of the public believing 
that Britain's relationship with Russia is "not close enough": 
FIGURE: 1-. 27 
"Do you think Britain's relationship with Russia is - 
too not close about don't 
close enough right know 
March 1967 8 37 41 14 
June 1977 13 25 40 22 
July 1978 15 26 41 19 
January 1979 12 27 43 18 
July 1979 9 34 45 13 
1981 14 34 38 13 
Gallup 
The highest percentage of "not close enough" occured in March 1967, following 
the visit of the Soviet Prime Minister, Mr. Kosygin, to London and the 
establishment of a "hot-line" between the Kremlin and 10 Downing Street. The 
effect of this fleeting contact between the two countries soon subsided. By 
June the following year polls indicated a 12% decrease in this response to the 
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question. Percentages rose slightly between 1977 and 1981, suggesting a 
general trend towards support for closer relations. 
The polls that we have just surveyed suggest that the British public favours 
contact and negotiations with the Soviet Union but displays growing suspicion 
about Soviet intentions. Even if respondents had been asked why they felt 
suspicious we cannot be sure they would have been able to articulate the reason 
for this suspicion. In the absence of such probing, we are even less sure about 
the nature of this suspicion, although it may be linked to the information they 
are given about the Soviets' arms build-up and their supposed superiority in the 
field of nuclear weaponry. 
1.1 r, WARSAW PACT VS NATO 
Polls over the last few years suggest that a growing anxiety has developed in 
public opinion about the threat from the Soviet Union in the political, scientific 
and military fields. Respondents were asked "Do you think that Russia does or 
does not pose a threat to Britain and other European countries in the: political, 
economic, scientific, military field? " The percentage perceiving a threat in the 
political field has risen over this period from 40% in February 1968 to 73% in 
January 1980. The percentage perceiving a threat in the economic and 
scientific fields has also risen but greatest of all has been the perceived rise in 
the military threat from 49% in 1968 to 85% by January 1980. These anxieties 
extend to the public's perception of the Warsaw Pact's superiority, in both the 




"Which side - NATO or Russia and the Warsaw Pact - has the strongest 
military force? " 
November January February December 
1979 1980 1983 1986 
NATO 12 13 17 
Warsaw Pact 64 59 55 
both equal 3 6 7 
don't know 21 22 20 
"And which side is strongest in nuclear weapons - NATO or Russia and 
the Warsaw Pact? " 
NATO 15 15 15 23 
Warsaw Pact 54 50 54 42 
both equal 6 8 9 10 
don't know 25 26 21 25 
Gallup 
We are left with the impression that the British public are willing to have their 
government develop closer ties with the Soviet Union, but at the same time 
they are anxious about what they perceive as an increasing military threat from 
Russia and the Warsaw Pact. It must be pointed out however that when 
respondents were questioned on the matter in January 1980,35% believed that 
the US posed a military threat to Britain and Europe. This is a high percentage 
bearing in mind the public's perception of a special relationship with the US and 
the close military ties that the two countries have had since the 1950's. The 
Soviet Union were considered a military threat by 85%. But military threat 
aside, when respondents were asked who do they see as the greatest threat, 
most likely to start a nuclear attack in Europe, the Americans came off rather 
less favourably in recent polls, compared with 1951 when a poll stated: 
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FIGURE: 1.29 
Should a war come do you think it is likely to arise through 
America, Russia or some other way? 
Russia America Both Other Dont know 
58 21 669 
Gallup 
In 1985 the response was rather dif f erent: 
FIGURE: 1.30 
Which superpower do you believe poses the greater threat to peace in 
Europe - The United States or the Soviet Union? 
Soviet Both Don't 
U. S. Union Equally know 
October/November 1985 32 33 28 7 
Gallup 
But the situation was to get even worse. In 1986 the US were seen to be a 
greater threat to world peace!: 
FIGURE: 1.31 
In your view what country is the greater threat to world peace, America or 
Russia? 
Both Don't 
America Russia Equally Neither know 
November 1986 37 33 22 44 
Gallup 
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And on the question of starting a nuclear attack in Europe, similarly the U. S. 
are increasingly being seen as the more threating: 
FIGURE: 1.32 
Which is more likely to start a nuclear attack in Europe, the 
U. S. or Russia? 
America Russia Don't know 
January 1983 28 




This may be symptomatic of the public's changing concept of Britain's role in 
the World and reappraisal of longstanding alignment with the US. We have seen 
that there is growing doubt about America's ability to deal wisely with world 
problems and more recently their apparent dragging of feet in response to 
Sovietlest bans and arms proposals. This is coupled with the general feeling 
that rather than try to be a leading world power, Britain should become more 
like Sweden and Switzerland. 
FIGURE: 1.33 
"Which do you consider to be of the most importance: the British to 
be on good terms with the Americans, to be on good terms with the 
Russians, or to be neutral between both sides? " 
Americans Russians neutral Don't know 
I November 1961 34 10 48 8 




In this chapter ý 1, have considered many dif f erent aspects of public opinion related 
to foreign policy and the defence debate. But this plethora of information actually 
tells us very little about the public psyche. It is as if parts of dif f erent films have 
been spliced together - we can make sense of sections but as a whole we are left 
bewildered and confused by the contradictions and juxtapositions of these 
fragments. One factor however tends to recur, that is the apparent role of the 
Soviet Union in influencing public opinion. Despite isolated events such as the war 
in Vietnam, the Cuban missile crisis and the Falklands conflict, the polls suggest 
that the underlying fear that generates public support for nuclear weapons and 
entirely dominates the defence issue is directed at the Soviet Union. It is assumed 
by pollsters that the public perceives the Soviets as a threat and questions are 
orientated in this direction. But developments since Reykjavik have shown the 
Soviet Union in a better light and Reagan has been cast more in the role of a 
prevaricator slow to respond to the wide-ranging Gorbachchev proposals and intent 
on continuing the arms race into space with his 'Star Wars' project; the recent 
polls which suggest people believe the US is the greater threat to world peace are a 
strong indicator of how public opinion may be changing. Part of the problem with 
opinion polls is that they only indicate the most superficial of public opinions -and 
as we have seen these can fluctuate with surprising rapidity, swayed one minute by 
the visit of a Soviet official and at another by an event such as the K. A. L. airline 
tragedy. They do not even attempt to delve beneath the surface to find the 
underlying attitudes on which longer-term opinions are anchored. They are not 
necessarily intended to give us a cohesive picture of the public's opinions over time 
and can be compared more to short cartoon strips than a full length film, where 
characters become caricatures - exaggerated and distorted for the sake of 
simplicity. 
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But it becomes clear from this material that both long and short-wave patterns of 
opinion change are discernible. The short-wave fluctuations are a surface feature 
of the longer waves of opinion change and may be precipitated by such things as 
external events. The longer-term patterns of change reflect basic attitudes and 
change slowly over a much longer period of time. This long-wave pattern of 
change can be seen in the overall movement away from complete faith (bordering 
on the messianic) in nuclear weapons in 1956 to a more critical approach in the 
1980's. A short- wave example is the sudden2 but short-lived, surge of support for 
increased defence spending during the Falklands campaign. 
More critical attitudes towards the US and a readiness to believe that Soviet arms 
proposals are genuine seem to be part of a growing trend rather than an isolated 
abberation, fuelled by public anxiety for national security together with a desire 
to reduce the fear associated with the threat of nuclear war. 
Although future research will be concerned with deeper probing of opinions, 
examining the relationship between deeper-lying attitudes and the fluctuation of 
opinion for example, does the deadweight of opinions eventually bring about a shift 
in underlying attitudes or must a change in basic attitudes precede longer-term 
changes in public opinion. The following chapter is an intermediate stage in 
which we examine how far existing research has progressed towards explaining 
opinion change. 
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We have now considered many of the pros and cons involved in eliciting the 
public's opinion; we have looked at the nature of this opinion over the last forty 
years or so and observed that it is not static but subject to both large 'and 
small-scale fluctuations. The objective of this second chapter is to look at a 
number of hypotheses that attempt to explain such metamorphoses of opinion, 
the factors which influence the large-scale movements of public opinion from 
one position to another over a period of years, and of equal importance, what 
causes the individuals that make up this composite to change their minds - or 
hold a particular opinion in the first place. Much of the research to be 
reviewed originated in the United States, since practically no research in this 
area has been carried out in Britain. However, this does not necessarily 
invalidate the relevance of these hypotheses. 
We shall first consider a number of theories on opinion change, then we shall 
look at some models for the formation of opinion, touching upon the 
psychological aspects and mechanisms that are allegedly involved. 
There are a number of theories that attempt to explain the large-scale changes 
in public opinion that occur over a number of years. Foremost amongst these 
are those that attribute changes to the transition of generations. Others more 
specifically see changes relating to political periods or as much wider 
fluctuations that occur in cyclical periods as an inherent process of any 
functioning system. None of these theories are mutually exclusive but rather 
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focus on different aspects of the same phenomena, and most agree that the net 
effect will be alternating periods of social change, for example, 
internationalism and isolationism or introversion'andextrovers ion. 
2.2 POLITICAL GENERATIONS 
The analysis of belief systems in terms of political generations has provided a 
useful framework for analysis since the 1930's when Mannheim, Herberle and 
Newmann first brought it to the forefront of researchers' attention. They 
suggested that the prevailing political climate at the time of an individual's 
political socialization has a lasting influence on his/her subsequent values and 
actions. 
One of the most interesting applications of this type of analysis was carried out 
in the early 'seventies by V. Jeffries 
1 
on a sample of American adults. The 
fact that Jeffries used this perspective to analyse attitudes towards the use of 
nuclear weapons in war makes this study of particular interest to us (other 
papers under review refer more broadly to war generally, foreign policy 
attitudes as a whole or military spending in particular). Jeffries defines three 
particular generations: 
DISSENT - born between 1943 - 1949 
2. COLD WAR -born between 1927 - 1942 
3. WORLD WAR 11 - born before 1927. 
He defines a political generation as individuals of approximately the same age 
who have experienced the same "politically' relevant" events. From these 
eventsp Jeffries maintains, certain political attitudes and world views are 
developed which are particular to that generation. Experiences during the 
formative years when political consciousness is developing (generally considered 
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to be between puberty and age 30) are central in the development of social and 
political attitudes, providing a frame of reference within which later events are 
interpreted. Each political generation, in Jeffries' analysis, is based on the 
general climates of opinion, major social issues and historical events pertaining 
to war. 
Jeffries' research supported his original hypothesis that the "dissent" generation 
would reject the use of nuclear weapons to a greater extent than the other 
generations - due to the climate of dissent and social protest prevalent during 
the 'sixties when this generation was reaching political maturity. This was a 
time of anti-war protests aimed at the unpopular war in Vietnam and it was a 
generation that had grown up with the prospect of nuclear war as a possibility. 
The World War 11 generation, on the other hand, had developed attitudes 
towards war before nuclear weapons appeared on the scene, before the prospect 
of mass annihilation had become a possibility. They had experienced the 
Second World War as adults, their attitude towards war "was one of total 
dedication to victory and bringing the war to as speedy a conclusion as 
possible". This generation proved in Jeffries' research to be the most 
accepting of nuclear war. The third group, the "Cold War" generation, as 
predicted, proved to lie between the "dissent" and "World War 11" generations in 
their attitude towards nuclear weapons. Respondents in this group were aged 
between 28 and 43 at the time of the study., They had, for the most part, grown 
up during a period of extreme tension between the U. S. and the Soviet Union 
after 1945. They were loyal to their country and vigilant against communism 
and they found nuclear weapons more acceptable than did those of the "dissent" 
generation, but to a lesser degree than did those who were politicized during 
the Second World War. It must be noted that this data was drawn from a small, 
sample (477) in a predominantly white area of Los Angeles and may not as a 
-57- 
result be representative of the U. S. as a whole. 
Footnote I However, an 
additional perspective was added to these findings. Union status and other 
variables were introduced into the analysis. Blue-collar workers, it was 
discovered, were more accepting of nuclear weapons than white-collar workers 
in all three generational groups but above all in the "dissent" generation. 
Within all groups 'fear of communism' and 'patriotism' produced changes in the 
levels of acceptance or rejection of nuclear war. The results of these 
additional variables underline the necessity of taking other groups with which 
individuals are associated - in addition to their generational group - into 
account. These and other perspectives are discussed below. 
A further complication to the generational analysis is introduced when we 
consider the relationship between attitudes changing as a result of generational 
experience and as a result of the ageing process. Jeffries acknowledges this 
problem in his paper but points to an increasing trend of less warlike attitudes 
in youth: the 'Dissent' cohort he expects will be "more likely than are the 
members of the generation of World War II to reject war when they reach the 
present age of this older generation", due to "three distinct periods in which 
war has been socially defined in an increasingly negative manner". This 
suggests, as Lipset and Ladd 
3 
point out, that the two are not mutually 
exclusive: 
There could be both persistence of a distinctive generational 
orientation and a moderation of views with ageing, for one has to take 
into account the historical shift of political climate in a society. 
Lipset and Ladd, concentrating on college generations between 1930 and 1960, 
were in fact interpreting a similar period of time to that studied by Jeffries. 
The radicalism and activist politics of the late sixties (Jeffries' 'dissent' 
generation), they predicted, would not be an enduring characteristic of that 
particular generation of students. Writing, you must remember, in 1971, they 
stated that: 
-58- 
it is likely that as a cohort those who experienced the radical activist 
campus policies of the late 1960's will not continue in the distinctive 
frame of mind which they now show. 
Upset and Ladd were drawing historical parallels with the college generation of 
the 1930's to make this prediction, acknowledging at the same time that, for 
both social and psychological reasons, as individuals grow older they tend to 
move from political extremes to a more "moderate" centrist position. Despite 
this maturational drift towards conformity they emphasise that this is a relative 
shift. Although each college generation may go through such a process, the 
authors of this study maintain that successive generations will in fact start off 
at a more liberal position than the previous one. The "historical slope" is a 
linear, age-related progression towards a more liberal ("less-warlike" in Jeffries' 
terms) standpoint. 
Footnote 2 
Further research, by N. Cutler, 
4 
attempts to come to grips with this relationship 
between generational and ageing processes. This is a longitudinal approach 
which allows for the study of generational trends apart from the influence of the 
ageing process by means of a cohort analysis. It tests out hypotheses of Almond5 
and agrees that the historically most recent cohorts are "not only more aware of 
discrete crisis, but attribute greater salience to problems of foreign policy in 
general, than do historically prior cohorts". In accord with the earlier papers we 
reviewedt Cutler's research suggests also that persons socialized during the wars 
were more likely to advocate war than the more recent cohorts, further 
emphasising the role of early socialization in the formation of attitudes. It 
concludes that this does not mean to imply that once formed attitudes never 
change but: 
the early imprinting of psychological and attitudinal patterns can have 
a profound effect upon the initial frame of reference of the attitudes, 
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2.3 SHIFTING GENERATIONAL PARADIGMS 
Roskin's 7 interpretation of this generational analysis is slightly different. He 
suggests that successive generations continually react against the "catastrophe" 
brought about by the previous generation's attitude towards foreign policy. He 
defines two generational paradigms, one is interventionist (the "Pearl Harbour" 
paradigm), the other non-interventionist which, in recent history, was brought 
about by the excesses of the interventionist generation in Vietnam. This he 
terms the "Vietnam Paradigm". These shifts in attitude Roskin sees occurring 
at approximately generational intervals because: 
-it takes that long for the bearers of one orientation, formed by the dramatic experiences of their young adulthood, to come to power and 
eventually misapply the lessons of their youth. 
This continual action and reaction between the two defence policy paradigms can 
be traced further back than the "Pearl Harbour" period. This in itself, Roskin 
maintains, was a reaction to the deficiencies of inter-war isolationism that 
preceded it. Table I outlines alternating periods of interventionism and non- 
interventionism and their accompanying foreign policy approaches. 
This use of the term "paradigm'P' taken from Kuhn 
8, 
provides us with an excellent 
dynamic model with which to interpret cycles of attitude change. The 
mechanics of "paradigm shift"- an integral part of Kuhn's thesis provides Roskin 
with an ideal model for interpreting the dynamics of his generation shifts. An 
existing paradigm comes into question when its basic assumptions and accepted 
laws are no longer adequate to explain and encompass present events. The 
boundaries of the old paradigm are stretched until eventually a new paradigm 
emerges. The new paradigm succeeds because it "can solve the problems that 
have led the old one to a crisis". 
9 In Roskin's analysis a generation centres upon 
either an interventionist or non-interventionist paradigm after some foreign 
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policy catastrophe brought about by the application of the opposite paradigm. 
At the point of changeover, according to Kuhn, a "paradigm clash" is 
encountered, eventually: 
The new paradigm wins because it gains more younger advocates, 
while the advocates of the old paradigm retire and die of f. The new 
paradigm triumphs not so much on an intellectual basis as on an 
actuarial one. 
2.4 THE "PRINCIPLE OF IMMINENT CHANGE" 
This analysis of alternating attitudes to foreign policy using the dynamics of 
Kuhn's "paradigms" is similar to a model suggested by Klingberg 
10 
some twenty 
years earlier. He did not have the benefit of Kuhn's perspicuity but drew 
instead upon Sorokin's" "principle of imminent change". Klingberg introduces 
the terms "introversion" and "extroversion" to describe what he sees as the two 
alternating moods in American foreign policy. Periods of extroversion are, he 
argues, characterised by a nation1s: 
12 
willingness to bring its influence to bear upon other nations, to exert 
positive pressure (economic, diplomatic, or military) outside its 
borders. 
Periods of "introversion" were marked by America's unwillingness to exert much 
positive pressure upon other nations. We can see here obvious parallels with 
Roskin's "interventionist" and "non-interventionist", but Klingberg maintains that 
these alterations in "mood" are discernible throughout America's history and 
have occurred at particularly regular intervals since 1770. A recognition of 
cyclical fluctuations is not new, G. Almond in his celebrated study of American 
public opinion in 1950 had recognised the "instability of mass moods, the cyclical 
fluctuations which stand in the way of political stability. " 
13 What we are 
concerned with here are the reasons behind these patterns of change. Drawing 
upon Sorokin's analysis of changing social systems Klingberg attributes this 
historical alteration of attitudes to foreign policy to change "as an inherent 
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process of a functioning system". In a field. where there are two major 
possibilities (introversion/extroversion, interventionism/non-interventionism) 
opposition will arise between the two opposing standpoints: 
As one group continues in power, more and more of the independents 
will turn from it, so that at a certain time a new majority is brought 
into being, and the policy shifts. 14 
Klingberg; however, does not rule out external factors influencing this process of 
change but emphasises their major function may merely be to'accelerate or 
retard an attitude or trend, and provide the opportunity in which a new mood can 
be displayed or "actually to precipitate in action a pent-up desire for change". 
Periods of transition, analogous to Kuhn's "paradigm clash" between one system 
and the next, are termed periods of transition in Sorokin's analysis of changing 
systems. This stage of transition or "Paradigm clash" becomes a useful 
framework in which to interpret what Rosenau and Holst! 
15 
see as a breakdown 
of consensus and the emergence of conflicting belief systems. 
0 
2.5 CONFLICTING BELIEF SYSTEMS 
Rosenau and Holstils research indicates that profound changes in attitudes have 
taken place both within and towards US policy in recent years. They refer to 
breakdowns (that] have occurred in the underlying value consensus on 
which unity had rested16 
and state that: 
the leadership consensus on which American political culture has long 
rested is conceived to have broken down and to have been replaced by 
severals largely mutually exclusive and internally consistent belief 
systems. 17 
They appear to be describing classic symptoms of Sorokin's period of social 
transition from one system, or paradigm, to another in which multiple crises 
reign where once consensus prevailed. These multiple crises, Rosenau and Holst! 
suggest may require the American people to: 
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have a broad and solidly based consensus that, in effect, is founded on 
a new social contract, redefined priorities, a new life-based ethic 
and/or other dynamic value changes, 
or in Kuhn's terms a new paradigm that, as we have already observed, can solve 
the problems that have led the old one to a crisis. 
What is more, Rosenau and Holsti outline three distinct belief systems that are 
almost directly analogous to Sorokin's three stages of "ideational", "ideological" 
and "sensate" eras, which they term "Cold War Internationalist", "Post-Cold War 
Internationalists" and "Neo-isolationists". Research on some 2,282 respondents 
in their leadership sample led the researchers to conclude that some "implicit 
and complex connections" existed between these foreign policy belief systems 
and a further set of three belief systems that they had defined to encompass 
domestic, as opposed to foreign policy, belief systems. In comparing these two 
belief systems -indeed in actually differentiating between the two -Rosenau and 
Holsti draw attention to the fact that complex and stratified belief systems are 
at work here. This is a point that two further analysts, Maggiotto and Wittkopf 
pursue 
Is in order to characterise the new attitudinal structure which, it is 
generally agreed, has emerged in the US since the Vietnam era. 
2.6 THE SEARCH FOR "STRUCTURAL CONSISTENCY" 
Although we concluded at the end of the first chapter that public opinion has a 
tendency to be erratic and often contradictory, we have to consider whether this 
is due to lack of a coherent belief system or to the inherent nature of a 
particular issue itself and the fragmentary way in which the public is approached 
as regards related foreign policy issues. "Belief system" is defined as "a 
configuration of ideas and attitudes in which elements are bound together by 
some form of constraint or functional interdependence". 
19 Does any sort of 
consistency exist in the structure of public attitudes towards foreign policy 
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which allows an analyst to predict attitudes on one issue from knowledge of 
attitudes to another? This is an important question if we are to come to grips 
with understanding public opinion. Converse's 
20 
pioneering work emphasised a 
unidimensional Liberal-Conservative continuum analogous to the 
internationalist-isolationist axis we have already become acquainted 
Footnote 3 
with. However, it is generally believed among American analysts that 
this unidimensional model is inadequate to describe attitude structures that have 
developed within the American public since Vietnam. Although analysts agree 
that: 
public attitudes towards international affairs cannot be described as 
responses grounded in several dimensions rather than linked to a single 
internationalism continuum2l. 
Debate revolves around just how many dimensions are necessary to analyse these 
attitude structures. Maggiotto and Wittkopf 
22 
attempt to reconcile the various 
models suggested by, for example, Hughes, 
23 
who adheres to the 
internationalist-isolationist framework, but distinguishes between military and 
non-militar , 
Footnote 4 policy, and Bardes and Oldendick (op. cit. ) also outline 
five separate factors including the militarist dimension. Magglotto and 
Wittkopf distinguish between "hard" and "easy' I issues. Easy issues are those that 
elicit "gut responses" rather than "reasoned analysis", tending to be symbolic 
rather than technical, dealing with ends rather than means and which have been 
long familiar in political thinking. Hard issues "are often new and complexly 
related to long-standing concerns". Their research was carried out on a national 
sample of 1813 respondents with 200 questions specifically designed to elicit 
responses to the underlying dimensions of foreign policy attitudes. Maggiotto 
and Wittkopf's research helps us to understand what would otherwise be 
contradictory responses. 
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Easy issues we can interpret as forming the basis of traditional, long-standing, 
and probably implicit attitudes, while hard issues represent new aspects 
expressed in opinions that are not yet fully incorporated into the individual's 
belief system. Using this easy-hard analysis two main dimensions become 
evident in this research: 
1. cooperative internationalism 
2. militant internationalism. 
Four additional dimensions reflect attitudes regarding 
3. satisfaction with U. S. policyrnaking institutions 
4. the importance of U. S. relations with other nations 
5. foreign aid as an instrument of policy and 
6. a need to resuscitate U. S. policy and policy-making institutions. 
From this analysis Maggiotto and Wittkopf define four attitude-types 
represented in Figure 2.1. 
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FIGURE 2.1 

















Oppose Cooperative Internationalism 
Percentages refer to the results of two separate surveys, as dated. 
From: Magglotto and Wittkopf (1984). 
These distinct types of opinion holders are outlined as holding the following 
beliefs: 
Tnternationalists - support the broad involvement characteristic of 
the pre-Vietnam consensus, including cooperative as well as more 
strident American approaches to the external world. 
Isolationists - are at the other end of the continuum, recoiling from 
any kind of involvement. 
Accommodationists embrace a strategy of selective 
internationalism that emphasises cooperation among nations and 
opposition to military involvement and other f orms of 
interventionism. 
Hardliners - move In the opposite direction. They share a sense of America's global responsibility, and they are internationalist on 
military matters. But perhaps because of their fear of communism 
they are sceptical of cooperating with the perceived "enemy". This 
group favours the "go it alone" posture, a position distinct from the 
isolationists as well as the Internationalists and accommodationists. 
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In conclusion, these two researchers believe that structural consistency does 
exist across a "reasonably broad" spectrum of policy issues within the American 
public. 
A caveat to this type of research must be added in the form of a study carried 
out by Marcus, Tabb and Sullivan 
25 
, who state that: 
without knowing the general principles an individual uses in forming 
his opinions, we cannot classify any one individual on the basis of his 
response to specific political issues as demonstrating2gigh or low levels 
of structure -much less aggregate across individualsi-- 
Although most political elites in the U. S. may use a recognisable "liberal- 
conservative" dimension to order their beliefs and behaviour these researchers 
felt that there was no evidence to suggest that the mass public used such an 
ideological framework. Moreover they point out that different specific issues 
may evoke different ideological frameworks from the same individual. Marcus 
et. al. employ a model that distinguishes content, i. e. the cognitive and normative 
framework an individual uses to structure political experience, and structure, 
which focuses on the organisation of belief systems, in a way that allows the 
respondent rather than the researcher to structure the test material by means of 
pair comparisons. Fifteen concepts were randomly paired (i. e. 105 pairs 
altogether). These ranged from economic opportunity, law, violence, to voting, 
innocent until proven guilty. It is difficult to do justice to the researcher's 
innovative research here and in any case this technique is not suitable for large- 
scale samples on account of time and expense further, criticisms have been made 
as regards its appropriateness to depth analysis 
!7 However this paper 
emphasises the necessity for observing that the criteria by which a person makes 
a decision, or forms an opinion, may vary from individual to individual and even 
within an individual between different policies. This question of structuring of 
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belief systems in relation to the consistency of an individual's beliefs is further 
exemplified by Barton and Parsons28 and applied to a comparison of elite and 
mass samples. - 
2.7 CONSISTENCY OF BELIEF SYSTEMS: "MASS" AND "ELITE" 
Researchers in the area of public attitudes and opinions have observed a 
distinction between the responses of 'elites', i. e. policy-makers, decision-makers 
and specialists, and the rest of the public? 
9 Elites are considered to have 
beliefs and policy attitudes which are more closely related to one another, 
forming a consistent framework of ideas and theories about the world in general. 
The general public are seen to have a less structured belief system because "they 
have not had the time, training, or intellectual ability to examine the 
interrelations between their beliefs and resolve inconsistencies". Converse, 
introduced the term "constraint" to describe the ideological framework in which 
an individual's ideas and attitudes are arranged, and this enables us to 
extrapolate from one area of opinion to another. For example it is assumed that 
if an individual is against increases in social security, he/she is probably 
conservative (with a small Ic') and also opposed to the nationalization of private 




a change in the perceived status (truth, desirability, and so forth) of 
one idea-element would psychologically require, from the point of 
view of the actor, some compensating change(s) in the status of idea- 
elements elsewhere in the configuration. 
31 Converse is practically outlining Festinger's theory of "cognitive dissonance" 
and indeed this would be a useful framework to understand the psychological 
processes involved when, for example) an individual discovers that a certain 
"idea-element" is no longer consistent with his/her belief system. Two choices 
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are open: either he/she must change their attitude to the idea-element so that it 
is no longer dissonant with the belief system or change the belief system so that 
it encompasses the new element. 
32 Barton and Parsons (op. cit. ) are more 
explicit and say that: 
once a large number of people accept new combinations of beliefs, the 
factor structure will change, and what had been a single dimension 
may break into two dimensions. Combinations previously defined as 
"inconsistent" will no longer be so by the standards of the society, 
because they will be defined as belonging to separate dimensions which 
do not have to be related. 
Barton and Parsons, however, take a slightly different approach. They look at 
the question of constraint on two levels: first they focus on the individual as a 
unit that is characterized as consistent or inconsistent (in the structure of their 
belief system) and secondly on the level of consensus between individuals who 
make up a group. Using this dual approach they supported Converse's original 
findings that elite belief systems are considerably more structured than non- 
elites both as individuals and as a group. This, Barton and Parsons agree with 
Converse, is explained by greater exposure to and participation in the issues 
involved. Particularly important, Converse feels, are the levels of information 
available to the elite. As one moves from the elite sources of belief systems 
downwards: 
constraint declines across the universe of idea-elements, and the range 
of relevant belief systems becomes narrower and narrower. 
Ideological constraints in belief systems thus decline with decreasing political 
information. They may be present among the elites at the higher levels of 
information and the sublevels but disappear rapidly as one moves downwards. As 
a result strata of classification emerges: 1, the unpoliticized, 2, the party-liner, 
3, the sophisticate (Barton & Parsons) or in Converse's definition the "ideologue 
by proxy", the "near-ideologue" and "idealoguel,. 
Footnote 5 
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The unpoliticized or marginally politicized represents the bulk of the electorate, 
they may respond in a quasi-random fashion to many questions in a survey 
leading to "high inconsistency" and changing responses over time. 
The party-liner however "knows all the 'proper' responses -as def ined by his 
political group" but shows no evidence of having developed his own personal, 
developed belief system. A high degree of attitude structure may be suggested 
by the consistency of the individual's responses but this is due to social or 
political group conformity rather than a developed belief system. These people 
Converse defines as having: 
a clear image of politics as an arena of group interests and provided 
that they have been properly advised on where their group interests 
lie, they are relatively likely to follow that advice. Unless an issue 
directly concerns this grouping in an obviously rewarding or punishing 
way, however, they lack the contextual grasp of the system to 
recognise how they should respond to it without being told by elites 
who hold their confidence. Furthermore, their interest is not 
sufficiently strong that they pay much attention to such 
communications. If a communication gets through and they absorb it, 
they are most willing to behave "ideologically" in ways that will follow 
the interests of their group. If they fail to receive such 
communication, which is most unusual, knowledge of their group 
membership may be of little help in predicting their responses. 33 
The sophisticate, on the other hand "follows political events, thinks about 
politics, and relates ideas to each other in a highly developed belief system". 
34 
The sophisticate's belief system is based on an independently constructed value 
system against which political objects and their shifting policy significance are 
judged over time; they are not dictated to by the blind necessity for party 
conformity. it is this group that is likely to introduce new "idea-elements" and 
bring about shifts in group consensus. 
Footnote 6 
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2.8 KNOWLEDGE AND MEDIA INFLUENCE 
There can be little doubt that elite and mass opinions do differ; for recent 
evidence for this differentiation see, for example, Schneider35 and Reilly. 
36 But 
there is an interesting dimension to the claim that it is increased knowledge due 
to higher levels of information and involvement that characterizes elite opinion 
f ormation. Gamson and Modigliani's 
37 
research suggests that increased 
knowledge leads to a greater attachment to mainstream ideology. The 
politically educated, they claim, are not better analysts of complex situations, 
but are simply more aware of what official policy is. Increased education and 
knowledge, they f eel, has a twof old ef f ect: 
there is a strain towards attitudinal consistency that increases with 
knowledge; this produces a higher relationship between belief system 
and policy among the more knowledgeable... At the same time, there 
is greater attachment to society and susceptibility to social influence 
a force that produces support for official government policies. 149 
Pilot studies by Putney and Middleton 
39 during the 'sixties suggested more 
precisely that it is not the levels of information Per se but the type of information 
that is available that influences attitudes and forms opinion. The students that 
they studied were found to be more accepting of war the more interested and 
knowledgeable they were. This acceptance or rejection of war, they felt, is 
influenced not by information (in an abstract sense) but by the specific data and 
viewpoints which the interested find readily available: 
information gathered from mass media seems to contribute to 
acceptance of war, but when the subjects are presented with data and 
viewpoints neglected by the mass media, increased information may 
have the opposite ef f ect. 40 
Research by Hamilton 41 further emphasises this relationship; tough policy options, 
he found, were more frequent among: "the highly educated, high status 
occupations, those with high incomes2 young persons and those paying much 
attention to newspapers and magazines". Although it is evident the media play an 
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important role in processing and disseminating information it is by no means 
clearly established what extent and duration of influence the media has on public 
.. Footnote 7 Erbring 
42 
et. al. see the media's role as shaping opinions and attitudes. 
our notion of the world beyond that which we can directly experience and the world 
of politics is almost entirely beyond the reach of our direct experience. Further 
research has drawn attention to the close relationship between the treatment of 
events on national network television news and the public's opinion on military 
spending (Russett and Deluca). 
43 Erbring et al (op. cit. ) however claim that 
secondary diffusion of news items through "networks of informal social 
communication" (i. e. chatting with friends, neighbours etc. ) naturally override the 
effect of earlier media influence. 
2.9 SOCIAL POSITION 
Those sections of the public most likely to attend to media coverage of foreign 
affairs, international events and defence issues generally, are professional people, 
those of high income and education, thus reinforcing the link between media 
influence and mainstream ideology. Russet and Deluca (op. cit. ) emphasise this 
relationship between socio-economic status and defence attitudes. At the peak of 
anti-military feeling during the Vietnam War, they note, anti-military attitudes 
were concentrated "disproportionately" among just these sections of the public. 
During the 150's and 160's when military spending was popular, those favouring cuts 
were drawn mostly from low-income, low-status groups those less attentive to the 
media. Galtung's 
44 
model of social position offers a useful explanation for the 
dynamics of public opinion moving from the periphery of society to the centre and 
decision-making nucleus. Information emanates from the centre "since the centre 
possesses access to the media of communication ... and besides has something to 
communicate". At the periphery interest in, and information on, policy issues is 
minimal; this section of society takes no part in policy-making and due to the lack 
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of ideological basis and "constraint" in its belief -system is liable to rapid shifts of 
opinion. Ina corresponding fashion: 
attitudes will be more stable in content at the centre than at the 
periphery, for in the former they will be protected by the anchoring 
influence of ideologies, and the pressure from organisations built 
around ideologies. 45 
There has been some criticism of this model and its applicability to societies other 
than that represented by Norwegian public opinion in Galtung's study (see Simon 
46 ). 
Further studies on American publics, however, agree at least on its partial 
applicability to a wider public. 
47 
2.10 AUTHORITARIANISM AND ATTITUDE STRUCTURES, 
We have noted in the preceding pages strong evidence indicating that a 
differentiation in attitudes exists between the 'elite' and the 'masses'. But can this 
differentiation be characterized more specifically? Lipset 
48 
would have us 
believe that low status and low education individuals such as we may find at 
Galtung's "periphery" have a tendency to favour extremist and intolerant forms of 
political behaviour with a predisposition towards authoritarianism. This, he claims, 
is a result of the lower-class person's social situation, characterized by: "low 
education, low participation in political organizations or in voluntary organizations 
of any type, little reading, isolated occupationst economic insecurity and 
authoritarian family patterns". Hamilton 
49 
, taking Upset's findings point by point 
found little to support these claims. Contrary to Upset's implications, Hamilton 
found, for example, that higher levels of education did not appear to create 
tolerant attitudes but rather people who are tolerant are more likely to seek 
education. What is more, Hamiltont as we have already noted, suggests that the 
more educatedý higher-status individuals are more likely to take a belligerant stand 
on foreign policy; his study attests: 
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to the presence of something which at least with respect to this kind 
of foreign affair concern, we might label as 'upper middle class 
author itarianism'. 
30 
The assumption, in both cases here, is that political ideology is only partly a result 
of indoctrination or group conformity and that the attachment to various views on 
political, foreign policy matters are, as Dicks5l puts It: "part of a Gestalt in which 
their personality structure is more or less deeply involved". 
Since Adorno et al 
52 laid down the basis for interpreting ideology on an 
authoritarian-democratic continuum a great deal of research has focused on this 
interpretation. (Greenstein 53 states that a selective review of the topic contained 
260 biographical references. ) What we need to know is: can types of individuals be 
distinguished whose personal make-up disposes them to act in a "democratic" or 
"authoritarian" manner? Greenstein draws our attention to a number of traits that 
are variously conceptualized as authoritarian which have particular relevance to 
attitudes in the political arena. These can be briefly summarized: domination of 
subordinates; deference to superiors; sensitivity to power relationships; need to 
perceive the world in a highly structured fashion; excessive use of stereotypes; and 
adherence to whatever values are conventional in one's setting. Greenstein further 
outlines personality traits attributable to the authoritarian personality at a 
somewhat deeper level. The authoritarian is described as being superstitious; 
preoccupied with virility, "tending towards exaggerated assertion of strength and 
toughness"; views human nature pessimistically and is cynical about the motives of 
others; lacks to some extent the capacity for introspection and the ability to 
acknowledge one's own feelings and fantasies. Research by Eckhardt and 
Newcombe 54 which incorporated a review of literature related to 
militarismFootnote 
8 
and other social attitudes, found a close correlation between 
militarism and authoritarianism and conservatism. We enter even further into the 
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psychological domain with their claim that authoritarianism and its attendant 
dogmatism have been associated with "arbitrarily and unduly restrictive childhood 
training experiencesil. 
Footnote 9 Further: 
Because of the close relation between authoritarianism, dogmatism, 
and militarism, it would be hypothesized that restrictive childhood 
training also contributes to the origin and development of militaristic 
attitudes. 55 
But, insofar as childhood training is only part of a total culture, they generalise 
that militarism, and by association authoritarianism, are at least partly a function 
of a "hypocritically restrictive culture". This borders upon the vast and well- 
documented body of literature related to childhood socialization 
56 
which we are 
not directly concerned with here. Levinson, 
57 however, further emphasises this 
link between autocratic child-rearing and authoritarianism and stresses the 
necessity of creating the polar opposite of this complex, associated with positive 
mental health which constitutes a more rational, realistic, self -actualizing and 
socially constructive guide to human behaviour where: "our underlying equalitarian 
potentials can become ideologically and institutionally kinetic". 
Sommers 58 goes further and suggests that the climate of distrust and suspicion 
existing between East and West engenders fear and insecurity in those who grew up 
in a society that is fearful and insecure. It has also been suggested that 
international attitudes ref lect more basic personality 
, 
dispositions ? 9960 
International and foreign policy issues constitute only a peripheral concern for 
most people and because of the attendant lack of information and interest they 
also lack an ideological framework with which to judge international relations. As 
a result their attitudes at an international level are likely: 
to represent generalizations to a relatively little known domain of 
ideologies found serviceable in more familiar realms. Thus, there 
may be widespread tendencies to personalize nations and believe that 
they ought to relate to one another in the same way that people are 
supposed to. 61 
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Can we extrapolate, therefore, and suppose that an individual's own psychological 
disposition (be it authoritarian, democratic or whatever) is going to influence to a 
great extent attitudes to much wider-ranging issues than his/her own area of 
immediate interest and concern? More research at a deeper level than expressed 
opinion needs to be carried out before this connection can be firmly 
Footnote 10 However it is clear that many psychological factors do established. 
exist which render more difficult the peaceful solution to international problems in 
our nuclear age. 
2.11 PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
The increasing involvement of psychologists and psychiatrists and their professional 
bodies Footnote II in the study of international af fairs bears witness to the 
importance of understanding the psychological mechanisms employed in both 
attitude formation and decision-making. 
Although by now we may appreciate many of the difficulties involved in eliciting 
the public's opinion (whether for example we can even be sure that the alleged 
opinion is indeed the true expression of that individual's feelings on the matter), 
when we come to consider the many psychological mechanisms that actually 
protect that individual from facing up to what may be the disturbing subject 
matter of the questions we may doubt even more the authenticity of response. 
Nuclear weapons represent the ultimate image of absolute destructiveness; they 
threaten our civilization, our species and ourselves as individuals. Surveys have 
shown that the thought of nuclear war evokes: 
prospects of being burned alive, of dying slowly, of being crippled 
without medical and social support, of mourning those we love, of 
starvation and misery, and, what is worst of all, of having to face 
mankind gone absurd and the collapse of everything one has worked 
for. 63 
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The anxiety aroused by these dreadful images may be unbearable so, for the 
individual to survive as a functioning - organism, all kinds of psychic defence 
mechanisms are activated as protective reactions. These-defences, Richards 
64 
points out, are not against any external threat but are defences against "threats 
stirring within the individual's internal world of unconscious phantasy and feeling". 
Their purpose is to defend the individual from deep-down impulses and images of 
self-destruction and the attendant anxiety that may destabilize the individual's 
overall functioning. 
Such defences include denial, one of the most basic human psychological reactions 
to danger. This applies to various degrees of non-perception, non-recognition, non- 
understanding, or non-acceptance of certain realities in order to cope with 
65 
otherwise unacceptable intrapsychic conflict, feeling, or memories. Thus, some 
individuals may disclaim any awareness of the destructive capacity of nuclear 
weapons, in spite of detailed media information on the subject. Others, while they 
may acknowledge the-existence of the weapons do not admit to their enormous 
destructive capacity. At a third level individuals may be well aware of these 
weapons' destructive potential but fail to respond in a way appropriate to this 
awareness. "Here one may speak of the effect as being denied and, because of its 
separation from the associated thought contact, consider it an example of the 
psychological mechanism of isolation". 
66 Related to denial are the processes of 
"psychic numbing" so well documented by Lifton in his study of Hiroshima 
survivors, and habituation which allow individuals to live in the shadow , (or 
aftermath) of nuclear annihilation. Habituation results from -the continual 
exposure to a repeated stimulus whereby it no longer becomes an element of 
consciousness. 
Footnote 12 Nuclear weapons have been with us a long time and it 
would be impossible to expect high levels of saliency to be maintained over the 
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decades: "most of the time". Frank 
68 
DOints out 11thev SiMDIV sink into the 
background. They are part of the ground rather than the figure, as psychologists 
say, and that makes it very dif f ! cult to keep them in mind". Projection assigns 
one's own aggressiveness to the opponent. Holms 
69 draws upon a case study of an 
individual patient to illustrate this process both on an individual level and a 
national level. Projection, he says: 
is intrinsic to the arms race, too. We have defensive deterrent, peace- 
keeping nuclear weapons, while they have aggressive, expansionist, 
first-strike bombs. By locating all the aggression in the enemy we 
avoid looking at the threat we pose to them. 
Similarly each superpower sees in its opponent a projection of its own ambition, 
expansionism and desire for absolute superiority. 
This terrifying vision of the enemy then fuels the race for more 
fearsome deterrents on each side. In this atmosphere of mutual 
projection it is impossible for each side to realistically assess the 
threat which the other poses. 
Thus we become aware of stereotyping, both of one's self and of the adversary as a 
result of these perceptual distortions. White 
70 
sees this as a result of cognitive 
limitations; most people, he feels, appear to conceive political and military 
realities in very misty terms, therefore stereotyping is: "of importance for 
reducing the world to a sufficient level of simplicity that actions can be 
determined in response to relatively complex circumstances". However, he adds: 
that "the dangers of such cognitive limitations in a highly complex world are only 
too evident,,. 
71 
Many of these psychological mechanisms are adaptive responses, activated when a 
particular danger is seen as unavoidablet to protect the individual from crippling 
anxiety. However, there is a danger that they become maladaptive when they 
contribute to "failure to face and cope with preventable threats such as that of a 
nuclear holocaust". 72 The individual becomes immobilized, either through sheer 
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terror or through the immobilizing strategies of the psyche, and feels powerless to 
prevent what is then seen as inevitable disaster. Perhaps this sense of 
powerlessness lies in what White (op. cit. ) sees as a projection of responsibility: 
too many people are too ready to relinquish responsibility for the course of affairs 
"and see the government or military personnel as being the only proper and capable 
decision-making agents in our society". People may- criticize these 
representatives but continue to abdicate from responsibility themselves. 
2.12 THE ARMAGEDDON COMPLEX 
If people feel helpless, powerless to inf luence the course of events, it is likely that 
they will succumb to despair and accept the inevitability of that which they fear. 
Farber 73 suggests that in the minds of many men lurks the secret wish for war, a 
motivation that: "may be more deeply buried in the prediction that war is 
inevitable, with the true dynamics evident only in the curious jest of the prophet. " 
He calls this the "Armageddon Complexllp in which the unbearable tension and 
anxiety of a prolonged crisis leads to a "let's-get-it-over-with-now" attitude. 
Farber links this type of attitude with levels of frustration in one's personal life 
(see section above), but whatever the origin of these impulses (and it would be too 
limiting to restrict an analysis to Freudian dynamics) there is no doubt that they 
are evident today. Farber was writing in 1951, but the Falklands conflict in 1982 
surely provides us with an example of this mentality. Hamilton (op. cit. ) sees this 
as the orientation of "an anti-intellectual vigilante mentality, one tired of or 
suspicious of talk, an orientation which prefers direct action against the enerny. " 
Putney and Middleton (op. cit. ) further encountered this syndrome among students 
of the 'sixties. Some of the students, they observed, did not appear to be too 
concerned about avoiding war and believed that, as one student expressed ito "the 
only way to reduce the threat of war is to have a war! " And the Group for the 
Advancement of Psychiatry (GAP) report also acknowledged this mentality; when 
-so- 
under extreme stress almost any course of action seems better than none at all, 
hence the desire to "get it over with". 
But these self-fulfilling prophecies of doom are not inevitable. Humphrey 
74 
, in his 
memorable and much cited Bronowski lecture, emphasises the self-fulfilling 
capacity of hope. Our control, he says, lies as it always has done whenever it's 
been tried in the force of public argument and public anger. 
2.13 CONCLUSION 
This chapter sought to analyse public opinion, not at a mere statistical level, but at 
a cognitive and attitudinal level drawing upon deeper levels of research into 
attitude formation. We became aware of the many factors influencing an 
individual's attitudes and opinions and the underlying structure of belief systems 
which is the cohesive factor binding the various components together. These may 
indicate high or low levels of "constraint", depending, it seems , on the quantity 
and quality of information available to, and assimilated by, the individual. It is 
I V1 
perhaps k the nature of opinion polls that questions, on any particular 
issue, are 
presented in a fragmentary disconnected fashion that does not allow the individual 
to think about the issue in a structuredp co-ordinated f ashion - or at the very least 
does not allow respondents to answer in a way that explains their response in terms 
of their particular belief system. An individual belief system can be likened to a 
film, it is a continuous imprint of attitudes and opinions that have been created 
over time from events and other inf luencing factors. To take a still, or even a 
sequence of f rames out of the context of the total system is to reduce it to the 
level of the banal. Nevertheless not all films, or belief systems, are well 
structured, coherent and bear detailed analysis. 
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Whilst public opinion polls may provide a quantitatively acceptable sample of 
public opinion on any given issue, they are not in suf f icient depth to be of any real 
value. And yet, while qualitative surveys may expose a depth of opinion Oe. a 
structured belief system) that is qualitatively of greater value to the researcher 
and/or policy maker, we have to ask how representative of the general public as a 
whole are these detailed opinions of a small sample of people? Especially given 
the many influencing factors that shape an individual's belief system. 
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Up to now we have considered attitudes as if they were a phenomena of some 
mass mind, some 'general public' - the opinion polls indicate attitude change at a 
? molar' level but what are the processes at the individual 'molecular level,? 
It is important to understand attitudes at a more individual level because, as 
Allport says, as a rule: 
science regards the individual as a mere bothersome accident. 
Psychology, too, ordinarily treats him as something to be brushed aside 
so the main business of accounting for the uniformity of events can 
get under way. 
As a result we are presented with statistics about the 'general public'. Allport 
continues: 
Though serving well a certain purpose, this portrait is not altogether 
satisfying to those who compare it with the living individual models 
from which it is drawn. It is unreal and esoteric, devoid of locus, self- 
consciousness and organic utility -all essential characteristics of the 
minds we know. 
The concern of this chapter, then, is to investigate attitudes at the more 
fundamental, individual level. The 'general public' are not just sets of numbers 
and percentages but made up of living, feeling and reasoning sentient people with 
beliefs, opinions and attitudes influencing each and every behaviour. What 
function do attitudes fulfill at this fundamental level? 
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3.2 ATTITUDE ACOUISITION 
One review of relevant literature in 1939 
1 
revealed twenty-three varying 
definitions of attitude - the last forty-five years can only have added to this 
diversity, but it is generally argued that attitudes are a: 
more or less permanently enduring state of readiness of mental 
organisation which predisposes an individual to react in 2a 
characteristic way to any object or situation with which it is related. 
or similarly: 
an inner mental organisation takes place which predisposes the peryn 
to a certain type of activity towards objects, persons and situations. 
They therefore serve the purpose of organising and categorising the vast amount 
of input we receive from the outside world. Rhine 
4 
utilixes the concept- 
formation approach to attitude acquisition to explain this process. Attitudes, he 
argues, are concepts with an evaluative dimension thus justifying his use of this 
approach. A concept he states is "a mental principle through which an individual 
can classify a number of objects in his stimulus world. " So, poodle, Irish 
wolfhound and chihuahua are all domesticated animals , and dog is the name 
given to this principle. We, therefore, have a concept of 'dog' but as yet no 
attitude towards 'dog' because there is no evaluative dimension. If we have had 
personal experience of a viscious dog or been given adverse information about 
dogs, then we may evaluate 'dog' as bad, thus acquiring an attitude towards it. 
Once these means of categorisation have been set in place then our reaction 
becomes a simple stimulus-response sequence, according to Rhine. Henceforth, 
whenever we see a dog we evaluate it as bad, whether it is the vi clous alsatian 
we first encountered or the neighbour's labrador. Mediating processes perform 
the function of uniting different objects under the same mental principle; thus 
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poodle, labrador and alsatian, Rhine would categorise as first order mediators 
which are accompanied by the response of categorising all of these as dog. This 
helps to explain the process of attitude learning to some extent. At least we can 
see how similar objects become categorised under an overall heading. Osgood5 
suggests that the more mature or intelligent (we could subsitute knowledgeable, 
informed) an individual the finer the discriminations that can be made and "the 
less gross its representing processes. " , Therefore a dogbreeder or someone 
interested in dogs can not only distinguish different breeds but is aware of the 
characteristics that determine a good pedigree. Similarly those who are 
informed about the nuclear issue can identify nuclear weapons as being 
qualitatively and militarily different from conventional weapons. 
Rhine's model is very much in the behaviourist mould and implies no conscious 
intervention 
-- 
ý\j the individual. For this reason it is inadequate if we 
are to assume that people process information in a critical manner -but the fact 
remains that if we did not use these mechanisms we would become completely 
swamped by the barrage of endless stimuli emanating from our environment. it 
is quite clearly a process used by all of us some of the time, but it is when this 
process seems inappropriate or maladaptive that we become aware of it. The 
nuclear debate is one area where this mechanism can be observed. Not only can 
we see fairly unknowledgeable people merely mouthing the prescribed arguments 
in support of nuclear weapons -many of which are entirely inappropriate to 
nuclear weaponry - but these are often activated in response to any suggestion of 
nuclear disarmament. Of course, this also applies to supporters of nuclear 
? disarmament when given the appropriate stimulus from their pro-nuclear 
counterparts. This may also help to explain the sort of impasse reached at lower 
levels of nuclear debate where an endless chain-reaction of arguments and 
counter-arguments following the sti- us-response pattern is set in motion. 
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This sort of mechanism then, when applied to attitude acquisition, allows a 
person, as Petty and Cacioppo 
6 
put it: 
to evaluate a communication or decide what attitudinal position to 
adopt without engaging in any exhaustive cognitive work relevant to 
the issue under consideration. 
This has very interesting overtones when we come to consider processes of 
attitude change later on in this chapter. 
3.3 FUNCTION OF ATTITUDES 
What is the function of attitudes? Why do some people hold to them come what 
may? Take, for example, a harbinger of doom who says the world will end 
tomorrow. When tomorrow comes and the world does not end, the harbinger may 
say "Ah, God relented". He does not change his attitude towards his original 
proclamation but merely accommodates new events into his original belief. Why 
doesn't he change his attitude towards his original belief despite incontravertible 
proof that he was wrong? What processes are at work that enable people to stick 
to attitudinal responses that, by all objective definitions, are no longer 
appropriate? Sarnoff 9 draws upon psychoanalytic theory to explain this 
process. This approach allows us to consider: 
the mechanisms of ego defence which serve to protect the individual 
against external and internal threat. Many attitudes are acquired and 
maintained in the services of such mechanisms. Where people cannot 
escape from threatening forces from without, they will often 
incorporate the hostile forces and identify with the agressor ... Or people will maintain the oW attitudes by denying and distorting t-he 
reality of existing dangers. 
Lmy emi)hasis] 
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By investigating the function that attitudes serve, we attempt to understand why 
people hold the attitudes they do. Unless we know the psychological need that is 
met by holding an attitude, Katz7 points out, we are in a poor position topredict 
when and how it will change. Katz D.; Katz D and McClintock C. 
S; Sarnoff 1.9 ; 
and Sarnoff 1. and Katz D. 
10 
use this functional approach to attitude formation 
and in doing so avoid the error of oversimplification - of attributing a simple 
cause to a given attitude and so acknowledging the likelihood that the same 
attitude can have a different motivational basis in different people. The basic 
assumption of this group is that: 
both attitude formulation and attitude change must be understood in 
terms of the needs they serve and that, as the motivational proces fis 
differ, so too will the conditions and techniques for attitude change. 
Four functions which attitudes perform for the individual are outlined: 
7 
1. The instrumental, adjustive, or utilitarian function. 
Attitudes acquired for the purpose of fulfilling this function tend to be oriented 
towards maximising the rewards in the external environment and minimising the 
penalties. Generally, Katz maintains, these attitudes are dependent on present 
or past perceptions of the utility of the attitudinal object to the individual. The 
closer these objects are to actual need satisfaction, the greater is the likelihood 
of a positive attitude being formed. 
2. The value expressive function. 
These attitudes have the functions of giving positive expression to the 
individual's central values and to the type of person he/she is conceived to be. If 
someone considers themself to be a conservative or an internationalist they will 
hold attitudes which are the appropriate indication of these central values. 
Attitudes that are congruous with this self-conception are rewarding in the sense 
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that they are establishing self-identity and confirming the individual's notion of 
the sort of person she/he wants to be. The outline of the individual's self- 
concept, Katz points out, Is, a result of socialisation processes during the 
formative years: 
Parents constantly hold up before the child the model of a good 
character they want him to be ... the candy and the stick are less in 
evidence in trainirf3the child than the constant appeal to his notion of 
his own character. 
The values of the group with which the individual identifies are also strong 
motivational forces of attitude formation if the group situation allow for his 
ego-involvement, i. e. allows him/her to contribute to the group effort. 
3. The knowledge function. 
This is analogous with Rhine's concept-formation approach in that it suggests 
people need frames of reference for understanding the world and attitudes 
provide definitiveness, consistency and stability of meaning in what would 
otherwise be a vague and confusing world. The need to know, Katz observes, 
does not imply that people are driven by a thirst for universal knowledge: 
People are not avid seekers af ter knowledge as judged by what the 
educator or social reformer would desire. But they do 1Vnt to 
understand the events that impinge directly on their own lives. 
Existing attitudinal structures will provide a basis for interpreting new 
information and may actively impede the assimilation of new information. It 
follows then - and this is important when we come to consider motivations for 
attitude change - "that new information will not modify old attitudes unless 
there is some inadequacy or incompleteness or inconsistency in the existing 
attitudinal structure [my emphasis] as it relates to the perceptions of new 
situations. "We shall be considering these motivating forces below. 
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4. The ego-defensive function 
Ego defences are mechanisms that protect the ego from threatening forces from 
- 
Footnote I*They include "devices by which the within and from without. 
individual avoids facing either the inner reality of the kind of person he is or the 
outer reality of the dangers the world holds for him. "16 
6- 
Attitudes acquired for the purpose of defending the ego serve the purpose of 
minimising the incapacitating effect fear has upon the ego's functioning. The 
only way to reduce fear is separation of the individual from the feared object. 
But as Sarnof f9 points out, the child - in whom these defenses have their genesis 
- owing to its relative helplessness, is often unable to separate itself from the 
threatening object and is thus unable to respond to the threatening object in a 
way which will reduce the fear and anxiety: 
under these conditions, the perceptual functioning of the ego may fail 
if the stimuli of the fear motive becomes too intense for conscious 
containment. .. To preclude such a catashophic state of helplessness, 
the individual attempts to defend his ego. 
We briefly touched upon these defence mechanisms in the previous chapter, but 
now they become crucial in understanding the individual basis of attitudes. Many 
of our attitudes have the function of defending our self-image. Although all ego- 
defences serve to eliminate the threatening forces from within and without, only 
denial and identification with the aggressor, according to Sarnoff (op. cit. ), 
fulfil this purpose by distorting the perception of objects in the outside world by 
obliterating those aspects of the individual's environment which give rise to fear 
and anxiety. 
Thus by not perceiving or by falling fully to acknowledge threatening aspects of 
his world, the individual can prevent those aspects from exerting the fear- 
arousing effects they would otherwise have. 
-96- 
Further, ego-defences aim directly at eliminating the internal source of threat. 
Repression is one of the most fundamental of these kinds of defence. Although 
Sarnoff, in accordance with classic psychoanalytic theory, concentrates his 
examples of repression as linked to sexual drives, we can also see repression in 
terms of repressed bad-object relationships in real life - the driving force being 
towards good-object relations rather than sexual gratification. By repressing 
the bad-object (we could see the bad-object in terms of nuclear weapons, 
perhaps) from conscious perception the individual is able to continue life in a 
fairly harmonious state both with rthe inner world and the outer. Projection of 
the attributes of the bad object onto others can also help to deal with aspects of 
the bad object when in intrudes into consciousness. (Fear of nuclear weapons 
which is supressed may, when this fear looks like surfacing, be projected onto the 
Soviet Union - it is the Soviet Union that is wicked, immoral, dangerous and 
threatening our very existence, not nuclear weapons). 
Everybody may employ defence mechanisms but, Katz7 says: 
they differ with respect to the extent that they use them and some of 
their attitudes may be more defensive than others. 
Furthermore, individual attitudes towards any given object may 
differ from person to person depending on the most successful means 
of reducing tensions towards that object. Conversely, Sarnoff 
19 
adds: 
identical attitudes may mediate the reduction of quite different 
motives, just as the same overt response of smiling may be used to 
reduce the tension generated by the motives of love, anxiety, or even hatred. 
Attitudes which are formed to serve the purpose of denial can be 
inferred, according to Sarnoff, from the individual's failure to 
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recognise or acknowledge a stimulus' which is present in his 
environment which is "presumed to have threatening implications for 
him. " If the threat is acknowledged then it may be severely 
underestimated and the individual's response to it could be 
desperately inadequate compared to the extent of the actual threat. 
This type of attitude is apparent with regard to the nuclear issue. 
Individuals completely deny that nuclear war is'possible, that it could 
happen or that they need be concerned about it. Others may fail to 
acknowledge the magnitude of the threat and suggest absurdly 
inadequate civil defence measures. While it may be difficult to 
believe that anybody could fail to feel some anxiety about the 
nuclear arms race and where it may be leading us, it is also dif f icult 
to prove that the person who claims to have no fears about nuclear 
war is using the ego-defence of denial to separate him/herself from 
the object of fear. The fact is that people are not aware of the 
defensive activities of their ego, especially 'at the time they are in 
operation and those objects that have been eliminated from 
consciousness by an ego-defence are virtually inaccessible to recall. 
It may be only at a later stage that they become aware of their use 
of defences: 
The most we can do is to reconstruct them in retrospect: we can 
never really witness them in operation. This statement applies, for 
instance, to successful repression. The ego knows nothing of it; we are 
aware oldt only subsequently when it becomes apparent something is 
missing. 
Attitudes that facilitate the ego defence of identification with the 
aggressor are inferred when an individual adopts the behaviour and 
attitudes of a person who threatens to arouse his/her fears. By doing 
this the individual becomes more like the feared person who 
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consequently becomes less threatening. Repression is a factor in the 
development of an attitude when the individual eradicates from 
his/her conscious mind a motive, sensation or cognition of which 
he/she was once aware. ' Linked with - this defensive measure is 
projection whereby the individual attributes his own hostility to 
others and displacement which means the individual reroutes his own 
aggressive impulses onto someone weaker. 
Footnote 2 Repression has 
been linked 21 with authoritarianism and this is a linkage we shall be 
pursuing later. 
Projection could be viewed as a strong motivational force for the 
development of attitudes relating to the nuclear issue. Take this 
statement by Sarnof f: 
22 
By attributing his own consciously unacceptable motives to others, the 
individual is able to avoid perceiving them as belonging to him. Thus, 
projection permits the individual to be preoccupied with the 
perception of other people's motives rather than his own. 
Consider its applicability to US-Soviet relations. Is Reagan really 
talking about American motives when he says the Soviet Union are 
bent on world domination? Is he really talking about his own motives 
when he says the Soviets are intent on nuclear superiority and is he 
projecting US military motives onto the Soviety military when he 
says the Soviets cannot be trusted to keep treaties and that they are 
always looking for ways round them? It is clear that the US 
themselves, according to an ex Polaris submarine commander now 
working at CDI, have just these motives: 
what the military's goal is, in reference to treaties, is to look for the 
loopholes and exploit therýý. But if you had a treaty that's fine - but how can we get around it? 
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The reasoning behind this sort of behaviour is that the Soviets would 
be doing the same, "They'd be trying to f igure out ways around the 
treaty and they'd be exploiting holes and f laws in the treaty and we 
should do the same, , 
24 
,'A projection of US motives into a mirror 
which is reflected back at them. 
Footnote 3 
Attitudes which serve the purpose of defending the Ego by means of 
reaction formation may be recognised when the individual behaves in 
a way which is directly contrary to that required to reduce the 
tensions caused by "consciously unacceptable motives" (such as 
aggression). 
Footnote 4 We can get into very murky water if we try 
to apply this to the nuclear issue: fear of nuclear war/weapons 
activates reaction formation so that nuclear weapons actively 
become the means of preventing nuclear war - and those who support 
nuclear weapons paradoxically become "the true peace keepers'll) By 
behaving in this way the individual ". .. maintains a 
'perception of 
himself as being responsible to motives which are as dissimilar as 
possible to those which he does, in fact, possess. " 
Sarnoff cites the rationalisation of behaviour as another ego-defence 
which can be facilitated by the formation of attitudes - especially in 
our society where so much emphasis is put on logic and reason. The 
clearest instance of rationalisation occurst he says, when an 
individual interprets his patently destructive behaviour in the light of 
an altruistic rather than an aggressive motive. This sounds very 
much like post ad hoc attribution of motive rather than a precursor 
of an attitude and it is something we shall be investigating in greater 
depth in the second half of this chapter. 
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3.4 ATTITUDE CHANGE 
An enormous amount of research has been devoted to attitude change 
but for reasons of space it is not possible to cover the whole area 
thoroughly, so particular attention has been paid to processes that are 
most relevant to this research. 
There are basically two ways of approaching the subject of attitude 
change which have traditionally depended on two fundamental ways 
of looking at people. One is the irrational model which suggests that 
people: 
have very limited powers of reason and reflection, weak capacity to 
discriminaJ3, only the most primitive self-insight, and very short 
memories. 
This model suggests that people's powers of discrimination are easily 
overpowered by emotional forces and appeals to self-interest and 
vanity. Furthermore, early experiments showed that - much in the 
same way as Pavlov's dogs - people could be induced to express 
preconditioned attitude merely at the flashing of a coloured light. 
The second approach suggests a more rational model for people which 
assumes: 
that the human being has a cerebral cortex, that he seeks 
understanding, the he consistently attempts to make sense of the 
world about him, the he possesses discriminating and reasoning powers 
which will assert theRelves over-time, and that he is capable of self- 
criticism and insight. 
These two models give rise to two distinct routes to attitude change 
laid out by Petty and Caccioppo? 
7 First there is the central route 
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which puts emphasis on the information that a person has about the 
attitude object or issue under consideration. And secondly the 
peripheral route to attitude change which is brought about by 
concerns which are not directly related to the issue under 
consideration. Attitude change via the peripheral route may result 
from factors inherent in'the persuasion situation such as rewards or 
punishments or association with other 'positive objects. Such 
persuasive clues facilitate a very superficial evaluation of a 
communication and adoption of attitude without the necessity of any 
critical avaluation of the issue under consideration. We shall be 
studying various routes such as message learning, motivational 
approaches, concerned with consistency, balance and congruity and 
various means of bringing about attitude change which will include 
the learning principle, preceptual-judgmental approach and various 
information processing models. 
But to begin with let us take a look at Sarnof f and Katz's models of 
attitude acquisition and see to what extent these are relevant to 
attitude change, because all the other approaches, and indeed 
whether the individual is going to be susceptible to the central or 
peripheral approaches, may depend on the underlying attachment to 
the original attitude. 
3.5 UTILITARIAN ATTITUDE CHANGE 
Changes of utilitarian attitudes, i. e. those that seek to optimise 
social rewards and minimise punishmenty depend, according to Katz 
on one of two conditions: 1. the attitude and activities relating to it 
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no longer provide the satisfaction they once did; 2. the individual's 
level of aspiration has changed. Attitudes towards political parties 
and voting behaviour may be difficult to change if there is no great 
dissatisfaction with the preferred party's handling of issues that are 
considered by the individual to be of greatest importance. Changes 
in utilitarian attitudes Katz says, occur "more readily when people 
perceive that they can accomplish their objectives through revising 
existing attitudes. " We can cite the Conservative party policy to 
sell council houses to tenants (primarily Labour supporters) prior to 
the last General Election which led to Conservative support for 
purely utilitarian purposes. Although the use of such 'rewards' may 
be effective in changing attitudes the use of 'punishments' may be 
more problematical - and this is something that must be of concern, 
with regard to the nuclear debate, to those who wish to encourage 
attitudes opposed to nuclear weapons. The use of 'punishment' and 
arousal of fear depend for their effectiveness: 
upon the presence of well-defined paths for avoiding the punishment, 
Le. negative sanctions are successful in redirecting rather than 
suppressing behaviour. When there is no clearly perceptible relation 
between punishment and the desired behaviour, people may continue to 
behave as they did before, only now they have negative attitudes 
towards fie person and objects associated with the negative 
sanctions. 
Clearly this is where the anti-nuclear lobby is at a disadvantage 
compared with the pro-nuclear movement. The former can only of fer 
a picture of the horrors of nuclear war, but often with very little 
suggestion of what can be done by the individual to avoid it. The 
latter, however, can offer, albeit superficial and unprovable, a 
picture of past security with nuclear weapons stretching out into the 
distant future. Furthermore if the 'punishment' is severe (and of 
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course the one we offer here is the ultimate) the subject may develop 
defensive avoidance of the whole situation. The subject's objective 
then becomes not one of solving the problem but of escaping from it, 
even if such escape is at the expense of increased 'punishment'. 
Therefore, it is very easy when attempting to change attitudes to 
traurnatise the individual into changing from a utilitarian attitude 
e. g. nuclear weapons increase security, to an ego-defensive position. 
Otherwise the individual would be incapable of functioning through 
extreme f ear. 
3.6 EGO-DEFENSIVE ATTITUDE CHANGE 
As far as ego-defensive attitudes are concerned Katz outlines three 
possibilities. First is the obvious factor - removing the source of 
threat that has given rise to the ego-defense. But of course this is 
not always possible, this is why the defence was developed in the f irst 
place. Second, catharsis - the discharge of pent-up feelings, fears 
and impulses-can be effective, perhaps in a tirade against the powers 
that be or some such target. There is always the danger here that 
this may reinforce the negative attitudes we are trying to change. 
Third, and this is probably the most realistic as far as this paper is 
concerned, ego-defensive attitudes can change as the individual 
acquires insight into his/her own ego-defensive activities. It is clear 
that many people may be already aware that they are avoiding an 
issue or denying it exists - "I don't want to think about it", they 
admit. More often this process will not be recognised at the time. 
Seminal work by Janis and Feshbach 
29 
on fear arousing 
communications suggested that: 
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When fear is 'strongly aroused but is not fully relieved by the 
reassurances contained in a mass communication, the audience will become motivated to ignore or to minimise the importance of the 
threat. 
Self insight, according to Katz, is only really effective amongst those 
who are low to moderately defensive. Research by Goldstein 
30 
suggests that there is no uniform reaction to heightened fear-arousal 
and that people can be divided into 'copers' and lavoiders'. Minimal 
fear appeal, he says, receives greater acceptance from those who 
deal with tension-producing information by avoidance; strong fear 
appeal was more effective among those he classed as 'copers', i. e. 
those who were able to cope with the tension-producing material and 
had no problem recalling it. A later replication of the original Janis 
31 
and Feshbach experiment by Janis and Terwilliger I however casts 
some doubt on Goldstein's findings - attributing them to procedural 
modifications of the original experiment. These modifications may 
have been what were necessary to reveal these finer distinctions in 
response. However, it is clear that where ego-defences are 
concerned, our prime aim must be to establish why people hold the 
attitudes they do - only when we do this will campaigns of attitude 
change be effective. 
Footnote 5 There are times when confronting 
the public with facts about dangerous situations may be more 
effective than a reassuring approach (consider, for example, 
instances when the Government assure us that there is "no danger to 
the public" after a nuclear leak or similar incident - this often 
increases fear and suspicion rather than allaying it). - On 'other 
occasions it is possible that the "full facts" approach may just 
increase avoidance measures. 
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3.7 VALUE-EXPRESSIVE ATTITUDE CHANGE 
Whereas utilitarian attitudes can induce someone to vote for a 
particular party in anticipation of a 'reward', voting behaviour can 
also be a symbolic expression of being a Tory or a Labour supporter, 
i. e. it is value-expressive. To change such attitudes2 Katz suggests, 
there are two prerequisites. First, the individual must be dissatisfied 
with his/her self-concept, and this can result from: 
failures or from the inadequacies of one's values in preserving a 
favourable image of oneself in a changing world ... Once there is a 
crack in the individual's central beYif systems, it can be exploited by 
appropriately directed influences. 
Secondly, dissatisfaction with old attitudes which now seem 
inappropriate to one's values can also help bring about attitude 
change. This may stem from new experiences or from information 
from others, but refers to the appropriateness of one attitude over 
another with reference to an individual's self-concept and central 
values. 
3.8 KNOWLEDGE FUNCTION ATTITUDE CHANGE 
Factors associated with attitude change in this category occur when 
old attitudes conflict with new information and new experiences, 
thus bringing about modification of beliefs. In other cases the beliefs 
may have been adequate to the situation, but the world has changed. 
Any ambiguous situation is likely to precipitate attitude change 
because the individual strives towards cognitive consistency - which 
is a theory we shall be considering in greater depth below - but f irst, 
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one final observation on motivation to change. It is clear then, that 
ef forts to change attitudes must be orientated towards the relevant 
motivati, onal basis of the attitude. In an earlier paper Katz and 
Sarnoff3 
3 
emphasise the importance of this approach when 
attempting to change attitudes with different motivational bases. 
Someone whose attitude was based on poor information may respond 
to the presentation of scientific facts; one whose motivation to 
conform and whose attitudes are utilitarian in nature would respond 
favourably to a situation where he/she was rewarded for changing 
his/her attitude. A third individual would act very differently if his 
attitudes were ego-defensive, regardless of rewards or information. In 
fact, the two previous approaches may even serve to reinforce 
his/her attitude., These approaches are formed on the assumption 
that the individual is interested in a more accurate picture and 
complete knowledge of the world or is orientated towards fulfilling 
recognised needs. 
I 
However, people do behave as if they have been decorticated at 
times, and one thing that the Katz model does is to be more specific 
about the conditions under which people act as the theory predicts - 
unlike some of the models we consider next which depend heavily on 
laboratory experiernents where the subjects are put under severe 
choice limitations in absurd situations and given little opportunity for 
critical thought - under these conditions the subjects are hard pressed 
to make sense of a nonsense situation. 
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3.9 CONDITIONING APPROACHES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE 
Some of the earliest research on attitude change used classical 
conditioning techniques to bring about the desired change. One of 
the earliest users of this approach was Doob who suggested that 
attitudes were: 
non-observable responses that were learned and changed through 1W 
application of rewards and punishments, just like all other responses. 
Various experiments were used to suggest that the principles of 
classical and instrumental conditioning could be applied to attitude 
change. Basically, the idea is this: the subject is given a neutral 
stimulus (the Conditioned Stimulus CS) in association with another 
stimulus (Unconditioned Stimulus UCS) that is connected to some 
response (Unconditioned Response UCR) and the whole procedure 
works like Pavlov's dogs, i. e. the dog is given meat (UCS) at the sound 
of a bell (CS); the dog salivates (UCR). Eventually the dog will 
salivate at the sound of the bell alone (Conditioned Response). A 
number of experiments were carried out along these lines using, for 
example, electric shocks as the CS (Zanna et. al. ) 
36 
, or f ree meals 
(Razran). 37 
Operant conditioning is another learning process where experiments 
have shown that subjects can be induced to respond in the desired 
manner simply by making encouraging noises ("mmmm" or "good") 
when the desired response is made . 
38 It has been suggested that 
another factor is involved in this process - that of approval by 
another person which helps reinforce the desired response to a 
- 108- 
greater extent. If the subject is aware of the interviewer's 
encouraging noises and hence his/her approval of the responses and by 
implication the subject, then there is even greater incentive to carry 
out the rewarding response. 
Observational learning is another possible way of conditioning 
attitudes. This is an indirect process depending not on the subject's 
direct experience but on observations or modelling of someone else's 
behaviour, by implying that if the subject does the same then the 
rewards will accrue to him also. Take, for example, an 
advertisement for pipe tobacco showing a man walking along smoking 
his pipe followed by a horde of women attracted by the smell - this 
all sound very simplistic and yet it is the basis on which many 
products are advertised in an effort to influence the viewer's attitude. 
Bandura 39 points out however, that two conditions must be met for 
this type of conditioning to be effective; firstv the observer must 
believe that the rewards will also be his/hers if the required 
behaviour is carried out; second, that the reward is actually worth 
the effort involved. 
To set up an experiment that proves that people behave like mindless 
mechanisms 
Footnote 6 is a self-fulfilling prophecy - of course we 
can all be induced to behave in this fashion under conditions of high 
ambiguity or great pressure. Unless our concern is crisis management 
these sorts of experiments have little relationship to attitude change 
in the real world. If we are really interested in how attitudes change 
then we must also see human beings as highly complex and intelligent 
organisms and study them in real situations rather than as laboratory 
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animals within a laboratory setting. When this method has been 
effective, as Petty and Caccicpo 
40 
recognise, it has more often been 
in the case of unfamiliar and/or neutral stimuli and this is certainly 
not the nature of the material under study here. 
3.10 PERCEPTUAL-JUDGEMENTAL APPROACHES 
These approaches assume that attitudes are based on latitude of 
acceptance (i. e. the range of positions that an individual accepts) and 
latitude of rejection (the range of positions rejected). Basically it is 
suggested that if a message is judged to be within the latitude of 
acceptance then attitude change will occur in the direction of the 
message; if the message is judged to be within the latitude of 
rejection then little or no change occurs or perhaps attitudes may 
even move away from the advocated position. Sherif et. al . 
41 
suggested a third latitude of noncommitment, i. e. the range of a 
position to which the individual is indifferent. Eagly 
42 draws the 
conclusion: 
persons who differ in the widths of latitude of acceptance and 
rejection on a particular issue should dif fer in attitude change. Thus, 
persons with a relatively wide latitude of acceptance and a narrow 
latitude of rejection are more likely to change toward a message then 
persons with a narrow latitude of acceptance and a wide latitude of 
rejection. 
Further research by Eagly and Telaak 
43 indicated that this was due 
to the fact that wide latitudes may be associated with low certainty 
and confidence (we might add knowledge and involvement too) and 
narrow latitudes may be associated with high certainty and 
conf idence. This position appears to be consonant with that 
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suggested by Osgood (op. cit. ) at the beginning of this chapter, i. e. 
the more 'mature' (confident, knowledgeable) an individual, the finer 
the discriminations that can be made, the "less gross its representing 
process" and the less likely the individual is to change his/her 
attitude. Petty and Cacclopo (op-cit. 1991) however, find this 
approach unsatisfactory and it does appear to be of greater value as a 
theory of human judgement than as a theory of attitude change. 
Footnote 7. Ego involvement has been considered an additional 
important factor in the perceptual-judgemental approach, i. e. the 
extent to which an individual is attached to an attitude. 
Alternatively this could be interpreted in terms of 'centrality'; how 
the issue in question relates to the individual's value-system which is 
closely related to the individual's self-concept. The greater the ego 
involvement - or if it is central to a person's value system then the 
greater the latitude of rejection and the likelihood of attitude change 
is decreased. 
3.11 MESSAGE LEARNING APPROACH 
This approach is actually quite basic to the problem of attitude 
change - after all if the message is not actually getting through to 
the recipient then there is no opportunity for the individual to 
review her/his attitude. The approach was developed by Carl 
Hovland et. al. 
44 
who suggested that first a person's attention must 
be caught by the message; the message must be understood; the 
person must mentally rehearse the arguments and conclusion 
contained within the message. In this process, it is presumed, a 
memory trace is established which is a precursor to remembering the 
- III - 
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message. In this process there are obviously a number of factors to 
be considered at each stage: first there is the origin of the 
message - is it a credible source?; secondly there is the message 
itself - is it communicated in a way in which it can be comprehended 
without too much effort?; thirdly there is the person or people at 
whom the message is aimed - are they intelligent and informed? 
Finally there is the means by which the message is conveyed - is it 
via the mass media or through personal communication? Each of 
these factors has an important role to play in the process of attitude 
change. 
3.12 SOURCE CREDIBILITY 
Much research has been carried out in these areas and early findings 
suggested that source credibility has an important effect on attitudes 
towards the message. 
45. Later research by Hovland and Weiss 
46 
proved more ambiguous - suggesting that while a more credible 
source may be initially more persuasive, over a period of time it was 
found that the power of the less credible source was increased. They 
explained this phenomenon, termed the sleeper effect, in this way: 
by assuming equal learning of the content, whether presented by a 
trustworthy or an untrustworthy source, but an initial resistance to the 
acceptance of the material presented by an untrustworthy source. If 
this resistance to acceptance diminishes with time while the content 
which itself provides the basis for the opinion is forgotten more 
slowly, there will be an increase after the corRpunication in the 
extent of agreement with an untrustworthy source. [my emphasis] 
This is a totally incredible and as yet unproven hypothesis. Many 
research grants, it would seem, have been squandered on this area of 
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48 ', 49 50 research ( see for example: Fine , Weiss and Fi neý , Weiss 
with no great addition to our knowledge of the matter. Once again 
this research concentrated on fairly irrelevant messages, therefore, 
one cannot assume that the actual communicatin was of great 
interest. Petty and Cacclopo 
51 
suggest that the communicator is an 
important factor when the issue: 
I 
is not personally relevant or significant to the recipient so there is 
little reason to devote much attention to the message. 
Source credibility may actually be of more importance in reinforcing 
existing attitudes. Take for example the situation where a Labour 
Member of Parliament is giving a lecture on defence policy. His/her 
very appearance will reinforce anti-Labour defence policy amongst 
Tory listeners and reinforce pro-Labour defence policies amongst the 
Labour listeners; therefore we can consider this factor as linked with 
the value expressive function (see above). 
3.13 THE MESSAGE ITSELF 
Research on this aspect of message learning suggests that while more 
arguments may increase the effectiveness of a message 
52 the 
inclusion of too many acts as a turn-off. 
53 Further research deals 
with the effectiveness of one-sided and two-sided arguments? 
4 
and 
concludes that, regardless of initial position, attitude change was 
likely to go in the direction of that advocated by a one-sided message 
but could be swayed back by persuasive presentation of a counter- 
message. When, however, a two-sided argument was presented, 
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subjects were less likely to be influenced by a subsequent counter - 
argument. This was attributed to the fact that the subject: 
has been given an advance basis for ignoring or discounting the 
opposing communicatiogjind, thus "innoculated", he will tend to retain 
the positive conclusion. 
Or we could attribute higher mental functioning to the recipients and 
conclude that they find the two-sided message more credible because 
it did not ignore counter-arguments levelled at it and was, therefore, 
not trying to pull the wool over the eyes of the recipients but 
treating them as people capable of their own critical reasoning. 
Careful work carried out by some researchers 
56 looked at the order 
of presentation of messages - is it more effective for a speaker to 
put his/her message across before or after his/her opponent in a 
debate? It seems that timing is of the essence here both in terms of 
how long the interval between speakers and how soon after the 
speakers attitudes are tested. Petty and Cacioppo succinctly sum up 
the pros and cons: 
When speaking back to back the candidate would do best by speaking f irst, 
unless attitude tests were taken immediately after the speakers: 
in which case it would not matter whether he spoke f irst or second. Perhaps more importantly, these results suggest that a last-minute 
media blitz may be highly effective, especially when some time has 
elapsed since the opposing candidate has presented his or her views. 
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3.14 RECIPIENT FACTORS 
Petty and Cacioppo revelwed research on how factors relating to the 
recipient of the message affected the likelihood of the message being 
accepted. High intelligence and self-esteem was likely to make 
individuals receptive to a persuasive message but unlikely to change 
their attitude, whereas low intelligence and self-esteem indicated 
high susceptibility to the message but less likelihood of actually 
grasping the message - all very confusing for the hopeful agent of 
attitude change. 
3.15 MEANS OF CONVEYING A MESSAGE 
Although past research in this area has suggested that face-to-face 
communications are more effective than media communications, 
57 
clearly television is now the most universal source of information, 
and was overwhelmingly cited as the most important source of 
information on problems of "rearmament and disarmament" by 
respondents in eighteen out of twenty-three countries in a recent 
survey? 
8 But as far as attitude change as a result of televisual 
information is concerned, this has not been established. Petty and 
Cacioppo emphasise the importance of the message being tailored to 
suit the channel through which it is being broadcast - this is fairly 
obvious but no research has come to light on the comparative 
effectiveness of any one channel over another as far as attitude 
change is concerned. 
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3.16 MOTIVATIONAL APPROACHES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE 
One area of research on attitude change which has probably attracted 
more attention than any other is that concerned with the individual's 
desire to maintain balance, congruity and cognitive consistency. One 
of the great pioneers of the motivational approach was Heider 
59 
who 
developed the idea of balance between three elements: the person 
who is explaining or perceiving the situation, some other perceived 
person, and a perceived event, idea or thing. Balance then, as 
defined by Heider is: 
a harmonious state in which the entities comprisin the situation and 
the feelings about them fit together without stress. 
'fo 
The relationships between the three elements are represented in 
diagramatic form with p representing the person, o representing the 
other person and x as the perceived event, idea or thing. Between 
any pair of elements two relationships are possible; Heider refers to 
these as Q) sentiment relations which is an attitude - an affective or 
feeling relation implying like or dislike, approving or disapproving, 
etc., (ii) unit relations which are elements "perceived as belonging 
together in a specially close way" - but the elements may also be two 
separate entities which are: 
related through 6V milarity, causality, ownership or other unit-forming 
characteristics. 
Although some ambiguities have been pointed out in Heider's concept 
of unit relations 
62 the basic principle that the tendency is towards 
balance between the cognitive elements still holds. For example if p 
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likes x, x is opposed to nuclear weapons and p is also opposed to 
nuclear weapons, then we have a state of balance. If, however, p 
was in favour of nuclear weapons then a state of imbalance is 
actuated which, according to Heiderv causes an unpleasant state of 
tension and motivation to cause a restoration of balance. This can be 
achieved in one of several ways. p can decide that perhaps nuclear 
weapons are not so bad after all (see Figure 3.1b. ); p can change 
his/her attitude towards o and decide o is not quite so likeable (c in 
Figure 3.1); p can decide that perhaps o does not feel so strongly 
about nuclear weapons or maybe given more information o would 
change his/her attitude to them; p could begin to feel that o is not 
after all responsible for nuclear weapons thus creating the situation 
at d in Figure 3.1; or finally, p could accept that o's attitude differs 
from his/her own and while he/she cannot quite agree with o on the 
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Adapted from Heider (op. cit. p. 208) 
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A particularly interesting aspect of Heider's theory, and one which 
Insko63 considers as least developed, has to do with assumptions p has 
towards him/herself. Insko points out that balance theory only really 
applies to people with high self-esteem; the implication, he says, is 
that the balance rules work in an opposite direction for people with 
genuinely low esteem. Low self-esteem may then, we suggest, induce 
the individual to change his/her attitude towards the perceived 
object/idea rather than the other possibilities outlined above and in 
Figure 3.1. This assumption supports Katz's prerequisite for attitude 
change, i. e. dissatisfaction with self-concept and Petty and 
Cacioppo's conclusion that low self-esteem indicated increased 
susceptibility to a persuasive message. Heider's diagramatic 
representation of this relationship clarifies this position. 
Developments of Heider's balance theory, or theories that seem to 
have derived much of their theore, tical background from Heider's 
ground work, include a 'probabilogicall approach, a theory of reasoned 
action and an information integration approach. Although some of 
these approaches impinge on the concern of the following chapter in 
which we shall be looking more closely at structure, we will briefly 
consider what some of them have to offer here - it is impossible after 
all to divorce structure from function. 
3.17 COGNITIVE THEORY 
One of the major shortcomings of Heider's balance theory is that 
there is no allowance for strength of feeling between elements - to 
what extent does p like o and does this ultimately effect the way a 
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dissonant unit relation between o and x is accommodated? Osgood 
and Tannenbaum64 allowed for gradations of liking which permits 
quantitative predictions about the effects of imbalance. Rosenberg, 
although he started out using gradations of liking65 similar to 
Osgood and Tannenbaum, was more concerned with the structural 
relationship between a person's attitude and values. 
66 Rosenberg 
maintained that an attitude consists of a cognitive as well as an 
affective component and that when stable feelings and beliefs refer 
to the same object then they are in a state of congruence. The 
affective component he defines as: 
the pattern of feeling g9gularly aroused by the psychological presence 
of the attitude object. 
An example would be fear, anger and perhaps helplessness felt by 
someone when he or she reads, hears or thinks about nuclear weapons. 
Rosenberg defines the cognitive component as: 
the sets of beliefs (held by the person) about the value-attaining and 
value-blocking powers of the attitude object viewed as an instrumental 
agency. 
For ex ample, the person in the example given above may explain 
their negative affect by saying what a danger to the survival of the 
planet nuclear weapons are and how much money is squandered on 
them. If someone had positive affect toward nuclear weapons then 
the cognitive component could be demonstrated by contending they 
maintained the peace, deterred the Soviets, etc. When the 
components are inconsistent "to a degree which exceeds the 
individual's 'tolerance limit' for such inconsistency", the attitude is 
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unstable. In such a state, he argues, the attitude will have to go 
through one of three processesý synonymous with Heider's 
formulation, in order to admit congruity. First, rejection of the 
communication may occur (d, in Figure 3.1). Secondly, fragmentation 
of the attitude "through the isolation of each other of the mutually 
inconsistent cognitive and affective components" (e, in Figure 3.1), or 
thirdly attitude change through the accommodation of incongruent 
components (b, c in Figure 3.1). Rosenberg carried out an 
experiment to test this hypothesisl 
Footnote 8. Using hypnosis he 
was able to induce subjects to change affect towards two attitude 
objects on which they had been previously tested. The main findings 
of this experiment, he felt: 
confirmed the original hypothesis that the production of a significant 
change in the affective component of a social attitude will eventuate 
in an accommodating reorWisation of the subjects cognitions about 
the object of that attitude. 
Attitude change, as suggested by Rosenberg, and supported by 
70 Carlson, can be seen as the result of a process that begins with the 
production of inconsistency between the cognitive and affective 
components of an attitude. Rosenberg points out though that if the 
strengths and rigidities of the competing components are such that 
return to consistency is not possible then: 
another type of outcome may occur: processes of selective 
inattention rný4 be used to avoid any further encounter with the 
inconsistency. 
While Rosenberg suggests that attitudes are made up of cognitive and 
affective components and attitude change is brought about when 
these are discrepant, Zajonc 
Footnote 9 
puts forward the idea that 
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cognition and affect represent two separate information processing 
systems and that the affective system "may be fairly independent of 
and preceed in time 11 the cognitive system. - This primacy of the 
affective system may be due to its mode of processing information 
which is 11 effortless, inescapable, irrevocable, holistic, more 
difficult to verbalise, yet easy to communicate and to understand. 1,73 
Ittelson describes this processing : 
The direct emotional impact of the situation, perhaps largely a global 
response to the ambiance, very generally governs the directions taken 
by subsequent relations with the environment. It sets the motintional 
line and delimits the kinds of experiences one expects to seek. 
The cognitive process is described as more sequential. Affective 
reactions, according to Zajonc are then often the very first reactions 
of the organism and are seldom subjectively wrong - once a cognitive 
judgement had been made, Zajonc claims, it is possible to accept the 
fact that we may be wrong. 
Footnote 10 But with af fect we are 
never wrong about what we like or dislike and it would be very 
difficult, for example, to persuade a child on the basis of convincing 
arguments that she really liked spinach when in fact she did not. 
Footnote II This helps to explain the fact that attitudes are 
virtually impervious to change by communication, which according to 
Zajonc, attests to the "robust strength and permanence of affect. " 
Rosenberg demonstrated that attitudes could be changed by 
manipulating affective responses under hypnosis - by suggesting the 
subjects felt differently about a particular attitude object, post- 
hypnotically their cognitions about the attitude object changed to 
produce an overall modification of attitude. I expect that had he 
suggested to subjects they had no strong feeling about the object, 
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attitudes likewise could have been modified, post-hypnotically i. e. 
without strong affect accompanying a cognitive evaluation attitudes 
are susceptible to change. The child with no strong feeling about 
spinach could be persuaded it was nice or tasty or whatever and 
induced to eat it on the grounds that it made her grow taller or 
healthier. Attitudes derived from cognitive judgements and 
accompanied by affect are stable attitudes in Rosenberg's definition . 
He also demonstrated by changing affect that cognitions would be 
modified to maintain a stable attitude, but now we have to consider 
what the consequences are for attitude research and attitude change 
when the individual deliberately suppresses affect. It is clear that 
individuals will do this when strong feelings would interfere with the 
functioning of the organism. Take, for example, a nurse or a doctor 
presented with a horribly injured patient. He/she necessarily 
suppresses affect in order to function as a life saver. Not only are 
these emotions held in, held back, but also repressed, i. e. banished 
from consciousness. It is also likely, indeed probable, on the same 
grounds, that processing leading to fear, anxiety and hopelessness 
towards nuclear weapons will likewise be repressed. What, then, are 
the implications for the individual? Obviously for the nurse/doctor 
it means that he/she is able to carry out tasks which he/she would 
otherwise be incapacitated to do - it could be said that they become 
cold, analytical, business-like about the operation before them, in the 
best interests of the patient. It may also mean that an individual - if 
he/she cannot avoid the issue entirely - is able to accept, for 
exampleo nuclear weapons/deterrence now they have been stripped of 
all emotional affect - to such an extent that he/she can come to 
accept a policy that attempts to prevent what he/she most fears 
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(nuclear annihilation) with that of which they are most af raid 
(nuclear weapons), clearly a very precarious, unbalanced act. 
Footnote 12 They may concentrate on the 'numbers game' and order 
and structure their world so narrowly as to avoid any emotional 
dangers associated with these weapons. By ordering, regulating or 
'freezing' his/her world it becomes predictable, controllable: 
he tends to live 'by numbers' by the rule book and to rely on external 
rather than internal fyes, on logic and fact rather than impulse, 
intuition and emotion. 
Furthermore, research by neurologists and neuropsychologists on 
laterality and hemispheric specialisation has indicated beyond 
reasonable doubt 
Footnote 13 
that different modes of processing 
information - such as we have suggested here - can be attributed to 
the functioning of the two separate hemispheres of the brain. This 
has been demonstrated both in the damaged brain, 
779 78 
and 'split- 
brain' 79 and in the normal-functioning brain. 
80 Of particular interest 
to us here are experiments carried out by Terzion, 
81 Gazzaniga and 
Le Doux 82 and others which reported that when the right hemisphere 
is anaesthetised (by injection of sodium amytal into the left carotid 
artery) patients became 'euphoric maniacal'. Characteristically the 
patient is: 
opt'm'stic. 3 about his future, makes jokes and of ten breaks into laughter. 
Injection and anaesthetisation of the left hemisphere causes the 
patient to exhibit 'depressive catastrophic' reactions: 
the patient ff ies and says he will never recover, that his family will 
got to ruin. 
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Similar states were also found in patients with unilateral left or right 
brain damage by Gainotti 85 What then, may the case be in the 
normal brain? Is it possible that, when an individual represses the 
functioning of the affective system that we can expect a similar 
process to take place? if an individual represses affective 
information originating in the right hemisphere then he/she may, on 
the one hand, feel less affect (fear, horror or anxiety for example, 
as we saw in the case of the nurse/doctor above ) but on the other 
hand it may be possible that the individual will as a consequence feel 
extra-positive (i. e. euphoric) towards the idea object. This may help 
to explain the incidence of a black humour in states of extreme 
anxiety or stress. This, we suggest, may also explain how some 
people can manifest extreme support for nuclear weapons; i. e. first 
they repress any feeling of fear, etc., that they feel towards them 
which supresses affective processing, leading to feelings of 'euphoria, 
or at least well-being 
Footnote 14 
towards nuclear weapons. 
Footnote 
L5 One further proposition that commissurotomy research offers us, 
is that when affect is repressed (i. e. 'functional commissurotomy') it 
is easier to attribute affect to the wrong causal stimulus, therefore 
making the whole process of denying fear of the original object easier 
when it can be transferred to another idea object. Consider, for 
example, the residents who live in close proximity to Greenham 
Common who direct all their negative feeling - often with great 
vehemence -against the peace-campers. Their attitudes are often 
out of all proportion to their objections which are often on the 
grounds that the peace protesters are dirty, unsightly and leave litter 
around! 
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Speculation aside, however, what we are primarily suggesting here is 
that genuine attitudes are charged with affect and may be termed 
'central, Footnote 16 to an individual's belief-system, and as such are 
not readily amenable to change. When an attitude is not charged 
with affect, i. e. a 'pseudo-attitude', at the periphery of a belief- 
system, then attitude change is more likely to be a possible outcome 
because the attitude is unstable. - 'Pseudo-attitudes' are likely to 
occur under social pressure to conform. When an individual has 
implicit beliefs or sets of arguments imposed on him/her and any 
affective evaluations incongruent with these cognitive packages are 
repressed or otherwise avoided, release of affect may be triggered, 
t-h4? - T- V- for example, by watchingA'The day after' or 'Threads' or other stimuli 
that cause a sudden release of af fect. Alternatively the process may 
be slow, affect may be suppressed for a long period of time if 
external circumstances encourage this, but the individual may begin 
to feel uncomfortable or uneasy as these affective judgements begin 
to surface. Even in Rosenberg's experiment with hypnosis, some 
subjects developed 'vague and uncertain suspicions' that their feelings 
had been manipulated. 
Footnote 17 
We now have a psychological and structural understanding of the 
process of denial whereby the individual is able to maintain both 
cognitive consistency and emotional well-being by means of rejecting 
threatening information. Whether attitude-change or attitude 
restoration is the outcome may depend on the potency of the original 
communication in relation to the strength of the original attitude 
components or upon the factors such as personality of the subject, 
communication credibility, etc-t covered above. 
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Before moving on to further advances on Heider's theory it is worth 
emphasising this relationship between attitudes and values because 
the centrality of an attitude, as Katz stated, depends on its role as 
part of a value system which is closely related to the individual's self 
concept. The centrality or importance of an attitude for an 
individual is a result of experience in which the individual, according 
to Woodruff and Di Vesta86 comes to value positively certain objects 
and conditions which have served to contribute to his/her well-being. 
Therefore the strength of feeling towards an object, person or 
situation is related to the individual's 'meaningful' experiences with 
the object and: 
One's attitude toward a specific object or condition in specific 
situation seems to be a function of the way one conceives that ohiect 
from the standpoint of its effect on one's most cherished values. 
97 
This is an important relationship when we come to consider the 
question of central and 'peripheral' attitude change, . 
Osgood 88 applies the theories of cognitive consistency to real-life 
situations using the example of Khruschev and disarmament talks - 
theories which we can also apply to the situation today. 
Extrapolating from Osgood then, we can draw attention to the 
(largely) American press which presents editorials about the 
deceptive nature of Soviet arms reduction proposals; Gorbachev's 
proposals -rather than sincere overtures towards peaceful solutions - 
are seen as carefully planned moves in the Cold War. It is cognitively 
inconsistent, Osgood says: 
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for us to think of people we dislike and distrust making honest 
conciliatory moves, behzWing as human beings ought to behave, and 
assuming noble postures. 
The effort to maintain internal consistency among our beliefs and 
attitudes is often pursued at the price of distorting reality. In all the 
cognitive consistency theories of attitude change which we have 
reviewed - and have still to review - it is important to emphasise 
once again that if cognitive elements are to interact then they must 
be brought into contact with one another. This has very often been 
the problem with laboratory experiernents in this area - they all 
deliberately creatz dissonant, inconsistent elements and force the 
subjects to see them in relation to each other. In real life it will be 
far easier for people to keep these discordant elements apart - they 
simply do not have to think about them, or as Heider points out, 
some people just seem to be able to live with dissonance-arousing 
material. Osgood considers this ability to tolerate ambiguity to 
increase with intelligence and education, but this is an assumption 
we shall be questioning later. Nevertheless, it seems likely that an 
increasing proportion of the population is likely to experience 
pressures towards congruity when these elements are forced into 
juxtaposition as a result of media attention. 
3.18 PROBABILOGICAL APPROACH TO ATTITUDE CHANGE 
This approach tackles the question raised by Osgood, from a 
structural point of view, and sees attitudes and belief-systems as a 
system of interconnected syllogistic networks containing vertical and 
horizontal structures. A belief syllogism, Petty and Cacioppo 
(op. cit. ) elucidate, is a set of three statements, two of which serve as 
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premises that lead psycho-logically to a conclusion. Psycho-logic is 
the process whereby the individual reaches his/her, conclusion from 
the premises in his/her own mind - and does not necessarily follow 
the rules of formal logic to do so. For example, if we are good, 
trustworthy and honest, and they are the enemy, according to 
Osgood, psycho-logic dictates that they must be bad, untrustworthy 
and dishonest. 
3.1 9THEORY OF REASONED ACTION 
This theory is based on the assumption that "humans are rational 
animals that systematically utilise or process information available 
to them. 1189 Although this theory is orientated towards behaviour and 
changing behaviour, it is also concerned with attitude change as 
precursors of behaviour, and is useful as far as we are concerned here 
because, generally speaking, "a person who believes that performing a 
given behaviour will lead to mostly positive outcomes will hold 
favourable attitudes toward the behaviour. " We will be more 
concerned with attitudes and behaviour later in this chapter but the 
main aspect of Fishbein and Ajzen's theory that interests us here is 
the suggestion that the individual's subjective norm is an important 
factor of behavioural intention, i. e. his or her belief that "most 
important others" think the individual should or should not perform a 
behaviour - or of course - hold a certain belief or attitude. This 
suggests a third dimension to Rosenberg's cognitive, affective 
components of an attitude, and also introduces the pressure to 
conform to others' expectations and group conformity. Hardy 
90 
suggests that attitudes may change as a result of changes in 
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"perceived social reality" or from influences which are thought to 
ref lect objective reality dependably - such as "most important 
others" this is because: 
The importance of "social reality" def ined in terms of the shared 
consensus of (significant) people in the environr%nt, is now widely 
acknowledged as a determinant of social attitudes. 
In support of Fishbein and Ajzens emphasis on the subjective norm, 
research by Stotland et. al. 
92 
and Maccoby et. al. 93 also emphasises 
the pressure of the group on attitude acquisition and change. 
Stotland et. al. also relate these effects to levels of self-esteem. 
3.20 INFORMATION INTEGRATION THEORY 
Anderson's 94 information integration theory is similar to Fishbein 
and Ajzen's in that he suggests that attitude judgements are 
determined by a number of beliefs. Each piece of information is 
represented by: 1) scale value, i. e. how favourable or unfavourable 
the person is to the information and, 2) the weight, which indicates 
how important the information is to the person. Petty and Cacioppo 
(op. cit. ) 
95 
maintain that this accounts for the effects of issue 
involvement on persuasion: 
by contending that more involved persons give their own initial 
attitudes greater weight than less involved persons and thus are harder 
to persuade. 
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3.4 COGNITIVE DISSONANCE THEORY 
Perhaps one of the most renowned of the cognitive consistency 
theories, and the one that has provoked the largest systematic body 
of data, is the theory of cognitive dissonance published by Festinger 
in 1957.96 The basic premise, as with all consistency theories, is that 
elements are either consistent with each other, inconsistent, or 
irrelevant and that where inconsistency arises - or as Festinger 
prefers, dissonance - the person will be motivated to reduce the 
dissonance and achieve consonance. Two'elements of knowledge, 
according to Festinger are dissonant when: 
considering thes$ýwo alone, the obverse of one element would follow 
from the other. 
Thus, for example, if someone supported nuclear weapons and also 
thought they increased the likelihood of nuclear war, there would be 
a dissonant relation between these two cognitive elements. Much of 
ho 
the work carried OUtA test this hypothesis, by Festinger and Carlsmith 
98 
, took the form of forced compliance situations whereby subjects 
were induced to behave in a manner that is inconsistent with their 
private beliefs. An individual will then be motivated to change 
his/her private attitude in order to make it consistent with his/her 
behaviour. According to dissonance theory a person should 
experience a high degree of cognitive dissonance if a counter- 
attitudinal act is carried out for a small incentive rather than a large 
incentive because the more reason a person has for performing 
counter-attitudinal behaviour (i. e. given $20 rather than $1 as in the 
Festinger and Carlsmith experiment), the less dissonance is 
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experienced and therefore less motivation for attitude change. A 
number of further experiments were carried out, to replicate these 
findings, by other researchers on, for example, schoolchildren who 
were induced to eat vegetables they disliked, 
99 
on members of the 
US forces who were induced to eat grasshoppers, - 
100 
on students 
persuaded to write counter-attitudinal essays, 
101 
and many more 
besides. Another aspect of dissonance theory that wasirevealed was 
the relationship between dissonance and exposure to information. In 
particular, Zajonc (op. cit. ) concludes that the assumption that 
dissonance is a psychologically uncomfortable state leads to: 
the prediction that individuals will seek out, 6yormation reducing 
dissonance and avoid information increasing it. 
Generally these results supported the applicability of dissonance 
theory. When dissonance is induced after an individual has taken a 
public stand different from his/her personal beliefs, the resulting 
psychological tensions motivate the individual to change his/her own 
private beliefs to make them consistent with the view expressed. 
While cognitive disonnance theory may be useful in explaining the 
attitudinal effect of dissonant behaviour, a number of problems and 
limitations arise. One problem that Cohen 
103 
emphasises is the way 
that dissonance theory appears to depend on the subject taking a pro 
or anti position on the subject to begin with: 
While dissonance theory may work well where there are such clear-cut 
alternatives, it may not be so helpful where compromise positions may 
be taken. It seems reasonable that dissonance reduction via attitude 
change is dependent upoqoVe individual's decision to commit himself 
to a discrepant position. 
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This further emphasises the importance of choice in cognitive 
dissonance. Cohen et. al. 
105hypothesise that under greater 
degrees of choice - but not lesser - increased dissonance, and 
consequently attitude change, would result from increasing the 
discrepancy between a person's original opinion and that 
advocated. Furthermore - and more important to this thesis -it 
may be assumed that chance exposure to discrepant information 
is unlikely to produce dissonance. It is only when a person 
chooses to be exposed to it that dissonance, and consequently 
attitude change, are likely to occur. As we stated earlier, the 
individual in the real world is likely to avoid information that is 
likely to give rise to the psychologically uncomfortable state of 
dissonance. Research by Cooper and MacKie 
106 further 
complicates the issue by suggesting the important influence of 
the intergroup situation, i. e. if the individual has the support of 
a group in respect of his/her original attitude, then attitude 
change is unlikely to take place in the compliance situation. 
Divorcing dissonance from the social context in which it occurs, 
they felt, allows predictions of attitude change to be made, but 
within the social context of a group: 
the very same dissonance that is aroused by induced compliance may 
have effects that are very different from, and even contradictory to, 
00 consequences of dissonance in a setting devoid of social context. 
Scott 108 also considers the social context. -, an important and often 
neglected aspect in dissonance theory. Attitudes, he believes, need 
not be cognitively consistent unless the requirements of external 
reality impose such consistency on them. Scott goes further and 
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maintains that: 
Ambivalent attitudes may be normal, stable components of many 
people's cognitive structures. They may even be cognitively 
consistent. Moreover, cognitive consistency itself is not even a 
requisite for a quasi-stable states of the total cognitive structure. 
Only when pressures for such consistency arise from within the person 
himself or from his environment do the demands for adaptation require 
a more consistent attitude structure. It is quite possible for one not 
confronted with the need to adjust to a consistently ordered 
environment, or with a need to defend his opinions against opponents 
who demand to knoyogtheir rational basis, to maintain quite 
inconsistent attitudes. 
Now this is a crucial point that has been too easily ignored by the 
many researchers who have attempted to test the minutiae of 
cognitive dissonance theory: they have almost entirely ignored the 
question of relevance and applicability to the. world occuring outside 
the laboratory. As we recognised earlier, the individual can too 
easily isolate the dissonant element from the rest of his cognitive 
system -or even, as Scott maintains, just simply fall to impose on 
him/herself any requirements for rationality in that particular area. 
Consonance follows no laws of logic but depends upon how the 
individual balances elements of an attitude with other cognitive 
elements such as values, expectancies, self-esteem and group 
consensus which increase its resistance to change. Festinger himself 
admitted that there is a variation in "tolerance of dissonance": 
For some people dissonance is an extremely painful and intolerable 
thing, whilst there are flt&ers who seem to be able to tolerate a large 
amount of dissonance. 
Reiss and Schlenker 
III 
suggest two ways in which an individual may 
respond to his discrepant behaviour: firstlyo he/she may try to 
excuse the behaviour by denying responsibility for the consequences. 
Of course, this means of escape is deliberately blocked in the 
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eI xperimental situation. Secondly, the subject may attempt to justify 
his/her behaviour - leading to attitude change. The point is that, 
outside the limits of the experimental situation, the use of excuses 
as a means of coping with such dilemmas isý going to be far more 
likely than justification. 
So where precisely does this get us with cognitive dissonance theory? 
Zajonc, rather perceptively, compares the concept of consistency to 
the concept of a vacuum: for centuries the principle that nature 
abhors a vacuum served to account for various phenomena, until too 
many exceptions were found and the previous concept had to be 
changed. Human nature, we were led to believe, abhors inconsistency 
but now this principle needs to accommodate too many exceptions to 
be entirely satisfactory. Joule 
112 
would seem to be in concordance 
I 
with Scott on this issue, even if he is writing some twenty-seven 
years later. Echoing Scott, he says: 
reduction in dissonance is not prese, nted as a process that always orients 
cognitive activity towards greater consistency, but as a rationalisation 
of conduct which may adapt to an increase in certain inconsistencies, 
and even generate them. 
Joule interprets Festinger's theory as one of 11rationalisation of 
conduct" rather than the elimination, or reduction of , cognitive 
dissonance. The process of dissonance reduction, - therefore: 
is not governed by a principle of cognitive optionality, but is rather a 
post-behavioural process that can perfliVy well accommodate a 
certain imbalance between cognitions. .. 
Although ý Joule maintains he is offering merely "yet another version 
of cognitive dissonance theory", he is in actual fact suggesting, as 
near as damn it, an attributional approach to attitude change. 
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3.22ATTRIBUTIONAL APPROACHES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE 
In 1965 Bem'14 offered a completely new interpretation of cognitive 
dissonance theory using what is generally accepted to be an 
attributional analysis. According to this theory the effects that had 
previously been attributed to the psychological tension of cognitive 
dissonance can be explained in terms of self -attribution. It is 
suggested by Bern 
115 
that: 
the attitude statements which comprise the major dependent variables 
in dissonance experiments may be regarded as interpersonal 
judgements in which the observers and the observed happen to be the 
same individual and that it is unnecessary to postulate an aversive 
motivational drive towards consistency to account for the attitude 
phenomena observed. 
This alternative interpretation rejects the 'hypothetical internal 
processes' posited by cognitive dissonance theory, and instead sees 
the relationship between the stimulus (counter attitudinal behaviour) 
and response (dissonance) in terms of the individual's past "training 
history". Although initial objections to this interpretation may be on 
the grounds that it reduces a human being to a simple mechanism of 
stimulus and response we have to consider it as a possible alternative 
to dissonance theory. Drawing from examples suggested by Skinner, 
11-6 Bern explains that an individual's ability to respond to his/her own 
behaviour is a product of social interaction. He suggests that 
children are taught to make statements about internal events to 
which only they have direct access. A child can easily learn to 
describe "butterflies in the tummy" without exhaustive training but in 
training a child to describe pain, Bern gives as an example, it is 
necessary at some point to teach the child "the correct response at 
the critical time when the appropriate private stimuli are impinging 
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upon him. " Experiments by Schachter and Singer which manipulated 
the external cues of a situation suggested, furthermore, that subjects 
used internal stimuli to determine an emotional state, but the more 
subtle discrimination of which emotion was determined by external 
cues. Bern suggests then, that: 
the many subtle discriminations which individuals do make when 
describing their attitudes are based, rather, on the kinds of cues 
potentially available to an outside observer. In particular it is 
suggested that self-descriptive attitude statements can be based on 
the individual's observations of his own overt jfýavlour and the 
external stimulus conditions under which it occurs. 
What had previously been attributed to cognitive dissonance in the 
experimental situation is now, in Bern's analysis, attributed to the 
individual's own perception of his/her behaviour, i. e. the individual, 
after behaving in a particular way analyses the stimulus conditions 
which gave rise to the behaviour and deduces what his or her attitude 
must have been. 
118. Rather than feeling tension due to 
inconsistency, the individual is said merely to analyse his or her 
behaviour and the stimulus configuration that preceeded it in order to 
deduce his or her private attitude. Bern replicated the Festinger and 
Carlsmith experiment (op. cit. ) and as a result indicated that an 
outside observer would attribute the same attitudes as a result of the 
designated contra-attitudinal behaviour as the individual himself 
would. Other work by Ross and Schulman 
119 
compared the efficacy 
of each interpretation and, while they acknowledged that'some of 
their findings replicated'Bern and McConnell's 
120 findings, concluded 
that: 
the results in the present experiment suggested that self-perception 
theory may not fulfil its original fffpose. It is probably not a viable 
alternative to dissonance theory. 
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This illustrates the difficulties of evaluating one theory over the 
other: each theory, as Bern and McConnell point out, is capable of 
claiming territory not claimed by the other, and: 
one's choice of theory irýH-eas that overlap is diminishing to a matter 
of loyalty or aesthetics. 
But the criticisms that can be levelled at dissonance theory can be 
applied with equal justification to Bern's alternative. Consider the 
absurdity of the following scenario: outside a night club one night a 
scuffle breaks out and one man (A) punches another (B) on the nose. 
Now (A) says to himself, "Oh. I must have been very angry with him 
because I punched him on the nose. " It seems rather more plausible 
that he would say, "He made me very angry so I punched him on the 
nose. " Neither is it likely that (A) could mistake his state of arousal 
prior to the punch-up for anything other than anger. The immensely 
elaborate experiment set up by Ross and Schulman, mentioned 
earlier, illustrates the problem of going to enormous lengths setting 
up an experiment that bears no relationship to circumstances in the 
real world. 
3.2 3 CONCLUSION 
When we are talking about attitude change - or the potential for 
attitude change - we are basically talking about the presentation of 
new cognitive components and their effective concomitants, and the 
effect this has on an individual's belief system. If the new 
components are inconsistent with the existing belief system - fall 
outside the individual's la titude of acceptance - then the individual 
- 139- 
will undergo a mental balancing act in order to f ind a state of 
equilibrium which will result in her/his reformulation of belief system 
to incorporate the new components (attitude change), or rejection of 
the new component and restoration of the old belief system. 
Obviously there is a degree of latitude, and vacillation is possible 
between logically contradictory belief systems. It is essential, 
however, to appreciate the important of the subjective norm (see 
above) in this process - we are not isolated individuals but supremely 
social creatures for whom social contact and acceptance is essential. 
The individual's social group or 'reference group' plays an important 
part. Not only does the individual seek consistency within his/her 
inner world, but the members of his/her social group also demand 
that a relatively consistent picture is presented to the world. Again, 
within the group, a certain degree of discrepancy is permitted, but if 
certain tolerance limits are exceeded then the individual in question 
runs the risk of being rejected by that group. Group pressure to 
conform has been demonstra, ted in experi ments where individuals 
modify their opinions to conform to that of the group. The basis for 
this can be found in the profound human desire to be accepted, which 
has its basis in the long period in which the individual is utterly 
dependent for his/her pleasures and for life itself upon those about 
him. Allport 123 observed: 
During the f irst two or three years every event of importance to his 
well being occurs through the administration of other persons. ... It is 
obvious, therefore, that ... these social stimuli must acquire an early 
and universal significance. 
One of the most devastating means of punishment in the hands of a 
124 
human community is, as Berger points out, "to subject one of its 
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members to systematic opprobrium and ostracism. " The belief 
system or ideology of the individual's reference group, be it the Navy, 
the Conservative Party or the scientific community, therefore, helps 
to prevent vacillation between belief systems and various explicit and 
implicit means are employed to prevent questioning which might 
threaten the individual's allegiance to the group. In this way we can 
see that the social control of the group, both with regard to attitudes 
and behaviour, effectively limits the range of the individual's possible 
actions and thoughts in a particular situation and as Gehlen125 says, 
such a group or institution acts as: 
a regulating agency, channeling human actions in much the same way 
as instincts channel animal behaviour. In other words, institutions 
provide procedures through which human conduct is patterned, 
compelled to go, in grooves deemed desirable by society. And the 
trick is performed by making these grooves appear to the individual as 
the only possible ones. 
So the social group or institution protects the individual from 
quandary and, according to Berger, shuts out all other options in 
favour of the one that his/her society has predefined for him/her. It 
even bars these other options from his/her consciousness so that 
he/she works within unperceived boundaries unquestioningly accepted 
at both the physical and mental levels. The ideology or belief system 
of the social group comes to justify what is done by the group whose 
vested interests are served, and it interprets social reality in such a 
way that the justification is made possible. In being a member of a 
group/society we are presented with a world view that tells us the 
world is such and such and these implicit tenets form the basis of our 
opinions, beliefs and actions. In the same way, and we turn once 
again to Berger: 
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society supplies our values, our logic and the store of information (or, 
for that matter misinformation) that constitutes our 'knowledge'. Very 
few people, and even they only in regard to fragments of this world 
view, are in a position to re-evaluate what has thus been imposed on 
them. ThSyactually feel no need for reappraisal because the world 
view into which they have been socialised appears self-evident to 
them. Since it is also so regarded by almost everyone they are likely 
to deal with in their own society, the world view is self-validating. Its 
'proof' lies in the reiterated experience of other men who take it for 
granted also. 
No tr uer can this be than with the nuclear defence issue today where 
we can see this whole process at work. The belief in the utility of 
nuclear weapons for national security was laid down more than forty 
years ago (when military thinking was firmly rooted in conventional 
warfare with non-nuclear weapons), and with each passing decade 
gains credence, and reverence until we have come to believe that the 
course of action predefined by such a belief system is the only one we 
can possibly take, the only one weare capable of. 
We can see how this implicit world view provides us with off -the-peg 
assumptions, beliefs and arguments about how the world is, with 
which to clothe our ignorance. We accept it like a second skin and in 
so doing our cognitive processes can be applied to more 'important' 
issues like unemployment, the cost of living or next week's dinner 
party. 
We can appreciate, therefore, the difficulties encountered by an 
individual and by a whole society when new information emerges 
which threatens this system. We become fearful, uncomfortable, 
upset about the unimaginable power of destruction we have at our 
disposal, and it can be understood how many choose to retreat into 
an old belief system where they can find refuge in the reiteration of 
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their old tenets of belief. For those who accept new information, 
who question these implicit beliefs, it can be a long, painful process 
to a new belief system. Any reappraisal of the old system of belief 
will require the existence of another group which will help to bring 
about this metamorphosis and provide reference points for the 
individual's emerging belief system. In the following chapter we shall 
see to what extent this is true when we look at processes of change 
that have taken place for individuals in the 'real world' - outside the 
constraints of a laboratory. 
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FOOTNOTES ' 
1. Psychoanalytic theory def ines the threatening forces 
emanating from within as being the individual's own 
unacceptable impulses deriving their energy from the id which 
centers "... around the basic needs of man and their striving 
for gratification. These nee are rooted in instinctual drives 
and their vicissitudes ... " 
%. 
A far rqye satisfactory 
interpretation is put forward by Fairbairn in his object 
relations theory. Nevertheless ego-defences still apply but in 
terms of pretecting the ego from internalised bad objects. 
2. See. FORNARI F., (1976) The Psychoanalysis of War, Penguin. 
3. See BRONFENBRENNER U., (1961) 'The mirror image in 
Soviet-American Relations :a Social Psychologist's Report'. 
Journal of Sociology, 17,45-56, for an account of 'Mirror 
Imaging'. 
4. It is worth noting, with reference to Footnote I that whereas 
Freudian psychoanalysis sees aggression as a primary drive 
along with pleasure, Fairbairn and other non-hedonists see 
aggression as "the accompaniment of the fulfillment of all 
drive-aims" and not a libidinal drive per se. 
5. Interesting information came to light recently, in this respect. 
Micro Live, B. B. C. Television, 28th February 1987 revealed 
that in the U. S. A. politicians have access to information on 
members of the public which enables them to gauge their 
mail-shots more appropriately to the receivers attitudes. This 
has far-reaching political overtones when possible 
supporters/opposers of particular political measures can be 
identif ied and contacted with specif ically tailored 
information. The Conservative party follow a similar path, 
according to this programme. 
6. An experiment was carried out to prove that people could be 
taught to salivate at the sound of completely neutral words - 
this surely must be scientific research gone berserk - research for its own sake. 
7. A great deal of research has gone into examining the minutia 
of this and similar approaches - as indeed there has in many 
aspects of attitade change research almost to the extent of 
utter absurdity. 
ýý 
8. Although this may seem just like another example of 
experimentation outside the bounds of real-life, Rosenberg 
maintains that hypnotic suggestion "was employed as an 
experimental analogue of a broad class of non-hypnotic 
experiences which seem to produce affect modifications in 
everyday settings". As an example he says that an individual's 
inner needs and conflicts are attained through experience and 
"growth", and that while "old affects may come to heighten 
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frustration and tension ... the expression of new affects may 
operate to reduce needs and resolve conflicts. " 
9. Zajonc came in for some criticism after publishing this paper, 
see: LEVENTHAL H. The Integration of Emotion and 
Cognition, in Affect and Cognition ed. Clark M. Fiskes, 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, New Jersey, and himself 
retreated defensively in a later paper. _ 
10. Isuggest this is only the case when the cognitive judgement is 
not accompanied by strong affect - this will become an 
important point later. 
11. This refers obliquely to experiments by Brehm (see section 
later on Cognitive Dissonance) testing the cognitive 
dissonance hypothesis in which schoolchildren were induced to 
eat a disliked vegetable. No attempt was made in this 
experiment to use convincing arguments to change attitudes 
but depended on a counter-attitudinal behaviour - which met 
with some success. 
12. Colin Gray is quoted as saying in the Washington Post 16th 
April, 1982, "The United States must possess the ability to 
wage nuclear war rationally and that means keeping our policy 
free from the influence of 'guilty' scientists and 'religious, 
political-theoretically and frankly emotional premises" -A 
good example of this type of behaviour. 
13. Where inconsistencies and contradictions arise, it has been 
suggested by Tanguay, 76-. these can be attributed to faulty 
methodology rather than faulty conceptualisation. 
14. Of course, this analysis can equally apply on the other side of 
the debate. Those who are vehemently opposed to nuclear 
weapons are often called 'emotional', lirrationallp 'illogical', , i. e. they repress analytical, logical functioning leading to 
'depressive, catastrophic' reactions and extra negative 
attitudes towards nuclear weapons. 
15. Perhaps we have here a neurophysiological explication of 
'identifying with the enemyl In fact much of the 'split-brain, 
research has discovered par allels with psychoanalytic theory. 
See Gazzanga and LeDoux (1978) Op. Cit. Page HOPPE K. 
(1976) Split-brains and psychoanalysis, Psychological 
Quarterlyp 46,220-224. See also Bolton-King L., (1983) 
Beyond Ego: M. A. Dissertation. University of Bradford, 
Unpublished. 
16. See Petty R, Caccloppo J., (1981) Op. Cit. p. 255-256 for use 
of central and peripheral routes to attitude change which is 
rather a different matter, but nonetheless related to this 
analysis. 
17. We can turn once again to commisuratory research to see 
parallels here. In Gazzanga's experiments when information of 
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a 'terrifying' nature was shown to a subject's right hemisphere, 
although the cognitive verbal hemisphere was not pri vy to 
this information, the subject reported feeling "Kind of scared 
... jumpy ... nervous". In the same way for the person with 'functional commisuratoryl feelings of worry may be felt as 
cognitive and affective incongruities increase. 
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CHAPTER 4- 
AMERICAN ATTITUDES AND ATTITUDE CHANGE: A CASE STUDY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter' we will be studying the attitudes of a small 4roup - of 
American 'elites'. The reason elites were selected was not because 
the author feels in any way drawn into' the 'Cult of Power' but 
because it was hypothesised on the basis of Chapter two that 
attitudes amongst the informed/elite would be more clear-cut than 
amongst a 'mass' sample where belief systems tend to be less well 
organised. The reason American elites are the subject of study is 
purely circumstantial: the author had the opportunity to spend some 
time in the USA and took the chance to interview members of the 
military and political community. 
The interviewees can be divided into 3 groups: 
1. Navy -ý lower ranking: 
Captain J 
Captain B 
2. Navy - high ranking: 
Admiral NE 




U. S. Navy (retired) 
U. S. Navy (retired) 
U. S. Navy (retired) 
U. S. Navy (retired) 
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Each individual was interviewed for between half an hour and two 
hours. Although a schedule was drawn up of what needed to be 
covered the interviewees were allowed a fairly loose rein so that 
their expression of attitudes could be free-ranging. I shall consider 
each on an individual basis before analysing overall patterns and 
differences. So that all useful quotes could be used without causing 
embarrassment to the interviewees, these people will remain 
anonymous. - 
4.2 RO, POLITICIAN 
RO was a prominent politician during the 'sixties, holding high 
government office. He describes himself as someone who, over a 
period of a quarter of a century, has 11 thought about the use of 
nuclear weapons and the strategic objectives towards which that use 
was pointed, and the likelihood of achieving those objectives by their 
use. . ." He considered any suggestion that he had changed his 
attitudes as "absurd": 
I think there's a consistent stream in my thinking - maybe 
consistently wrong - but it's consistent. 
We can perhaps see him as a man very much lodged in a belief system 
prevalent at the time, but who was not entirely trapped by it. He 
was able to evaluate and question the prevailing world view to some 
extent and even, when he held office, instigate a degree of change. 
But the difficulties he encountered in doing this serve to illustrate 
the deadweight of a prevailing belief system and the pressures on an 
individual to conform. Perhaps we can see RO as a man who, as long 
ago as the 'sixties, was making that long painful process to a new 
system of belief, and is still in that process. 
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RO makes a particularly interesting subject for study because we can 
appreciate that the pressures on a public figure to conform are even 
greater than those on a private individual, and consequently 
attitudes and behaviours during office may be discrepant with a 
belief system out of office. So we can expect to see RO attempting 
to reconcile these incongruities with his existing self-imabe. 
Footnote 
hhe 
prevailing defence strategy within NATO when RO took office 
was one of massive retaliation, i. e. if the Soviet Union made the 
"smallest attack" on NATO forces in Western Europe, then NATO 
would launch a massive nuclear force against them. This RO, said: 
*** seemed, as one studied it, it seemed an inconcievable 
response contrary to the interests of NATO. 
He believed it was inconceivable that nuclear weapons could be used 
with benefit to the initiator and this is something he still believes 
today: 
... there wasn't a single piece of paper that showed 
how 
NATO could initiate use of nuclear weapons with benefit 
to itself. There wasn't then and by the way I don't think 
there is today. After more than twenty years of trying to 
develop plans for beneficially initiating use of nuclear 
weapons, NATO has been unable to do so. 
We can surmise that it was events during the Berlin crisis in 1961 
2 
which brought this home to him. In a BBC interview, paralleling an 
account in a book 
4 he outlined the events and says how he asked a 
senior allied officer what the Soviets would do and how NATO would 
counter. A series of moves and counter-moves were outlined for him 
which ended in resorting to the use of nuclear weapons: 
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And that experience of being forced to think how we'd 
respond militarily to Soviet pressure - being forced to 
hear from Senior Allied officials that we use nuclear 
weapons certainly required me to sit down and meditate 
whether such initiation of their use would be to our 
advantage. And I considered then and I haven't changed 
my mind one bit since then, that under no circumstances 
could NATO initiate the use of nuclear weapogs with 
benefit to NATO. It would lead to its destruction. 
[his emphasis] 
As a result, RO, as part of the Kennedy administration, helped 
develop and put forward what was known as the policy of 'flexible 
response', which was calculated to raise the nuclear threshold. 
Furthermore it was proposed, first to Kennedy and then to Johnson, 
that they never initiate first use of nuclear weapons. Five years 
later, flexible response was eventually accepted by NATO but in a 
very modified form which RO claims ". .. didn't go nearly as far as 
my private thinking went". After this, and especially after he 
ceased being head of an International organisation, RO's thinking 
moved further: 
it's moved towards negotiating, in so far as one can, lo 
a non-nuclear world. 
This solution, he says is, "stimulated in part" by the administration's 
SDI programme which, as outlined will: 
... stand in the way of any further offensive arms limitations. 
He sees SDI as having a destabilising effect on arms control which 
would impede moves towards a non-nuclcar world. This development 
in his thinking, which was surely ahead of its time, was evolving 
during his seven years in Government office and during the five years 
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he headed an International organisation. Throughout this time he was 
prevented by his office from engaging in the debate, but he 
participated more when he had left the Organisation. 
Although RO was critical of nuclear, policy during his term in the 
Defence department this didn't prevent him from being involved in 
one of the biggest nuclear weapons build ups in American history. 
Looking back on the period he explains this in terms of the problem 
of "proceeding on imperfect knowiedge of the other side's plans" 
which necessarily lead to worst case estimates. This was something 
RO saw as not unreasonable: 
**' if the worst case is defined as a sufficiently possible 
case to justify concern, if it is, then one has to have a 
potential response to that sufficiently possible case to 
justify that concern. 
Which seems a peculiarly 'circular argument. Initially the problem 
was caused by a defence department estimate that said there was a 
missile gap -in favour of the Soviet Union, which was leaked to 
Congress, while a second report that said there was no missile gap 
received no publicity. 
Footnote 2, this occured during the 1960 
Presidential elections and when Kennedy came in, with RO in an 
important governmental position: 
*.. it was very clear there wasn't a gap, or if there was it 
was in our favour in total offensive strength. 
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The subsequent build- up in weapons was, according to RO, due to 
the need to project forces five to seven years in advance: 
So we had to estimate what their force levels would be in 
166 to 168 and we had very, very imperfect knowledge. We 
had to assume that they would intend to use whatever 
they were capable of producing .... by the time '66 or 168 came around we had forces substantially larger than 
theirs. 
[his emphasis] 
He makes it sound almost accidental but if we turn to the Secretary 
of Defence's reflections in office written in 1968: 
,** we have acquired a considerably improved balance in 
our total military posture. That was the mandate I 
received from Presidents Kennedy and Johnson .... we 
were able to create a strengthened force structure ... 
with a massive superiority in nuclear retaliatory power 
over any combination of potential adversaries. 
Earlier he had written: 
*, * the United States currently possesses a superiority 
over the Soviet Union of at least three or four to one. 
Furthermore, we will maintain superiority by these same 
reaIII& criteria for as far ahead as we can realistically 
plan. - 
Which suggests that the build-up was a deliberate instrument of 
policy. However, at the same time RO emphasised then and 
reiterated in the interview that superiority was of limited 
significance; it didn't make the US less vulnerable to Soviet counter 
attack: "We didn't think we had superiority in any usable form, 
Y 
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never, never. " There is evidently a recurring incongruity. On the 
one hand is the drive for superiority (numerical superiority, 
Footnote 
2 RO is anxious to emphasise, not superiority per se , and on the 
other, that this (numerical) superiority, he recognises, does not 
actually enhance security. 
Footnote 4 This incongruity is, I suggest, 
indicative of an individual vacillating between two contradictory 
belief systems. This is further emphasised in the interview where RO 
is trying to make sense of his past behaviour in the light of his 
present belief. Retrospectively he is therefore inclined to attribute a 
more favourable interpretation on the events. Later in the interview 
he introduces the concept of parity to explain this mental balancing 
act: 
the width of the band of parity is very great. It didn't 
maýe any difference to us in October '62 whether we had 
an advantage of 17 or 15 to 1, or 2 to 1, or if they had an 
advantage of 2 to 1. It would have made no strategic 
difference at all. So in those terms superiority meant 
nothing - in terms of numerical superiority we had it, but 
numerical superiority doesn't mean anything. 
With regard to the Soviet Union's stationing of SS 20's in Europe and 
the US response with Cruise and Pershing missiles, RO almost 
confronts these contradictory approaches head-on. The Soviets, he 
said, had no reason to introduce SS20's in Europe, at least no military 
reason because their forces were already sufficient to deter NATO's 
use of nuclear weapons. Once they were stationed, he adds, there 
was no military purpose served by NATO deploying Cruise and 
Pershing: 
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*** if there's no military reason then there's a political 
reason otherwise they wouldn't have put them there .... 
whatever the political reason was would have been 
indicated if the other side had properly explained to its 
constituents that there was no military purpose served by 
the action; because there would be a political objective 
served only if the other side understood the action to have 
no military implication. If the West believes that the 
Soviets are strengthening themselves militarily by putting 
SS20's in - even though the Soviets know they weren't - 
they activated their political objective by increasing the 
West's fear of the Soviet military. But, if I said, and I 
convinced all the people in the West, that the Soviet 
military strength had not been increased by the SS201s and 
all they'd done was waste money that they badly need for 
their domestic economy, we'd all clap with glee and say 
"How great! they screwed it up! " But the West didn't say 
that they said "Oh my God they've put those S520's in 
there, we're at risk, we're in much worse shape militarily 
today than we were last year and we've got to respond 
militarily. " And that's absurd. 
[his emphasis] 
He outlines an 'Alice through the looking glass' world of bluff and 
counter bluff which leaves us not quite sure of which is the real 
image and which the projected image. But he is clear enough about 
his position on these missiles, because no military objective was 
fulfilled by them and because they actually add to crisis instability, 
he sees their removal as "highly desirable ... I think they should be 
removed. Absolutely". 
The fact that the (leaders of) European members of NATO are not so 
keen on the idea is, he feels, not due (as I suggested) to the European 
fears of the 'Soviet threat' that are enhanced by negative evaluations 
of the Soviet Union projected from the US (which was a suggestion 
he refused to countenance), but because: 
European thinking is way behind the US ... in 
understanding the realities of the nuclear age. Way 
behind. ... the politicians are behind the Chiefs in 
understanding the reality of the nuclear age. 
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He is, it seems, accusing European politicians such as Thatcher and 
Kohl of subscribing to an outdated belief system that he himself has 
long since outgrown and abandoned. RO illustrated this point -indeed 
the whole contradictory position of an individual in belief-system 
transit - by referring to a telt-vision interview in which Robert 
McNamara took part along with Holst, the Norwegian defence 
minister, Joffe, editor of a Munich paper and professor of security 
affairs, and a moderator. McNamara was arguing that ultimately 
"we would not need the nuclear deterrent, we could command 
conventional forces to deter Soviet conventional force aggression", 
Joffe disagreed, and the programme ended with McNamara 
suggesting that they could surely agree that the use of nuclear 
weapons would not benefit the initiator, that it would end in the 
destruction of the initiator: 
"Yes", says Joffe, "But", he says, "don't tell the Soviets 
that. " Now, I submit to you that that is an absurd 
position. This is the position of the security experts 
majority of security experts - in Europe. 
RO suggests that American thinking on nuclear defence has evolved 
beyond that of her European allies (except perhaps for people like 
Weinberger and Perle), and this of course includes his own thinking 
on the issue. But his thinking, it seems, has not evolved so far as to 
encompass the suggested removal of American nuclear bases in 
Britain. Although Britain giviýg up her own nuclear force is "for 
them [Britain] to decide" the American nuclear bases are seen as an 
entirely different matter. He emphasises strongly that they "are not 
US Nuclear bases - they're NATO nuclear bases" and for Britain to 
- 162- 
ask the US to remove the bases would be: 
- absurd. It's just absolutely absurd - and 
you talk 
a 
'ýOut the incorrect behaviour of the US at Reykjavik. u 
Well it would certainly be incorrect of a member of the 
alliance to unilaterally disarm. ... it's not for Britain to 
unilaterally decide they'll be pushed out now, [i. e. the US 
bases]. I think that would be a serious error if that were 
done. It would have adverse effects on the unity which . 
. is essential for the strength of the alliance. 
Perhaps the thinking of some of us Europeans has evolved further 
than that of some Americans.... 
4.3 PA, POLITICIAN 
PA is a senior US statesman who, as seems to be the rule with most 
of those interviewed, was not sure that his attitudes towards nuclear 
weapons had developed much, and when asked to outline his attitudes 
during the 'sixties he said he was a faithful disciple of Robert 
McNamara. As a member of the Nuclear Planning Group during this 
period, he was dealing with "questions of possible use of tactical 
battlefield nuclear weapons. " PA saw that the problem, in this 
respect, was: 
*,. trying to wean the Europeans away from the idea that 
nuclear weapons were somehow functionable with 
conventional weapons and that you could use nuclear 
weapons to remedy conventional defects. 
This suggests that conflicting belief systerns were already emerging, 
consonant with RO's statement that Europe was way behind America 
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in its conception of the nuclear age. PA goes further, however, and 
recognises that this dichotomy - conflict of belief systems-existed 
among American policy makers: 
We talk about nuclear weapons in deterrent terms but 
nonetheless if you look at actual declaratory policy and if 
you look at NATO doctrine - If you look at things like 
Presidential decision 59 -a lot of other things - they're 
really couched in nuclear war fighting terms. And that's 
why it's been difficult to make sense out of strategic 
policy because you have these totally divergent mutually 
exclusive themes. 
This, in PA's view, is not just a problem between the administration, 
civil policy makers and the military, but a divergence of views that 
exists within the military itself: 
:.. you've got a lot of statements by very capable, 
intelligent military leaders lik ,e 
Davy Jones, like a number 
of others - Maxwell Taylor - about the fact that they, as battlefield commanders, wouldn't know how to use a 
single nuclear weapon. But nonetheless you have the SIOP 
and you probably have something like 10-11,000 targets 
and the idea that you have to have a number of warheads 
to hit that number of targets is consistent only with 
thinking about a protracted nuclear war. So, as I say, 
there has always been this difference of view ... 
What the Nuclear Planning Group did, PA thought, was to reveal the 
contradictions in NATO policy which were highlighted by the 
Reykjavik proposals which the European policy-makers found 
threatening. He thought that they don't want anybody to say nuclear 
weapons are no good. "They want the declaratory policy to be that 
when the first Soviet tank rolls into West Germany, we hit Moscow. " 
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This policy, which suggested a scenario starting with conventional 
war, escalating to tactical, battlefield nuclear weapons, then a 
strategic exchange, PA found unbelievable: 
I didn't believe it and I didn't believe the Europeans in 
fact would want it, but what they want is the Russians to 
think that this would occur and it would occur 
automatically. 
PA believes that nuclear weapons "have a very, very limited utility" - 
to deter the other side using their nuclear weapons - but he is against 
any increase in nuclear technology because that assumes flexible 
response is possible: 
*. * that there is such a thing as flexible response -1 just don't believe that. 
He holds firmly to the idea that a 6uclear deterrent is necessary. In 
this respect his attitude diverges somewhat from that of McNamara, 
and perhaps it could be said that his attitudes have not developed 
towards the new way of thinking about nuclear weapons to such an 
extent as McNamara: 
The world runs on deterrents. That's the basis of the 
criminal code - you can rely on most people perhaps not 
to murder, steal, rape, but would you throw away 
criminal punishment? 
Nuclear weapons, for PA then, fit into a wider belief systern than 
nuclear deterrence and this comment gives us an illuminating insight 
into his world-view. 
Footnote 5, Nevertheless, PA stated that the 
systein of thought. When this lincongruity was pointcd out 
to him hc 
brought up the dangers of first strike: 
**. as long as each side is afraid that the other side has 
an offensive potential, then in a time of crisis there's 
always the problem of somebody moving first. I mean 
you're afraid the other side is going to conduct a surprise 
attack, so you pre-empt, and then all of a sudden you've 
got the war going - how do you stop it? And wars are 
very hard to stop. 
To reduce to the dange ,r of this, PA draws up what he sees as a likely 
scenario involving Yugoslavia and the "domino effect". He suggests a 
nuclear free corridor in Central Europe: 
**. just pull the forces apart and then you know people 
cou Id begin to think rationally about very substantial 
reductions in nuclear forces beyond the strategic levýl. I 
think that's what ought to be done. - 
'Substantial cutbacks in offensive nuclear forces and restraints on SDI 
would further- reduce the dangers, he thinks. But the problems 
encountered during PA's time as Under -Secretary of Defence for 
Internaiional Security underlines the difficulties to be encountered. 
He saw the SALT talks as a lost opportunity: 
I'd say that was the real tragedy. If we'd been able to get 
SALT talks started in the fall of 1968 we could have 
caught MIRTs. Because that was prior to advance testing 
and deployment ... 
Then the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia: 
That slowed kip the beginning of the SALT talks and by the 
time that could have started Mr. Nixon had been elected 
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and fie would not authorize Johnson to go ahead and begin 
the SALT talks. ... And then 
it stalled too long and by 
that time MIRVIs had been deployed. But that's one of the 
difficulties is that the discontinuity in policy has been a 
big handicap to arms control. 
The development of US MIRVs lead of course to Soviet MIRV-ing too, 
and another upward spiral of the arms race. PA can see the same 
dynamics developing with SDI: 
I can remember David Packard, who was Deputy 
Secretary of Defence, testifying that going ahead with 
MIRVs was giving us great bargaining power - and all it 
gave us was Soviet MIRVs. And we push with SDI and 
naturally we'll get a Soviet SDI and then we'll have a 
combination of a defensive arms race and an offensive 
arms race. So I say this situation is exactly the same as it 
was back in 1968. 
Development of 5131 will not lead to Soviet capitulation in the arms 
race -a position of strength that will get them to the negotiating 
table - but to Soviet counter measures, including an increase in 
MIRV-ing which, PA points out, "was exactly our response to the 
Soviet ABM. 11 If Carter had been re-elected instead of Reagan PA 
stated: 
there's no question in my mind that SALT (111 would ýa`ve* been ratified and we would have gotten into talks 
prior to the expiration of the protocol. But as it was 
when ... Reagan took office, the Reagan administration had no interest in arms control -I mean not at all ... not 
at all, I mean they all said so. .. Jean Ross ... at the Arms Control Agency said he couldn't find anybody in the 
administration who knew anything they wanted to 
negotiate about. .. and nobody ever accused Al Haig of being seriously interested in arms control. He testified 
against the SALT 11 Treaty - even though he hadn't read it. 
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When asked at what stage he thought the US was going to start 
negotiating sincerely, he replied 11198911, with a new 
President. Footnote 6 
there is no way you can get an arms control agreement 
with the present people in the administration. 
Reagan's commitment to SDI discarded the possibility of using it as a 
'bargaining chip' in any sort of negotiation - as was on the table at 
Reykjavik. Reagan, according to PA, 
really thinks that his contribution - that his place in 
history - is going to be assured by getting away from the 
threat of nuclear war by providing a defence - and that's 
what he believes. 
The situation is even bleaker in PA's eyes: 
I think he (Reagan] doesn't know anything. I mean 
you have to start off with that. I'm not saying that he's 
stupid. I've never known a stupid President, but in this 
field he's ignorant. He doesn't know anything about it - 
and he will never learn. 
There is no question in PA's mind that it is possible to negotiate 
sucessfully with the, Soviet Union. The stumbling block has been the 
US administration's belief in negotiating from a position of strength. 
The fallacy of the argument of building more weapons so you can 
negotiate from strength, in PA's view, is that the other side is unable 
to negotiate: 
If you're in a position of greater relative strength, to any 
meaningful extent, then the other side is foreclosed from 
negotiating. They've got to build up - and I think that's 
what people who talk about negotiating from strength 




It is, PA points out, the Soviet Union who have made all the 
concessions, right from the begining. But he feels that it is "easier 
for them to make the concessions than it is for a democracy". 
Nevertheless he admits: 
I used to think sometimes that if they treated me the 
same way I treated them I'd take up my bags and go home. 
The proposals put forward at Reykjavic, PA suggested, may cause 
the European members of the NATO alliance to resist the elimination 
of the Euromissiles because of the way in which the proposals were 
put forward without consultation with the allies - raising fears of de- 
camping and abandonment. On the question of Britain unilaterally 
nuclear disarming he could see no problem: 
* it seems to me it would be awfully hard for anybody io 
articulate a policy under which you could criticise 
Britain for wanting to get out of the nuclear arms 
business itself, and it's certainly a decision you can make 
and if done in the right, I see no problem with it. 
But PA was not quite so magnanimous on the question of removing 
American nuclear weapons (and there is no pretence here that they 
are NATO weapons, as with PO). That, he felt, was "a very different 
thing", although he admits that "I thought logically that the 
Pershings and ground launched missiles made no sense". As far as he 
is concerned it makes no difference where the weapons are launched 
from: 
If the men's room in the Kremlin goes up in a mushroom 
cloud, the Soviet Union are going to say: "I've been 
attacked by the United States" and that's the only thing 
they're going to think about. 
Despite feeling that nobody could fault the idea that someone wants 
to get out of the "nuclear business", the question of American bases 
is an entirely different question and appears, to PA, to be a unilateral 
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act that has nothing to do with European or NATO security, but is 
"strictly to do with the British getting out from under the nuclear 
threat". What he thinks Britain should be doing is pushing to eliminate 
the S520's and Cruise 
Footnote 7 but then he added, rather 
insensitively: 
and the Fill's - why worry about that? If the kussians don't. 
But he admitted that if he was the British Prime minister held make 
sure that there was a binding agreement under which no nuclear 
weapons could be fired from Britain without his permission, and also 
conceded that this was "probably not" what the US themselves would 
want. If the original Labour party policy were to be implemented, PA 
agreed that "pressure would be applied" to Britain but, he said: 
**- you're grown-ups, you're going to resist illegitimate 
pressure and you ought to be responsive to legitimate 
[ ressure. 
his emphasis] 
Furthermore there is the feeling in the US, according to PA, that: 
"The UK ought to recognise that we aren't going to do anything that's 
contrary to their interests". Of course, he said, Britain can't rely on 
this, but there is that feeling in the US because of the (so-called) 
"special sort of relationship". PA also subscribed to the popular idea 
that if Britain did go ahead with Labour's plans then it could lead to 
the withdrawal of US troops in Europe - something which was both 
desirable to the peace-minded groups and "very conservative groups" 
also. This is pre i ely where Gorbachov's appeal lies: 
... he feels that if lie continues to look like the good guy its going to encourage more of that sentiment. If you stop 
being afraid of the Russians then a lot of the 
configuration of forces is going to change quite 
dramatically -I mean, after all, NATO is a response to 
fear of the Russians. 
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PA suggested that Gorbachov could "make a real mess of things" by 
reducing nuclear forces. 
Footnote 81n doing so he would be eliminating 
the fear that is "the only thing that's holding NATO together". The 
way Gorbachov can do this is to demonstrate that the Soviets have no 
intention of attacking Western Europe, and what made PA optomistic 
that Gorbachov may initiate some such move was the fact that they 
had not tested any nuclear weapons for the last year and a half. He 
added: 
... no President of the United States could do that - there's no way any President of the United States could 
stop testing nuclear weapons for a year and a half while 
the Soviets went ahead. 
PA's scenario for reductions involved the Soviet Union making 
unilateral cuts in nuclear weapons, then calling on the World 
community and NATO leaders to instigate reciprocal responses. 
"That", he said, "would be a real sneaky thing for him to do ... that 
would be an awful evil thing for an Evil Empire to do and it would 
cause consternation in the United States! ... those sneaky Russians, 
they're throwing away nuclear weapons! " 
Events since this interview took place have shown PA's scenario to be 
quite prophetic, and his understanding, indeed empathy, towards the 
Soviet Union to be quite substantial. He said in the interview that if 
Gorbachov was genuinely sophisticated what he could say to himself 
is: 
... I'd like to see NATO break up. Now I'd like to stop having this potential threat of some move that's going to 
try and prise loose Eastern Europe from my control and 
turn it over to the West. And not only that, if I could 
break up NATO I could even relax a bit as far as Eastern 
Europe is concerned and then not have all the problems 
that I have had with it. The way to break up NATO is to 
dernonstrate that my intentions are peaceful and that the 
sole reason that I have nuclear weapons is to protect 
myself ... 
It would seern that PA's hopes for disarmament lie with the Soviet 
Union rather than with his own country. 
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4.4 CAPTAIN B. 
Background information 
Captain B is an ex-Polaris Submarine commander who spent all his 
working life in the US Navy or, when he retired from the Navy, in 
defence-related industry. By his own admission he " got in the Navy 
quite by accident -.. because of the war" and stayed in because he 
"liked it and got an education". At the end of the war he saw 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and spoke to a survivor. This experience, he 
told Wesleyan Undergraduates 
, made him appreciate the qualitative 
difference between conventional and nuclear weapons. Although the 
effect was the same as the fire-bombing of Tokyo, everything at 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki had "gone in a flash". Between 1964 and 
1967 he was commander of a Polaris submarine and following this he 
worked at the Naval War College until he retired from the Navy. He 
has been an active member of the Freeze movement for the last six 
years. 
Process of change 
The process of change in Captain B's thinking follows a distinct 
pattern which can be divided into four stages: 
1. uncritical stage 
2. growing awareness, critical thinking 
3. impetus to action 
4. active opposition 
Uncritical stage. During this period, including whilst Captain B was 
commander of a Polaris submarine, it can hardly be said that he was 
an ardent follower of nuclear defence policy - in fact he had minimal 
knowledge: 
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I didn't know anything about arms control negotiations, 
deterrence, all that sort of thing. We never thought about 
it, never talked about [it] it was just not part of our 
concern 
He felt that what fie was doing was "the best anybody could be doing 
at that time to guarantee that we didn't have nuclear war. " He had 
seen the effect of two small nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki; on board his submarine he had sixteen - each of them a 
hundred times more powerful than those used on Japan. When asked 
if he ever thought about using these weapons he replied: "No. I really 
didn't. No. " He was sure that while they were there this would 
guarantee they wouldn't have to use them. It is likely that he used 
the ego-defence of denial in order to carry out his job: he denied 
that they could ever be used, he didn't allow himself to think about 
the awful consequences: 
We didn't -I didn't and I don't think anybody else did - 
allow themselves to deal with the moral contradiction of 
retaliating with those things, we just didn't allow 
ourselves to think about that. 
and as a consequence: 
I didn't think it was immoral to do what I was doing. I 
refused to think beyond that. That's really what 
happened. 
So he was able to feel "comfortable" with what he was doing, "proud" 
of what he was doing, without bringing up images of the appalling 
destruction lie had seen at the end of the war and without having to 
entertain the notion that lie was the sort of man who could inflict 
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this sort of damage himself. It can be argued that he was both 
avoiding facing the inner reality of the kind of person he was and the 
outer reality of the dangers the world held for him . In so doing he 
was able to maintain a state of congruence between the cognitive (he 
was doing the best anybody could be doing to prevent war) and 
affective (proud, comfortable) components of his attitude. This state 
of congruence was further maintained by his identity within the 
Navy. This helped him to both focus on the positive aspect of his job 
("on the front line of deterrence") and ensure thatpositive attitudes 
were sustained through the consensus of his community which was 
characterised by certain approved attitudes where the individual's 
attitude becomes a function of the way in which he relates himself 
to the total membership group . Furthermore, Naval routine and 
the structure of command ensured that he was preoccupied with the 
day to day running of his ship which he acknowledged enabled him to 
focus on his immediate logistical problems rather than the wider, 
moral ramifications: 
Oh sure. Yeah. Sure has to be. Sure. Yeah it has to be. 
And what are the limits of that is the real question. It's 
real clear to me that if I'd been ordered to shoot, the 
questions that I would be dealing with was: is this a valid 
message? And how do I know it? And I check off the 
reasons I do. Is my ship ready? Are the missiles ready? 
Is the navigation up? So, so, so. Those are the questions I 
would be answering and solving down the line and finally 
shoot. I wouldn't even be dealing with the question is this 
moral? Should I do it? Is it right? 
Captain B was, then, further able to divorce his actions and 
cognitions from his feelings and avoid the psychological state of 
dissonance because the demands of his job ensured that everyday 
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problems dominated his cognitive processing. The sense of being "cut 
off from the world" added to the atmosphere of unreality, of 
unconnectedness with the real world or with his feelings. A 
potentially dissonant situation simply did not arise because he was 
able to deny, repress and avoid discrepant feelings and cognitions 
aided by a system that programmed its components to carry out 
orders like well-oiled and tested machinery, completely 
unquestioningly. It was not until Captain B began to gain more 
knowledge of Naval policy and planning that he started to think about 
the issue and begin, not so much to change his attitudes, but to 
formulate an attitude whereas before he had merely been carried 
along by the ideology of his reference group. 
Growing awareness , critical thinking stage. Doubts 
began to arise 
for Captain B when he worked on a study group for Electronic Long 
Range Missile Systems (ELRMS), in 1965, which eventually led to the 
Trident programme. No longer could he ignore the implications of 
nuclear defence when they were now talking about more accurate 
missiles, bigger warheads and with the capability of attacking Soviet 
land based missiles. This development, Captain B" firmly believed 
was nonsense, we shouldn't do that. " He thought it was "absolutely 
insane. " This was the first time he began to think through and 
become involved with Naval policy and he began to question the 
motivational basis for such decisions. He saw no reason for wanting 
to attack the Soviet missiles: 
You clearly don't attack them in retaliation ... and to 
pre-empt them I think is insane because they always will 
have the ability to retaliate with unacceptable damage, 
always. 
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In fact he became 11 so upset, so unhappy about what we were doing" 
that he decided to retire - lie could no longer involve himself with 
such a policy. This can be seen as the first stage of attitude change. 
Suddenly he could no longer justify these bigger, more powerful 
submarines on the basis of more deterrence - they were actually 
threatening to do to the Soviet Union what they had done to Japan 
but with weapons that were vastly more powerful. He could no 
longer deny that these weapons could and would be used, and we can 
hypothesise that memories of what he saw at Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
could no longer be repressed either - giving rise to such acute 
psychological discomfort that he just wanted to get out of the Navy. 
This was not the f Irst time that he had considered retiring -he almost 
did so before he took command of the Polaris Submarine, when he 
was seriously thinking of going into a Seminary and becoming a priest 
in the Episcopal Church. Despite his apparent pride and feeling of 
being comfortable with his role in the Navy we must suppose that he 
had some doubts and uncertainties at this time. Captain B also said 
that at the time, had he looked back on his life - had his life to live 
over and was a young person starting up - he would have been highly 
motivated to join the Church. Is this regret? It is difficult to say but 
clearly when he wanted to retire on account of Trident this was not 
the first time he had grave doubts about his role in the Navy. 
Instead of retiring, Captain B was offered a job at the Naval War 
College, which he accepted, and it was here that his knowledge 
developed and his emerging attitudes were accentuated: 
there in an academic atmosphere [11 began to really study 
these issues - I'd never really studied them before in an 
acadernic sense that I did there. 
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While he says it was these things that changed his thinking, it didn't 
really become a personal issue for him until he had retired and went 
to work in defence-related industry where he became "more and more 
troubled by what was going on in International politics". But what 
really "triggered" him to get active was an event some time later. 
Impetus to action. In November 1981 Captain B and his wife 
attended the commissioning ceremony for one of the first Trident 
Submarines, The Florida. This was the most crucial event in the 
process of his developing attitudes; he described it thus: 
it was the first time I'd seen a Trident submarine since I'd 
been in the programme - of course they were just an idea 
then - now this was the real thing and there was a speech 
by Senator Hawkins, the lady senator from Florida, and 
she talked about what a marvellous thing this weapons 
system was and it was sitting there along the pier and it 
was an impressive ... thing. And how it was really saf er 
today because we're commissioning this ship - much safer 
today. And I thought, you know that's not true, that just 
isn't true. And then, we visited the ship. Pauline and I 
walked throught it, talked with the sailors on there and 
some of the officers and I realised this was the best 
American technology could do, it really was. It was just 
incredible, far more than it had to be in my judgement, 
but nevertheless, o. k. there was a billion three ($1 
worth of ship and these were the best men our country 
had and they were trained up, they were smart, they were 
eager, they were really good people, believed in what they 
were doing - but the truth is the world would have been better off if they'd all just stayed in bed. 
As a result of his visit to the commissioning he wrote a letter to his 
local paper expressing his feelings: 
and just said that 1, that I really felt uncomfortable 
going to that commissioning and seeing this marvellous 
machine and those people and feeling deep in my heart 
that they were dead wrong, we weren't adding to our 
security. And that's all I said but that article received a 
fair amount of response. 
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Being faced with the reality of the Trident Submarine - which 
previously he had felt upset and unhappy about when it was still at 
the planning stage - triggered him into making a public statement of 
his feelings and state of discomfort. His actions suddenly began to 
fall into line with how he perceived the situation to be and how he 
felt about it. He had take the enormous step outside his previous 
reference group, which gave rise to the final stage of Active 
02posLition. As a result of his letter he was invited to join the Freeze 
movement which provided him with a new reference group that 
shared his own beliefs - and he beqame an active member to the 
extent that "it's almost a full-time job! " We can interpret the 
development of Captain B's attitude as fulfilment of the 'value- 
expressive' function (see above) in that he became dissatisfied with 
old attitudes which now seemed inappropriate to his values and which 
no longer provided a satisfying image of himself in a changing world. 
Indeed the 'knowledge function' (see above) also seems appropriate; 
i. e. Captain B's old attitudes conflicted with new information on the 
role and purpose of the Trident submarine and by inference Naval 
policy per se His beliefs may originally have been adequate until the 
whole emphasis of Naval policy appcared to change. Although 
Captain B's attitude is pragmatic in that he believes nuclear 
deterrence is something "we're stuck with, " he also believes that: 
We can't just walk away from it but we'd better ... get out of it as quickly as we can through negotiations and 
political settlements that change the climate. And I think 
that the real danger, I believe the worst serious danger in 
what we are doing now, is that o ocus on the nuclear 
business has caused us to fail to really understand the 
reality of modern warfare anyway. And the reality of 
modern warfare is that it's ... irrational for modern 
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industrialised nations to engage in war ... its intolerable to think about. Even if we didn't have nuclear weapons 
the destructive power of the conventional weapons we 
have is, incredible. Most don't even know that, don't 
even realise that we've quadrupled the capability of 
killing each other with conventional weapons since World 
War Two - and that was bad enough compared to World 
War One, and World War One was bad enough. You know, 
the progression from the Civil War to World War One and 
World War Two ... for industrialised nations is just 
enormous. So I think that we really need to understand 
that is not an acceptable instrument of policy for modern 
industrialised nations. 
Previously he didn't allow himself to think about the morality of 
nuclear deterrence and, therefore, didn't think it was immoral., But 
since joining the freeze his attitude is that it is "fundamentally 
immoral to attack civilians", immoral to hold them hostage and to 
retaliate with nuclear weapons. And finally he agrees with the 
Methodist Bishops that it is also immoral to threaten retaliation. 
Originally Captain B was able to ignore all these issues, they were 
"just not part of our concern". Now they are of deep concern to him 
and he considers a Freeze only as a first step: 
And then from there ... over the possibility of 
negotiating other reductions, and from there over the 
possibility of recognising we can negotiate with each 
other - we can rely on agreements that each perceives to 
be in its own interests. 
With regard to the possibility of limiting nuclear war, Captain B sees 0 
this as "absolutely not" possible and has no illusions about the 
outcome of a nuclear exchange: 
The end of civilisation on this planet, clearly. Absolutely, 
if not life. I think we can't even calculate or begin to 
understand the magnitude of what would happen to this 
planet. The nuclear winter concept is I think the first 
serious inkling we have and it's just the beginning of 
thinking about it. There are other things we just haven't 
even begun to think about it. But certainly civilisation as 
we know it would end. I believe it. 
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At first glance Captain B appeared to have undergone a radical 
change of attitude: from Polaris Submarine commander to active 
member of the Freeze movement. After close analysis we can 
appreciate that this was not the case: his attitude developed from an 
unthinking acceptance of mainstream ideology at a superficial level, 
when he avoided any issues, thoughts or feelings that threatened his 
identity within his chosen group. Although many of the theories 
outlined in the previous chapter seem appropriate to understanding 
the processes at work, it would appear that incongruent elements of 
thoughts, behaviours, and feelings play an important part and that 
while these elements can be kept in isolation by many internal and 
external strategies, there is no necessityý for attitude change or 
development. However, as human beings we are ever struggling to 
make sense of our world, both internally as far as our innermost 
feelings are concerned and externally as far as the cognitive world is 
concerned. Our attitudes, I suggest, are a juggling act between the 
two, seeking a state of balance, harmony. That this is a difficult 
act, often only finding a temporary, perhaps unsteady equilibrium, is 
further illustrated by Captain B who, while his attitude may be firmly 
against the immorality of nuclear deterrence, still feels in a dilemma 
when he considers his former comrades: 
My problem with that is that I'd hate to say to my former 
comrades who are doing the job on those ships today that 
what they're doing is immoral. I'd have to say that. In 
fact I don't think I could say it, so I'm really in a dilemma. 
This suggests how pervasive is the power of his former reference 
groups, a fact that was further indicated during an informal chat over 
lunch when Captain B with obvious pride talked about his son in the 
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Air Force. He explained how he didn't want to influence his son's 
decision but said, nevertheless, how his son would be swayed his way 
when on leave and would go back to his squadron saying how he'd try 
to influence his friends. But Captain B knew full well that once his 
son -was back amongst them he would swing back to their way of 
thinking. 
4.5 cAPTAI-,; i 
I 
Captain J was in the Navy for 26 years, retiring in 1978. The last 
three years he spent in command of a Polaris Missile Submarine. He 
now works for a Defence Information Group. Like Captain B, Captain 
J didn't join the Navy from any ideological commitment: 11. .. it was 
a sort of accident. I enlisted in the Navy as with so many other 
people, to get away from home. " He expanded on this: "I mean 
almost everybody goes in the Navy - wants to see the world and 
usually has problems at home. I discovered that in the twenty-six 
years I was in. " Although Captain J maintained that his attitude 
didn't change, it is possible from the interview to determine a certain 
change of position which he expresses in terms of: 
what I was doing then was trying to prevent nuclear war. 
What I'm doing now is trying to prevent nuclear war from 
a different point of view. 
The development of this "different point of view" falls into three just 
discernible stages: 
1. uncritical stage 
re-evaluation 
3. emerging point of view, flux. 
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Although these stages are by no means as clear-cut as those outlined 
in the previous interview, i number of parallels with Captain B are 
discernible. 
1. Uncritical stage. We are really only concerned with the period 
after 1960 when the submarines were nuclear armed. Once again it 
was the technical and logistical problems of having nuclear weapons 
on board which were the primary focus of attention: 
Well, I think what nuclear weapons represented wasn't 
anything we thought that much about. It was - there were 
some technical aspects of bringing the nuclear weapons on 
board that provided us with new challenges. Primarily the 
requirements were for very accurate navigation. And 
that was what we were more or less extremely involved 
with, very accurate navigation and constant 
communication. 
There was, he said, no ideology involved, it was just the technical 
interest: 11 but nobody really thought about it - the weapons. " He 
knew nothing of deterrence policy: 
Not at all. Not at all. As a matter of fact there never 
was any -I mean - just passing knowledge that our major 
purpose was to prevent war. 
Captain J was "reasonably happy" with this state of affairs - his main 
concern was getting ahead: 
I wanted to be Executive Officer and I wanted to be 
Captain ... Commodore ... I wanted to make Admiral. 
And there was very little discussion of any "Soviet threat". Their 
primary role, Captain J saw, was to make sure the number of times 
they went down equalled the number of times they came up. As far 
as the possibility of having to use the nuclear weapons was concerned 
lie didn't really think about it. Again as with Captain B, Captain J 
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could be said to have become anaesthetised by the routine aboard 
ship and in Captain J's case habituated to the drill: 
I mean maybe the first time, the first time I went on 
patrol and we used to have these tests, weapons systems 
and radar tests in which we got a message and depending 
on which ship you were on, they might or they might not 
tell you that it was a drill. And the first time you see 
them getting ready to launch these missiles is a pretty 
awesome thing to see. But eventually you got around to 
the point where it meant nothing. I mean you first of all, 
you got tremendously involved in the ship itself. 
Once again the possibility of using the weapons can be easily denied 
and we can appreciate again to what a large extent the routine of 
Naval life conspires to preoccupy cognitive processes. Captain J 
thought that even if he had thought about having to use the weapons, 
it would have made no difference to how he felt about his position 
because "undoubtedly we would have been subjected to 
indoctrination" and 11 there would have been all sorts of efforts to 
excuse what we were doing. " People just took it for granted, he 
said. There is no spontaneous reference to how he felt about his role. 
His saying he was "reasonably happy" about the situation was in 
response to the question: "And you were happy with what you were 
doing? " 
Re-evaluation. Captain J was, however, "upset" during the 
formulating of the SALT I Treaty: 
That is one time my attitudes got a bit difficult 
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His attitudes got a bit difficult - as long as he was able to avoid the 
implication of policy he could feel "reasonably happy" until he began 
to question the recieved wisdom of the direction in which he 
perceived planning to be going. The problem for Captain J was that 
he: 
didn't like the idea that we were trying to get the MIRV 
weapons out before the SALT I Treaty was concluded. 
The realisation that the military were not a hundred percent in 
favour of limitations had, Captain J said, a lasting effect: 
It became a little bit clearer to me that, you couldn't 
depend on the military to - let me put it this way: what 
the military's goal is in reference to treaties is to look for 
the loopholes and exploit them. And I thought, I don't like 
that. 
Originally Captain J considered the best way to prevent nuclear way 
was with nuclear weapons, but gradually his point of view changed - 
his objective was still to prevent nuclear war, but he felt it could 
best be achieved through arms control. Although Captain J couldn't 
say when this changeover came, we can surmise that his realisation 
that the military couldn't be depended upon to take treaties seriously 
-their main objective was to find a way around them - was a crucial 
moment. 
3. Emerging point of view, flux. Captain J began to realise that 
there were far more nuclear weapons than were needed to deter war 
and that the only way to limit them was through negotiation. He also 
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realised that if it was possible to negotiate limits then " obviously 
you could maybe negotiate them away. " Clearly this was not the 
path being taken by the military at the time and Captain J believed 
that the way the U. S. was building up the numbers of weapons not 
covered by treaties (the 'Euro-missiles' and sea-launched Cruise 
missiles) was: 
bad in all respects. I think that it's a violation of the 
Treaty really - unilateral violation of the Treaty ... 
Of particular concern to Captain J is the way the Navy refuses to 
acknowledge the presence of nuclear weapons on board ship when 
entering foreign ports - this is an area in which he has become 
particularly active and it is something he sees as "totally anti- 
democratic" and against "all the principles the United States, in 
theory, stands for". Captain J's attitudes have not turned against 
nuclear weapons in any clear-cut way and we can see here the 
difficulties faced by an individual who takes the step from one 
reference group to another, from one way of thinking to another. 
This is a very similar problem to that faced by Captain B. Captain J 
still believes that: 
there probably is a certain amount of logic in the fact 
that nuclear weapons have prevented a major war. 
But he adds: 
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Despite this somewhat ambivalent position he sees the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons and the likelihood of accidental nuclear war as 
greater threats than that posed by the Soviet Union. We can 
appreciate that this is a man still juggling for a state of consistency 
between opposing belief systems -a point that becomes clearer when 
he talks of Reykjavik: 
Let me just say that I'm coming to this point of view - its 
not one I've always had - I'm coming around to this point 
of view in the last few months that we really don't know 
what the Soviets would do if we did say yes ... I think it 
could be a bluff. 
Captain J is in favour of negotiating limits on nuclear weapons but at 
the same time we can see him vacillating again when he talks of 
cutting back on nuclear weapons. The reduction proposed in table 
4.1, he believes does not look like a "reasonable strategit force" 
because it increases the possibility of one side feeling it can launch a 
first-strike and not suffer "unacceptable damage" from retaliation. 
The basic change in his position, Captain J sees, is that he now 
appreciates the poverty of deterrence as an international system and 
that: 
we're stuck with nuclear weapons until we can understand 
that war is not a way of dealing between nations. Not so 
much nuclear war, but war itself. 
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4.6 REAR ADMIRAL EU 
Rear Admiral EU had a long career in the US Navy before retiring in 
1980. He became Rear Admiral in 1972 and served in a major theatre 
as director of military operations of all US forces. His final post was 
in the Pentagon where he was engaged in US naval planning for 
conventional and nuclear war. Since retirement he has become 
Deputy Director of a Defence Information Group in Washington. He 
had doubts about the utility of nuclear weapons early on in his career 
but, like many of the other people interviewed, the Navy dominated 
his thinking and it wasn't until he left the service that he took part in 
active opposition. 
Rear Admiral EU, looking back at his early career in the US Navy, 
said he "probably had accepted at face value the fact that we 
dropped two nuclear bombs to end the war, to save American lives 
and so on", and that he had very little awareness of the new situation 
that existed since the splitting of the atom. During 1955 and 1956 
he was trained with these weapons and took part in planning the 
destruction of actual targets. "Practical and pragmatic concerns" 
enabled him to ignore any moral implications which he also avoided 
"on the grounds that I'll never have to do it". Again, Naval routine 
enabled him to avoid thinking about using the weapons and at the 
same time he was able to deny the possibility that he would ever have 
to use them. But right from this period Rear Admiral EU says it 
became absolutely clear that there wasn't any way one could fight 
with nuclear weapons: 
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I had one target that, had I destroyed it, that would have 
had relatively little effect on military relationships - it 
was a target that the Navy had on its target list to justify 
having the weapons, to justify the budget, to justify the 
numbers - and destroying this supply depot, which 
unfortunately was located in an urban area would have 
resulted in an estimated 600,000 casualties - and you can't 
fight that way. There is no military objective that 
warrants the use of nuclear weapons. So in 1958 when I 
was a student in the Naval War College and really had 
time to go thought this in detail and think about it ... I 
wrote a thesis that the Navy ought to get out of the 
[nuclear] war-fighting business - should get rid of our 
nuclear weapons, our nuclear missiles and design and train 
a Navy that would actually defend the United States of 
America ... [his emphasis] 
Whilst America was adding to its ability to destroy the Soviet Union, 
the Soviets were adding to their ability to destroy the US and Rear 
Admiral EU saw at the time that this was no defence. This. is the 
same concept of defence that exists today. Nevertheless, Rear 
Admiral EU said that at the time it was easy to justify more and 
more weapons because "I think I was more inclined, in those days, to 
accept at face value those horrible estimates (of Soviet 
capabilities]. " The reason he was able to do this, and here we can 
detect that vacillation between belief systems that he must have 
been going through, was, he felt: 
Well, it was my training, it was my mind-set. I was 
supposed to defend the United States of America and 
according to Intelligence tables and reports and so on, 
here's what the Soviet capability was! 
Although Rear Admiral EU believed back in 1956 that nuclear 
weapons could not be fought with and that they did not increase U. S. 
security, he was still very much trapped in the "mind-set" or belief- 
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system that prevailed in the Navy. He spent "more time at sea in 
the operating forces than 99% of my contemporaries" which enabled 
him to avoid thinking about the implications of nuclear defence 
policy, and it meant, as he put it, that: I simply didn't get charged 
with any of the responsibilities in this political process. " He not only 
ignored it, but also he didn't have any way to be part of it and being 
commanding officer of a ship meant: 
You are just really engaged making sure your unit's ready 
and it's safe, that the people are well cared for and so on. 
When you're on the staff directing operations you work 
eighteen hours a day, just doing it. You just don't have 
time or any authority to intervene in the process. 
[his emphasisJ 
Another factor of being in the Navy that Rear Admiral EU recognised 
as a factor that helped to maintain a certain way of thinking was the 
"legal/ethical sort of thing" - that of a professional with a job to do 
and orders to obey. That level of responsibility and also "personal 
stimuli" were important factors: 
... ambition, earning a living, caring for your family, 
mortgages to pay and one thing and another. So that, as 
you work in the institution, you simply learn that it is 
very unwise to be a stormy petrel or the hair shirt always 
saying "This won't work, this won't work". You find you 
can raise objections, you can write a thoughtful appraisal 
and so on and have it dismissed - as my proposition was dismissed - by a very senior naval officer who said: 
"Young man, if we did what you recommend the Airforce 
would get every dollar on the budget and we wouldn't even 
have a Navy. " He didn't deal with the logic of the 
arguments, he just dealt with the outcome as he saw it, 
which was: the Navy would be giving up the nuclear 
mission. 
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It wasn't until 1970, as a Flag Officer, that he "started questioning 
the whole idea of the nuclear relationship", as soon as he started 
finding out exactly what nuclear weapons were and how they would 
be used in a conflict. He began to question Soviet capabilities at the 
time when he was Naval Task Force Commander in the 
Mediterranean and had "more access to responsibility for considering 
how to deal with them. " Later, when he had to deal with Soviet 
forces, plans and capabilities, American forces, plans and 
capabilities, and the security and readiness of 6000 US nuclear 
missiles: 
Once again I found we could destroy Europe with those 
weapons over and over and over again. We certainly 
couldn't defend anything with them, nor could the Soviets 
defend or gain anything with theirs. ý But then you took a 
look at the military balance of conventional forces and it 
was clear that our nuclear preparations were handicapping 
us in building and maintaining an effective conventional 
posture/capability. We kept putting all this reliance on 
nuclear weapons, at tremendous cost by the way, and 
inhibiting the capability to be f ully prepared 
conventionally. And furthermore I began to have these 
questions. You know, why would they want to attack? 
He saw "an awful lot" of decisions being made for political reasons 
like the deployment of INF: 
The Pershing 11 missile was funded in the army budget in 
1974 ... so we had plans from that day on really to have 
this weapon, but there wasn't any clear mission for it. 
The reason we had withdrawn our Intermediate Range 
Missiles 12,15 years before, was because there wasn't 
really any requirement for them; we'd covered all the 
targets by other, more reliable and more secure means, but now we're talking about sending them in so it must be 
for some other purpose than military. We didn't even 
know what kind of warheads to put on! 
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In 1979 Rear Admiral'EU was assigned to Plans for Policy Operations 
at the Pentagon where he was supposed to "develop plans to support 
Navy policy, " but he retired within five months. He saw no chance of 
changing things there: 
Most of the decisions are made for political reasons 
related to budget process and inter-service rivalry and all 
of the determinations are made way over Rear Admirals' 
heads. All you ever are doing really is developing the 
paperwork that provides a facade, the sophistry to support 
the decisions, and you finally wake up one morning and 
decide you don't want to go to work because you know 
that what you're going to do is just going to be futile. 
You finally say: "Well, I don't have to go anymore, I'll 
retire. 
[his emphasis] 
It is very much his opinion that inter-service rivalry provides the 
impetus for new nuclear weapons deployment. While at the Policy 
Operations it became obvious to him that there was no "thoughtful or 
logical appraisal of what the real needs of the Department of 
Defence were in support of national strategy". Each service 
competed with its rival for a maximum portion of the defence 
budget. Even US foreign policy, he felt, is "terribly out of balance', 
with US real defence needs in that it gives primary emphasis, to 
military measures to support foreign policy: 
When we put military elements into our foreign policy, to 
a degree I've never seen before and to a degree which is 
clearly detrimental to our long-term interests, all we are 
really doing is perpetuating conflict and violence... 
Because so much new money has been put into the nuclear systems, 
Admiral EU sees the conventional capability being starved. All the 
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forces, he believes, have urgent conventional requirements. But, he 
says: 
they are putting all the money, all the new money, 
into these creatures; things like stealth bombers and 
Trident D5 missiles, SDI. So that the natural competition 
amongst the services for an element of conventional 
defence capabilities is accentuated by the fact that they 
are competing against the strategic demands which don't 
really benefit the structure of the services near as much. 
[his emphasis] 
Despite this competitive spirit among the services for nuclear 
weapons rear Admiral EU stated that: "I don't know of a single 
professional officer who thinks you can fight with nuclear weapons. I 
don't know of any professional officer either in the US or in the 
Soviet Union. " The main body of the Soviets' public position is, he 
believes, that you can't fight with nuclear weapons, that it's illogical. 
But, still, inter-service competition exists for more nuclear weapons 
because: 
That's where the budget is. If you give up the nuclear 
mission, then the money goes over to somebody else who 
says we can do it. 
Rear Admiral EU suggests that America uses somewhat the same 
tactics within the NATO Alliance as the Soviet Union uses to 
maintain their alliance: 
The US makes the decisions - defines the threat - that's 
the thing! We're the ones who keep saying the Soviets are 
out to take over the world - they're going to kill us unless 
we maintain our strategies. 
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He says that this now is "absolutely wrong" and that there is no 
chance of reaching any arms control agreement with the Reagan 
administration because their goal is military superiority: 
They can deny it all they want, but up until 1983 they 
were foolish and candid enough to explain their concepts 
and since 1983 they'e simply gone underground ... the 
programmes are still the same ... Arms control is totally incompatible with military superiority ... So you can 
either have and pursue military superiority or you can 
pursue equal security based on arms control procedures. 
You can't do both. 
America's failure to negotiate seriously, Rear Admiral EU feels, 
could lead to Gorbachev being "forced out": 
it's frightening to think that a time has come in the 
relationship of the two sides, that there is willingness 
over there to accommodate and to reduce the dangers, 
and we are rejecting it in hopes of creating a superior 
relationship. 
If his recommendations, including a long series of steps, confidence- 
building measures, negotiating agreements, and movements were 
carried out, he believes that by the year 2000 both NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact could be dissolved: 
**. that should be our objective ... to permit the 
restoration of the normal international relationship 
between sovereign states. 
US tyranny is illustrated, in Rear Admiral EU's view, by America's 
attempt to use muscle to force the New Zealand government "into 
going along with our decisions about their security.,, it is the type of 
- 194 - 
tyranny that could only be possible should Britain draw away from 
American policy but, EU divulges: 
*i* it's been happening with respect to all the NATO 
allies for a good many years, although a little more 
subtly. 
The basic problem, however, as regards attitudes about nuclear 
weapons, he believes, is that everything has changed "except that 
we simply don't admit it and [continue to] pursue this dual goal of 
superiority. " 
The whole establishment, Congress, the manufacturerst 
everybody who constitutes the power structure, are still 
thinking about relationships in the world as the basis of "if 
you've got enough military power you are safe and you can 
make the other people do what you want them to do" 
Although Admiral EU is unwaveringly in favour of reaching a stage 
where there are no nuclear weapons at all, he confesses that he sees 
no way of getting there except by a long continuous process which: 
move[s] away from nuclear policy by time, move[s] along 
into the era of no nuclear weapons and no forces which 
threaten the survival of the human race. 
4.7 ADMIRAL NE 
Background 
Admiral NE spent forty-one years in the U. S. Navy and during this 
long career his positions included Carrier Fighter Pilot, Assistant 
Chief of Naval Operations, Deputy Director of the Joint Target 
Planning Staff and latterly Commander in Chief of all U. S. forces in 
a major theatre -a position he held until his retirement in 1976. He 
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currently'works with his wife on a Committee concerned with East- 
West relations, described as an organisation of " very credible and 
experienced US/Soviet experts who work'to improve various aspects 
of US Soviet relations ... from trade, to diplomacy, to labour " for 
the most part made up of government officials. 
Attitudes 
Admiral NE maintains his attitudes towards nuclear weapons: 
"haven't really changed that much", that he has never thought nuclear 
weapons had any useful, military purpose. When nuclear weapons 
were f irst introduced at the end of the war he believed then that it 
was: 
an extraordinary military, political mistake. Thought so 
at the time. 
At the time he was Air Operations Officer for the Second Carrier 
Task Force operating in Japanese waters at the end of the War. He 
thought the bombing of Hiroshima was not a necessity: 
Japan was completely defeated, there was no necessity to 
drop those bombs. 
From the start, when the forces were being armed with nuclear 
weapons, Admiral NE was against them on the grounds that they had 
"no sensible military use, " although this did not stop him serving two 
years at the Joint Strategic Planning Centre in Nebraska, whose 
function is 11... to target nuclear wcapons for the United States-" He 
"made a distinction" herc bccause the weapons were being targetted 
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in order to provide a credible deterrent against attack by nuclear 
weapons. Whilst he was still in the Navy, Admiral NE made no 
secret of his attitude towards these weapons however: 
I have spoken quite a lot while I was in, but not publicly .. 
.I made my views quite unequivocally known while I was in uniform. Incidentally, it was not that dangerous, I was 
promoted a couple of times afterwards. 
When asked how he could account for this his answer was: 
I think that a good many people agreed. I remember 
making a speech at the Naval War College, while I was a 
two-star Officer, not very different from -the views I 
publicly espouse now - and I was promoted twice after 
that. 
The key factor here is probably that he did not speak out publicly As 
long as disagreement was kept within Naval circles - i. e. a consistent 
picture is presented to the outside world -a degree of nonconformity 
or discrepancy is permissible. But it is clear that he was aware just 
how far he could safely go without jeopardising his chances of 
promotion. Although he was not told he must not speak out publicly, 
he acknowledged that: 
**, I thought I'd been prompted, the chain of command 
existed. .. 
He did not exceed the limits of tolerance permitted by the chain of 
command, even though these were only implicit, and in so doing the 
Navy were able to keep a man they wanted and he was able to keep a 
good conscience! Furthermore, it is likely that only those in positions 
of some power could be safely allowed to speak out against nuclear 
weapons - they arc, after all, part of the system. 
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The incongruity of Admiral NE's career in the Navy, with his long- 
standing rejection of nuclear weapons may be difficult for us to 
reconcile. But it must be borne in mind that he first became a Naval 
Officer in 1935, so lie had been part of the Navy for more than 
twenty years by the time nuclear weapons were introduced into the 
service. It seems possible that Admiral NE reconciled this 
incongruity by denying the fact that nuclear weapons have anything 
to do with Naval Policy - an assertion he made no less than nine 
times during the first quarter of an hour of the interview. He 
actually became quite agitated when pressed on this point, suggesting 
that it was causing some psychological discomfort to have his ego 
defense probed in this way. This denial basically took three forms: 
1. nuclear weapons play no part in naval operation 
2. nuclear weapons have no sensible military use 
3. the Navy does not rely on nuclear weapons. 
What he is really doing is confusing his own attitude towards nuclear 
weapons with that of the Navy per se. He appeared unable to 
distinguish between the two, which caused some confusion during the 
interview. These merged attitudes are exemplified in his fourth 
denial: 
Let me say again, nuclear ballistic submarines have no 
sensible military use, form no part of Naval capability 
either in Great Britain or here or elsewhere in the Alliance. 
To begin with he asserts his personal belief which then becomes 
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confused with Naval policy. It is patently obvious that nuclear 
weapons and plans for their use are important aspects of Naval 
policy - it has even been suggested that it is sea-based nuclear 
weapons that will be used first in an exchange with the Soviet Union - 
a fact that Admiral NE is unable to accept. This confusion, however, 
is made all the easier, for example, by the ill-defined, ambiguous 
nature of the new Maritime Strategy: 
. the often vague descriptions of the strategy offered 
the Navy leVs the Maritime Strategy an ambiguous or 
elastic quality. 
This 'elasticity' allows people like Admiral NE, who are opposed to 
nuclear weapons, to accommodate themselves in the Navy without 
being constrained by nuclear policy, and the ambiguity permits him 
to turn a blind eye to aspects with which he does not agree. 
According to Admiral NE's testimony, there are many Naval people 
opposed to nuclear weapons: 
I don't think you'll find many people in uniform that are 
so nuts [about nuclear weaponsJ like these civilians in the 
Defence Department. 
If, as Admiral NE suggests, there are, many more Naval officers 
opposed to nuclear weapons then there must be many more engaged 
in this difficult balancing act between incongruities of belief. How, 
then, is nuclear policy perpetuated amongst these unwilling 
custodians? The Admiral's reply was: 
Because in this country, in our dernocratic principles we 
have civilian control over the military and if civilians 
appointed are zealots from the right wing - unless we 
want to do like the Argentines or something - this is what 
we do: we take our orders. 
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The US Navy, Admiral NE maintains, does not depend on nuclear 
weapons; its purpose is (and he quotes the Maritime Strategy) to keep 
the seas open and maintain linkages with the Alliance and to "project 
and sustain" power. The US in Admiral NE's opinion has a special 
responsibility for this because: 
There are strong countries, there are free countries, and 
we're the only one that's both; we've got a special 
responsibility for freedom around the world. We have to 
be able to project and sustain power and we have to be 
able to defend this country and our allies. In all these 
nuclear weapons play no part. 
Although Admiral NE maintains a degree of autonomy from Naval 
ideology - viz nuclear weapons - he is nevertheless imbued with 
Naval dogma: the belief system still has quite a stong hold on him. 
The NATO doctrine of responding to a conventional attack with 
nuclear weapons is, he believes, "absolute lunacy" and, he adds: 
... totally without, foundations because no American President with all his marbles is going to unleash nuclear 
war, devastate Europe, in order to save it - devastate the 
whole of the United States - the devastation of Russia 
would be small recompense for that. The notion that it 
could be limited to some so-called tactical nuclear use is, 
I think, absolutely fallacious. No commander, whether 
lie's Russian or Allied could have the enormous explosions 
going off and say 110h, this is only limited and I'll reply in 
only a limited way" ... It just flies in the face of common 
sense. 
What Admiral NE thinks the Europeans can rely on the US to do is to 
fight with the conventional forces: 
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... when we have tens of thousands of troops over there - 
that's a certainty. And that's what you can count on. And 
so the situation is quite the reverse of what people seem 
to think. It's not the nuclear guarantee its the fact that 
we've got our troops over there and those commitments. 
That some Europeans should feel "alarm and indignation" at the 
Reykjavik proposal to reduce European weapons filled Admiral NE 
with scorn, and the antipathy felt towards Europe's apparent 
addiction to US nuclear weapons - which was strongly expressed by 
RO, also and is felt by many American military - was clearly 
expressed: 
I'll tell you how they [the Europeans] are going to defend 
themselves - pull up their socks! This is all elaborate 
camouflage for not taking care of their own defence. For 
the German General tell him there's one thing he can do 
right quick and that is to start digging trenches and tank 
traps along his border. 
Again we find the same frustration that we encountered with RO, 
where two contradictory belief systems came into conflict: the 
emerging belief system among some Americans that nuclear weapons 
serve no military purpose and must be reduced and the belief system 
still prevalent among many European elites that Europe must have 
these weapons for 'defence'. 
Footnote 9 This frustration surfaced with 
some vehemence when the Admiral suddenly burst out saying: "Tell 
the Europeans to get off his [i. e. Reagan's] back. " 
Although Admiral NE's objection to nuclear weapons are at a 
cognitive level, i. e. they serve no military purpose and they are "a 
cancer on the navy", it is possible that the genesis of his attitude was 
at an affective level: 
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... there'd really be very few people 
left around who've 
seen these things go off - have any real visceral feelings 
of what they are. I have and I want to tell you it makes 
an impression. Once you've experienced it there's nothing 
in motion pictures, there's nothing in description, there's 
nothing other than seeing, feeling the damned thing go 
off. What we now call a small to moderate weapon, 
twenty miles away is just like the end of the earth. 
As a result of his strong antipathy to nuclear weapons Admiral NE 
has outlined an eight point programme for reducing nuclear weapons 
and the threat of nuclear wat. 
Footnote 10 This programme includes: 
a political perspective to improve relations between the US and the 
Soviet Union and reduce the "insulting rhetoric" being bandied back 
and forth; abandonment of the nuclear war fighting doctrine; reduce 
the hair-trigger effect of the shorter-range weapons; measures to 
prevent proliferation, and a process of arms reduction based on the 
counting of warheads. 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
In this sample of American elites we can determine patterns of 
attitude change common to them all and from this develop a 
rudimentary framework of the process taking place. Of all these 
interviews Captain B's exhibits the most complete process in his 
development from an uncritical position where he was carried along 
by mainstream ideology and "just accepted" it, through to a position 
where he is now actively involved in opposing possession of nuclear 
weapons. We can see this process taking place in a number of stages 
which begin with: 
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1) Uncritical stage. During this stage the individual accepts or takes 
for granted the prevailing ideology on the issue in question. He/she 
may not be conscious that they are doing this. Indeed, the individual 
may hold no apparent attitude towards the idea object until directly 
questioned on the matter, either in normal social intercourse or 
more specifically when encountered by an opinion pollster. 
2) Emerging awareness. This stage occurs when the individul comes 
into contact with information or attitudes that are novel to those 
which he/she has already incorporated. This may. cause self- 
awareness of the existing assumptions and lead to one of the 
following stages: 
3a) Information rejecting. The individual may reject the new 
information by either repressing it, in which case he/she is likely to 
return to the old assumptions in stage 1, or by denying its relevance 
and ignoring the issue altogether and re-directing attention to more 
mundane concerns. 
3b) Information acquisition. Alternatively, new information could 
encourage the individual to seek yet more information in order to 
reconcile the contradictory situation she/he finds him or herself to be 
in. 
4) Vacillation. At some point the individual is going to have to weigh 
up the pros and cons of the old and the newly emerging belief 
systerns. At this stage they may vacillate between the two - may 
even be dominated by the weight of mainstream ideology, or for 
pragmatic reasons allow this to dominate. There is always the 
Figure 4: 1 Model of attitude change. 
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possibility at this stage that the individual may return permanently to 
stage I or 3b. 
5) New belief system, opposition to old. This is the final stage in the 
sequence, where the individual, under the weight of new information, 
rejects the old assumptions and constructs a new attitude structure. 
He/she may also become involved in active opposition to the old 
ideology. 
It is also possible that this whole process will have repercussions in 
other areas; related attitude objects may also come in for 
introspection and reappraisal. Figure 4: 1 shows this whole process in 
diagramatic form, but it is essential to appreciate that this is a 
surface plan of what is externally perceptible - underneath this at a 
deeper level are the individual's personal, psychological needs and 
motivations which determine the extent to which a person is open to 
the process. 
From the interview analysis it is clear that Captain B was the only 
one of those whose interview showed passage through each stage. 
The whole process took from the begining of the second World war 
through to 1981 -some 41 years. Stage I lasted up to 1965 when his 
involvement with ELRMS increased his awareness of the nuclear issue 
(stage 2). During stage 2 there was an attempt to go to stage 3b, 
information rejecting, and on to ignoring the issue. But instead of 
retiring he went to the Naval War College, and it was here that his 
knowledge really developed, stage 3. From then until 1981 he was 
both acquiring information and, for pragmatic reasons (his job 
dcpcnded on it), allowing mainstream ideology to dominate. The final 
stage (5) was entered as a result of the Trident launching and his 
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subsequent activity in the Freeze movement. Although Captain J 
follows a similar path, in that his attitudes developed f rom stage I to 
stage 2 and 3b, as a result of his awareness of the disarmament 
process and the US military's lack of commitment to it. Unlike 
Captain B it could be said that Captain 3 remains at stage 4. This is 
because he still retains a number of basic assumptions of 
characteristic of mainstream ideology, although at the same time he 
is in favour of negotiating limits on nuclear weapons. 
Both RO and PA show very similar patterns of attitude development. 
They both believed that their attitudes to the nuclear issue had not 
changed much, and from analysis of the interviews it is clear that 
neither of them ever did uncritically accept mainstream ideology 
about nuclear weapons, as far as I was able to establish. . 
Both 
rejected the prevailing belief that nuclear weapons could be used to 
def end anybody, and yet both worked within the system where 
mainstream ideology prevailed. We can put this down to the 
pragmatism factor, because once out of office both have been 
outspoken and optimistic advocates of arms reduction. 
Admiral NE and Rear Admiral EU similarly follow common paths to a 
large extent. Both enter our analysis at stage 2 and again neither of 
I 
them ever believed in the utility of nuclear weapons advocated by 
mainstream ideology, although they too both worked within a systern 
where this prevailed. They differ from PA and RO to the extent that 
they are now more actively involved in working towards their goal of 
arms reduction and disarmament, although for all four the duplicity 
over INF in Europe has provided a strong impetus to action. 
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Social and Psychological Influences on the Process of Attitude 
Change. 
From the accounts of the four Naval officers I interviewed, it is 
obvious that pressures from reference groups play an important part, 
firstly in indoctrinating an individual into a set of attitudes and 
beliefs, and secondly in exerting pressure to conform to these beliefs. 
This was something each of them experienced, confirming the - 
hypothesis at the end of the previous chapter. Of course, this 
is not the only reason why they should conform. The pragmatic or 
instrumental function of doing so within the system would obviously 
maximise the rewards available, and these must be carefully 
calculated within the degree of latitude of acceptance of the group. 
Rear Admiral EU, for example, found that he could voice his 
objections to nuclear weapons within the Navy and not jeopardise his 
chances of promotion, but pragmatism prevented him from going too 
far: 
... if you ran around all day saying "Gee, we've got to 
give up the nuclear mission" you'll certainly find yourself 
sent to some outpost in Siberia - close to it! - until you 
are due for promotion, and you won't be promoted, you'll 
be pushed out. 
The value-expressive function outlined in Chapter 4 may also have 
played its part in that. Conforming to the prevailing beliefs about 
nuclear weapons reinforced their image of themselves as peace- 
keepers and defenders of the 'free world' - an image they were 
strongly encouraged to believe in. And at a deeper level again we 
cannot ignore the possibility that believing nuclear weapons enhanced 
security and denying the possibility of ever using them, served an 
ego-defensive function against the dangers of a nuclear world. 
The main point to appreciate about the attitude change witnessed in 
these interviews is that they were all spontaneous processes, not 
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induced by deliberate counter-messages or communications for the 
purpose of changing attitudes. So in this respect the theories about 
message learning, source credibility, etc. outlined in the previous 
chapters have little relevance here. What we have to, ask is "Why did 
attitude change occur? " We noted in the previous chapter, when we 
were considering cognitive dissonance as a motivational force to- 
change, that chance exposure to discrepant information is unlikely to 
produce dissonance and consequently attitude change: an element of 
choice must be involved. If we consider the process of attitude 
change outlined in Figure 4: 1 this element of choice occurs first at 
stage 2 when the individual can either reject the information (stage 
3a) or accept and acquire further information, 3b. Which path the 
individual chooses may depend upon underlying psychological factors 
determining whether they are 11copers" or "avoiders". Either way, the 
individual is likely to take the course of least resistance and avoid 
the stress of attitude change if at all possible. I suggest that 
cognitive dissonance does play a part in this process. Initially minimal 
least effort and anguish is required to accept mainstream ideology, 
and when you consider the importance of day-to-day concerns for 
most people it is not surprising that these overshadow wider issues 
that can be avoided. As with Captain B, Captain J, Admiral NE and 
Rear Admiral EU the everyday concerns of running a ship dominated 
cognitive processing, so for the ordinary person in the street 
everyday concerns centered on running their lives dominate attention 
-whether this is as deliberately orchestrated for the person in the 
street as it is for the person in the Navy can be debated. But once the 
individual becomes cognizant of 'outside' information, the possibility 
for attitude change is set in motion. 
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Insulation from the possibility of coming into contact with outside 
information is naturally the objective of system s/organ i sat ions which 
seek to keep tight control over their membership. Once contact with 
outside influence is encountered then the frame of reference 
provided by the existing belief system may be brought into question. 
But, true to the principle of least resistance, the new information 
will not modify old attitudes unless some inadequacy or 
incompleteness or inconsistency is percieved in the existing system, 
or inadequacy arises in fullfilling ego-defensive, value-expressive 
function or whatever motivating force gave it utility. It seems likely, 
furthermore, that the supression of emotional charge related to the 
attitude object may facilitate the continuance of the uncritical 
acceptance of mainstream beliefs. When events or new information 
release this supressed affect the process of attitude change becomes 
more likely. 
These interviews give a valuable insight into the processes of attitude 
change, but they also suggest that when this process occurs 
spontaneously it may take a very long time amongst elites. So how 
important are these insights for attitude change over a shorter time 
scale? It seems that a number of factors are important. First we can 
learn from the first indoctrination with mainstream ideology and 
ensure that new information is easily accessible and constantly 
available and that it is gauged for its audience: are they copers or 
avoiders, does their existing attitude serve sorne ego-defensive, 
value-expressive function, etc? A second factor to bear in mind is 
the importance of reference groups, and the need to ensure that an 
individual developing a new belief system is given support and 
identity by a new reference group. 
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Footnotes 
1. Vietnam is a case in point here. RO refuses to talk about Vietnam 
publicly, and in this interview mention of it created an instant shut- 
down, which suggests he may be repressing these events because they 
are too painfully incong" us with his present ego-image. Futhermore, r, ýo 
this whole issue may be associated with pain of rejection from his 
family at the time due to his attitudes, further neccesitating 
repression. 
2. RO explained that prior to the setting up of the Defence 
Intelligence Agency which co-ordinated the various intelligence 
reports "there were three, sometimes four different intelligence 
agencies putting out independent defence estimates within the 
Defence Department .... " which compounded the confusion. 
The 
Administration were bound to welcome the one that was congruent 
with their perception of the Soviet Union. 
3. We can justifiably ask whether this fine distinction might be lost 
on the Soviet Union. Semantics aside, they are going to feel inferior. 
4. This was a tendency noted by Kull 
7 in his interviews with American 
policy-makers. 1 
5. During my stay in America, talking as I did to a wide range of 
people, this view epitomised for me, what I saw as the 'American 
world view'. 
6. This interview was held before the precise danger to the 
Presidency from the 'Trangatel fiasco had become apparent, which 
eventually may have given impetus to the Administration to seek 
some credibility in arms control. Also, Gorbachov's zero-zero option, 
which has suddenly changed the prospects for a Reagan 
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administration arms deal, had not been tabled in Geneva at this 
stage. 
7. Since this interview Labour Party Defence Policy has in fact 
moved towards this position. 
8. Gorbachov's proposals actually come quite close to PA's proposed 
scenario - and they have indeed thrown NATO into confusion. 
9. This incongruity is further emphasised by a recent opinion 
poll 
9 
that indicated 56% of the British electorate believed the US 
would use nuclear weapons to defend Europe from Soviet invasion. 
Compare this view with Admiral NE's comments on the previous 
page. 
10. This is before Admiral NE's publisher therefore I shall only allude 






CONTENT OF BELIEF SYSTEMS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters have been concerned with establishing more precisely 
what is known about attitudes towards nuclear weapons and nuclear war, how 
they are measured, what these measurements represent and the whole question 
of attitude change and how it comes about. We have also looked at a sample of 
American elites and established a model for a process of attitude change. 
We have considered the possibility that degrees of constraint within a belief 
system are dependent on levels of information and involvement. We have 
established the power and influence of mainstream ideology on an individual's 
belief system where attitudes and assumptions are implicitly accepted and are 
unquestioningly adhered to. 
The US interviews emphasised the importance of giving an individual the 
opportunity to freely express their attitudes in a relatively unrestricted way. In 
doing this it enables us to analyse the arguments generated and upheld by the 
individual. In this chapter we shall be looking at the sorts of arguments used by 
individuals and considering the extent to which they conform to a mainstream 
ideology - and establish the content of this mainstream. We shall, furthermore, 
compare the content of 'elite' and 'non-elite'('mass') belief systems in the light 
of these findings. 
It becomes evident in any study or discussion of the nuclear issue that the same 
arguments surface again and again and that ultimately. an individual can be 
categorised as being either in favour of the possession of nuclear weapons - 
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albeit however reluctantly - or against nuclear weapons. This is not really 
surprising when we consider that the information sources available to the 
public, from which they draw their knowledge, reflects this polarization. 
We begin this study, therefore, by analysing some of these information sources 
in order to identify the basic pool of arguments that exist both for and against 
nuclear weapons. Upon analysis of opinions in this study, it becomes clear that 
individual subjects are drawing upon this already existing pool of arguments to 
express themselves. 
5.2 PRO-NUCLEAR INFORMATION SOURCES 
The - sources of pro-nuclear material are almost exclusively generated 
by 
"of f icial,, Footnote 1. bodies. Material advocating the pro-nuclear line has 
always been available through official channels since the nuclear programme 
was first made public. Furthermore the general consensus between political 
parties (until recently) on the question of nuclear defence has ensured the 
continuous production of propaganda notwithstanding changes in government. 
As a result it can be expected that this material will have been well-publicised 
and the arguments expounded will be cohesive, well-coordinated and subject to 
much media attention - not merely in the realm of printed material which is the 
focus of this present study. It follows that these pro-nuclear arguments will be 
familiar to the public at large to the extent that they almost become part of 
the general public's ideological inheritance. For our purposes the primary 
sources of this material then, are: 
1. The Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit at the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (ACDRU); 
2. The Ministry of Defence via its Public Relations Section (MOD); 
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3. The Central Office of Information (COD 
and combinations of these sources. 
No systematic selection of the available material was possible. This, however, 
was not a real drawback because the objective was to analyse a wide selection 
of the material produced between 1980 and 1985 - during the revival of interest 
in the defence issue. The final selection consisted of: 
The Statement on the Defence Estimates (1985), Vol 1. 
Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit (ACDRU) Newsletter (October- 
December 19841-, -No22. 
Defence and Disarmament Issues 1-14, (October 1983-March 1984) (ACDRU). 
The Balanced View: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control, (December 1981) 
(COI). 
The Nuclear Debate, (September 1982) (ACDRU). 
Britain and Arms Control, (February 1983) (ACDRU). 
Nuclear Weapons and Preventing War (MOD). 
Cruise Missiles: Ten Important Questions (MOD). 
Peace and Disarmament: a short guide to the arms negotiations, (1981) (COI). 
Cruise Missiles: Some important questions and answers, (April 1983) (MODt 
COI). 
Cruise: Your Questions Answered, (April 1983) (MOD, COO. 
A Nuclear Free Europe? Why it wouldn't work (MOD). 
Arms Control and Security (MOD) reprinted from Statement on the Defence 
Estimates 0ý 2). 
The various leaflets, pamphlets and broadsheets produced by these agencies 
vary in sophistication of argument and visual presentation and are aimed at 
reaching all levels of the public. Arguments are clearly presented often in a 
simple question-answer format and the material is well designed; most 
especially recent leaflets on cruise missiles. 
These publications, which have the kudos of having come from "official" sources 
were supplemented for our purposes by further material at a more popular and 
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rather less credible level, publications produced by the Coalition for Peace 
Through Security (CPTS) and the Ca mpaign for Defence and Multilateral 
Disarmament. (CDMD). These latter productions have a tendency to be 
presented crudely, both visually and in content although this does not 
necessarily detract from the power of the message. The samples we studied 
were: 
Preventing Nuclear War: a few simple facts (CPTS). 
30 Questions and Honest Answers about CND (CPTS). 
50 Tough Questions for CND (CPTS). 
CND: Communists, Neutralists, Defeatists (CPTS). 
Peace and the Route to Disarmament (1984) (CDMD). 
How You Can Help (1984) (CDMD). 
Defence and Disarmament: Points at Issue (1984) (CDMD). 
5.3 METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
Each publication was closely scrutinised and the arguments identified and 
underlined. Cross-comparisons between publications indicated that these 
arguments could be grouped under four main headings -each taking a slightly 
different perspective: 
1. The Soviet Threat 
2. Nuclear Deterrence 
3. Multilateral Disarmament 
4. NATO Alliance. 
Within each category every argument that had previously been identified was 
categorised and coded: 1: 1,1: 2 etc. Although the actual means of expression 
may have varied from publication to publication the essence of the arguments 
were almost always directly comparable and as a result it was possible to 
construct a list of "archetypal arguments" distilled from this homogeneity. 
These then, were the shortest, most concise expression of the essential 
arguments that we could find or create from the material. For example, the 
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archetypal argument 2: 2, "Nuclear deterrence has kept the peace for the last 40 
years", was derived from such statements as: 
"Deterrence has kept the East/West peace for 37 years and shows no sign 
of failing. " from The Nuclear Debatey September 1982 (ACDRU). 
"By maintaining adequate nuclear forces, peace has been preserved. " from 
The Balanced View, December 1981 (COI, ACDRU). 
"The peace of Europe has now held for thirty-nine years. Common sense 
suggests that deterrence - has played a key part in securing that. " Defence 
and Disarmament: Points at Issue, 1984 (CDMD). 
5.4 THE PRO-NUCLEAR ARGUMENTS 
The sequence in which these archetypal arguments are presented is not intended 
to suggest any order of priority, at this stage. 
1. The Soviet Threat 
1. The Soviet Union is an expansionist power. 
2. They are a military threat. 
3. They have superior forces. 
4. Their forces are greater than needed for defence afone. 
5. Soviet defence expenditure is growing. 
6. They regard military power as a key element in policy. 
7. The Soviets will invade if given a chance. 
8. They do not share our abhorrence of war. 
9. Their past invasions show their real intentions. 
2. Nuclear Deterrence 
1. Nuclear deterrence alone keeps the Soviets at bay. 
2. Nuclear deterrence has kept the peace (for the last 40 years. ) 
3. Nuclear deterrence is needed to counter the military threat. 
4. Nuclear deterrence works because it would be madness for one side to 
attack. 
5. Nuclear deterrence ensures a clear balance of power. 
6. Nuclear deterrence is cheaper than conventional deterrence. 
7. Nuclear deterrence ensures security, freedom, democracy. 
8. Nuclear deterrence exists only to deter. 
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9. Nuclear deterrence prevents blackmail. 
10. Nuclear deterrence cannot be disinvented. 
11. Nuclear deterrence excludes accidental nuclear war. 
3. Multilateral Disarmament 
1. Multilateral disarmament is the only safe way of reducing nuclear 
weaponry. 
2. Multilateral disarmament negotiations have been/continue to be successful. 
3. Unilateral disarmament would make nuclear attack more likely. 
4. Unilateral disarmament would jeopardise Soviet commitment to 
disarmament negotiations. 
5. Unilateral disarmament forfeits the opportunity to trade British weapons 
with Soviet weapons in a multilateral agreement. 
6. British renunciation of nuclear weapons would weaken her influence on US 
policy. 
7. Britain benefits from NATO weaponry therefore she must also share the 
risks of having nuclear weapons. 
4. NATO Alliance 
I 
1. NATO has produced the basis for peace and freedom during the last 40 
years. 
2. Solidarity with our allies in NATO is essential to counter Soviet aggression. 
3. NATO's policy is worked out for our common protection, not imposed by 
the 
-US. 4. NATO's forces must be maintained at a level that continues to deter the 
Soviet Union. 
5. NATO is committed to disarmament from a position of strength. 
5.5 ANTI-NUCLEAR SOURCES 
The sort of publications that espouse the anti-nuclear line, generally speaking, 
are presented at a more academic level. Until recently they could be found 
only in books rather than leaflets -a means of presentation that did not have 
the general public in mind - and were not presented in a way that made them 
generally accessible to the uninformed public who need to be presented with a 
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clear, well-argued and co-ordinated presentation such as that produced by the 
pro-nuclear group. What is more, the material against nuclear weapons has a 
tendency to originate from diverse sources such as the Peace Literature Service 
of the American Friends' Committee, the World Disarmament Campaign, the 
European Nuclear Disarmament (END), J. D. Bernal Peace Library and similar 
obscure sources that cannot compete with Official Government sources for 
credibility (and funds for presentation. ) The main source of popular material, 
besides these unco-ordinated and individual organisations, is the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament (CND) which has attempted to present material in a more 
accessible way especially more recently when they adopted the question - 
answer technique in their leaflets on non-nuclear defence, Trident etc. CND 
publications however do not convey the same illusion of neutral benevolence 
and impartiality that government publications have. Moreover their lack of a 
co-ordinated and clear set of arguments sets them at a disadvantage. 
Again the objective in selecting the publications for this analysis was to cover 
as wide a range as possible. This comprised: 
Defence Without Fears, November (1982), (Just Defence). 
Towards the Final Abyss? M Pentz 0D Bernal Peace Library). 
Unintended War, A Waskow, (1962) American Friends' Service Committee. 
Nuclear Disarmament and Beyond, (Ecology Party Defence Policy Paper). 
Politics for Life, (Ecology Party Manifesto 1983). 
Defence and Se urity in Britain, (1984) Labour Party Statement. 
Nuclear Disarmament Starts Here, (1983) (CND). 
Questions and Answers about Nuclear Weapons,, (CND). 
Questions and Answers about Trident, (CND). 
Questions and Answers about Non-Nuclear Defence (CND). 
Questions and Answers about Christians and Nuclear Disarmament, (CND). 
Questions and Answers about Space Weapons, (CND). 
Eleventh Hour for Europe, (1981) END publication. 
Protest and Survive, (1980) (ed. ) E Thompson, D Smith, Penguin. 
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British Nuclear Weapons: for and against, (1991) J McMahon, Junction Books. 
How to Make up Your Mind about the Bomb, (1981) R Nell, Andre Deutsch. 
The Choice, Nuclear Weapons Versus Security, (1984) G Prins, Chatto and 
Windus. The Russian Threat, (1983) J Garrison, P Shivpuri, Gateway Books. 
The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, D Holloway, (1983) York University Press. 
Apolcalypse Now? (1983) Lord Mountbatten, Lord Noel-Baker, Lord 
Zuckerman, Spokesman. 
From this diffuse set of material it is possible to extract a number of 
categories but these are often ill-defined and it became clear that there are not 
such familiar "archetypal arguments" as those encountered within the pro- 
nuclear material. Furthermore the "moral aspect" tends to be de-emphasised in 
the anti-nuclear information for the sake of more concrete arguments although, 
as we shall discover, it is one of the most prevalent arguments used by the 
"general public". For this reason the "moral aspect" is not treated as a 
category itself but as a separate viewpoint which can be summarized by the 
following arguments: 
MI. It is immoral to squander millions of pounds on nuclear weapons 
when it could be better spent elsewhere, for example: on helping 
the starving millions in the Third World. 
M2. It is immoral to threaten the lives of millions of people with nuclear 
weapons. 
5.6 METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
Exactly the same procedure was employed as that used to analyse the "pro- 
nuclear" material: the arguments were underlined in the various publications 
then grouped together under the following categories, with each category 
containing a number of related arguments. 
1. Nuclear Threat 
2. Nuclear "Deterrence" 
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Unilateralism 
4. Soviet "Threat" 
5. NATO 
Again the archetypal arguments within each category were distillations of the 
arguments found within the whole range of publications. Archetypal argument 
1: 4 "The concept of a limited nuclear war is fallacy" was derived from such 
statements as: 
"I do not believe that a tactical nuclear war could be fought in areas like 
Western Europe for more than a few days, or even a few hours, without 
getting out of control. (In: The Choice, Nuclear Weapons versus Security, 
G Prins) 
"That is, we will try to limit nuclear war but actually we will start sliding 
all the way over the nuclear cliff. " (Nuclear Disarmament Starts Here, 
CND). 
"... I cannot imagine a situation in which nuclear weapons would be used as 
battlefield weapons without the conflagration spreading. " (Lord 
Mountbatten, Apocalypse Now? ) 
5.7 THE ANTI-NUCLEAR ARGUMENTS 
1. Nuclear Threat 
1. The proliferation of nuclear weapons increases the likelihood of 
nuclear war. 
2. The concept of a limited nuclear war is a fallacy. 
3. Nuclear war would destroy civilization. 
4. The change of nuclear policy from defence to war fighting 
capability increases the likelihood of war. 
5. US weapons in Britain enable the US to consider a "limited" war 
with the Soviets in Europe. 
6. Cruise and Trident are quantitative and qualitative escalations of 
the arms race. 
2. Nuclear "Deterrence" 
Defence based on the willingness to commit mass suicide is no 
defence. 
2. No situation could justify unleashing a nuclear holocaust, therefore 
the bluff of deterrence is meaningless. 
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3. Nuclear strategy is no longer a strategy of avoiding or deterring war 
but frightening and winning. 
4. The nuclear deterrence does not prevent wars - as the Falklands war 
has proved. 
3. Unilateral disarmament 
3: 1 A unilateral move by Britain could be the f irst step towards 
complete disarmament by all nations. 
3: 2 Britain's unilateral disarmament would remove the risk of a pre- 
emptive strike against nuclear weapons in Britain. 
3: 3 Britain would be in a better position to press for disarmament if 
there were no nuclear weapons stationed here. 
3: 4 If the bomb has kept the peace then the safest most peaceful world 
would be one where every single country has the bomb. 
3: 5 Multilateral negotiations for disarmament have not and are unlikely 
to get us anywhere in the foreseeable future. 
4. The Soviet "Threat" 
1. Assessment of weaponry does not take into consideration the Soviet. 
Union's own security recLuirements. 
2. Soviet weaknesses-and NATO strengths are under-publicised. 
3. The USA is equally guilty of hegemony. 
4. The Sovief 
--Union 
has made no attempt to invade existing non- 
nuclear countries- in the West. 
5. NATO 
5: 1 All Britain's nuclear weapons and over 90% of our military spending 
are devoted to NATO. Therefore membership of the alliance must 
be taken into account when considering disarmament. 
5: 2 NATO preoccupation with military preparations have been a major 
obstacle to detente and disarmament. 
5: 3 British withdrawal from NATO is not an end in itself but would be 
undertaken only if efforts to achieve mutual dissolution of NATO 
and Warsaw Pact alliances fail. 
5: 4 NATO military policies are essentially determined by the Pentagon: 
the present bellicosity of US leadership gives cause for acute 
anxiety. 
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5: 5 Membership of NATO does not bring British security but 
inextricably involves us in the affairs of USA and USSR. 
5: 6 Britain's status as a nuclear-armed member of NATO means that it 
too is involved in a strategy which is now one of war fighting. 
Because of the diffuse nature of the anti-nuclear arguments they lack the 
impact and familiarity of the pro-nuclear arguments which are readily available 
and well used. Furthermore although many more arguments may exist to 
support the anti-nuclear position they have not been reduced to simple catch 
phrases which the public can easily grasp and assimilate. As far as these 
information sources are concerned (we are talking of both the pro- and anti- 
nuclear material here) it is not the material per se that is important so much as 
the fact that it is a representation of the archetypal arguments that can be 
found throughout the nuclear debate as collective arguments. When we came to 
analyse the free-range opinion of the "elites" and the "mass" public the 
recognition of these pre-existing arguments allows us to evaluate the utility of 
categorising subjects along the "unpoliticised-sophisticate/ideologuelI axis 
suggested by Converse and Barton and Parsons although inevitably we must 
question the validity of such a category as "ideologue" or sophisticate" in terms 
of the present analysis, which suggests that the "ideologue', is in fact a well- 
informed "party-liner'l. -- 
5.8 THE DATA 
Mass opinion sources and method of analysis 
The first set of data used to determine the range of opinions held by the mass 
public consisted of 848 essays written by students aged between 11 and 22 years 
of age. These were originally written for a Sunday Times essay competition in 
April 1983, under the title "The Bomb". They were already divided into three 
age groups:. 
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11-15 (633 essays) 
16-18 (141 essays) 
19-22 (74 essays) 
These groupings were retained but further divided by sex, type of school (state 
or public) and finally by the student's attitude towards the bomb, according to 
the archetypal arguments identified above. Categorizations were as follows: 
F Fiction: These were stories about events leading up to an imaginary nuclear 
attack and the aftermath. 
0 No Stated Opinion: These essays were factual accounts of nuclear weapons 
systems and power which included detailed accounts of the effect of a nuclear 
explosion. Many give historical information about the development of the bomb 
and its use at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At no stage was a clear opinion 
expressed for or against nuclear weapons. 
- Anti-nuclear: The essays in this category clearly expressed the writer's 
rejection of nuclear weapons, using a selection of the archetypal arguments. 
+ Pro-nuclear: Although many of the essays in this section may have expressed 
anti-nuclear opinions, all of them, by drawing upon the archetypal pool of 
arguments, finally concluded that nuclear weapons were necessary for Britain's 
defence. 
Within the 848 essays, were those that debated the pros and cons of nuclear 
weapons, drawing upon both the pro- and anti-nuclear arguments. When it was 
clear the writer positively identified with one set of arguments they were 
categorised accordingly and the arguments of the opposite persuasion were not 
recorded. On occasions when it was apparent the subject did not identify with 
one or other set of opinions, remaining ambivalent, they were categorised as 
"No stated opinion". The data gathered from these essays is summarised in 
Table I which shows the breakdown into age, sex and type of school. Within 
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each age group both the number and percentage of students is tabulated for 
each'of the categories; Fiction, No Stated Opinion, Anti-nuclear, Pro-nuclear. 
The final section of Table I shows the total number and percentage of students, 
in each age group, that wrote essays in each of the categories. 
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TABLE 1 SUMMARY OF DATA: BY AGE, SEX, SCHOOL AND CATEGORY 
AGE GROUP 
MALE 11-15 FEMALE 
State Public Total 
No % No % No % 
F 48 14 3 9 51 14 
0 67 20 5 15 72 20 
110 33 10 30 120 33 
+ 111 33 15 45 126 34 
Total 336 33 369 
State Public Total 
No % No % No % 
36 14 7 64 43 16 
51 20 0 0 51 19 
116 46 3 27 119 45 
50 20 1 9 51 19 
253 11 264 
MALE 16-18 
State Public Total 
No % No % No % 
F5 8 2 17 7 9 
0 14 22 1 8 15 20 
26 41 4 33 30 39 
+ 18 29 5 42 23 30 
Total 63 12 76 
FEMALE 
State Public Total 
No % No % No % 
9 16 3 27 12 18 
11 20 0 0 11 17 
23 42 3 27 26 39 
12 22 5 45 17 26 




F 0 0 
0 11 23 
33 48 










11-15 16-18 19-22 Total 
F 
Total 
No % No % No % No % 
94 15 19 13 5 7 118 14 
123 19 26 18 20 27 169 20 
239 38 56 40 43 45 328 39 
177 28 40 28 16 22 233 27 
633 141 84 848 
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5.9 SUMMARY OF DATA 
General summary 
Taken as a whole the findings in this summary of the data are commensurate 
with those found in the Gallup and Mori opinion polls reviewed in Section 1. But 
when we came to analyse them in greater depth, fine distinctions became 
obvious and we begin to understand the complexity of discovering and 
interpreting public opinion. 
Looking at the age groups as a whole, irrespective of sex or type of school 
attended, it appears that rejection of nuclear weapons increases with age; from 
38% in the 11-15 age group, 40%'in the 16-18 group to 45% in the 19-21 age 
group. This seems to give us a more detailed understanding of how attitudes 
develop amongst the younger age groups than the standard opinion polls 
ecountered in Section 1. The youngest age category in opinion polls is most 
often aged between 18-34 or perhaps 14-24. This is perhaps too wide an age 
range to encompass in a single category if, as it appears from this study of 
data, attitudes can change appreciably between the ages of 11 and 22. 
Nevertheless public opinion polls in the past have indicated the youngest age 
category has always rejected nuclear weapons to a greater extent than the 
older categories. 
The use of fiction was a mode of expression that tended to decrease with age; it 
fell from 15% in the youngest age group to 7% in the 19-22 group. However if 
we examine the male and female subjects separately, it is clear that this means 
of expression is most likely to be employed by females - reaching 19% in the 
19-22 age group. In the same age group not one male student wrote a work of 
fiction on the bomb. 
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5.10 MALE-FEMALE DIFFERENCES 
The slight increase in the female "fiction" category is accompanied by an 
increase in the "no-opinion" category as we progress through the age groups. 
FIGURE 5: 1 
% "Fiction"P'No Opinion" amongst female subjects 
Female 11-15 16-18 19-22 
16 18 19 
19 17 35 
The predominance of "no-opinion" amongst female respondents has long been 
recognised as a feature of opinion polls (see Ganley op. cit. ) and it is common 
for female "don't know" to be twice that registered for male respondents. This 
present study indicates that it may well be during the age of 19-22 that female 
respondents undergo a loss of confidence in their opinion; the younger age 
groups registered no more indecision on the matter than their male peers: 
FIGURE - 5.2 
% of "No-Opinion" in male and female age groups. 
11-15 16-18 19-22 
Male 0 20 20 23 
Female 0 19 17 35 
One further point that emphasises the error of treating this age group as one 
whole is that taken as a single group, female rejection of nuclear weapons is 
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more emphatic than male (51% female 37% male), however if we take each 
group individually it becomes clear that female rejection of nuclear weapons 
only predominates in the largest 11-15 age group. In the 16-18 group male and 
I 
female are both 39% against nuclear weapons, and in the 19-22 age group a 
higher percentage of the male subjects reject nuclear weapons (48% male 38% 
f emale). 
FIGURE 5.3 
% of "anti -nuclear" in male and female age groups 
11-15 16-18 19-22 
Male - 33 39 48 Female - 45 39 38 
From the available data it was also possible to investigate the possibility that 
type of school Oe public or state) may have some bearing on attitudes towards 
the question of nuclear weapons. This relationship, of course, looks directly at 
the question of authoritarianism which we encountered in. chepterI As one 
might hypothesise, if one accepts the influence of authoritarian regimes, the 
subjects attending public schools (which could be interpreted as being more 
traditionally authoritarian and restrictive) were undoubtedly more in favour of 
nuclear weapons than their counterparts in state schools - with the exception of 
female subjects in the 11-15 year old group: 
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FIGURE-5.4 
% of "pro-" and "anti-nuclear" attitudes by age, sex and school 
MALE FEMALE 
11-15 16-18 11-15 16-18 
State School - 33 - 41 - 46 - 42 
+ 33 + 29 + 20 + 22 
Public School - 30 - 33 - 27 27 
+ 45 - 42 +9 45 
More research would need to be carried out to determine the precise influence 
type of school has upon the formation of attitudes; is it, for example, a result 
of public schools being more conservative in outlook with a tendency to 
inculcate mainstream ideology? or can the influence in fact be due to an 
authoritarian regime that instils a tendency to support hard-line militaristic 
options? 
The nature of the data in the 19-22 age group made analysis of attitudes, in 
terms of further education, impossible. 
Twenty sample essays were drawn from the total number (ten representing pro- 
and ten representing anti-nuclear attitudes). These typify the pattern of 
divergent opinions that was evident in the sample as a whole. These essays 
were analysed according to the procedure established above for the information 
sources - except that this time it was possible to code each argument as it was 
identified. The results of this analysis can be found in tables 2 and 7. 
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5.11 ELITE OPINION SOURCES 
The second set of data, used to determine the range of opinions used by "elites", 
was drawn from a variety of sources with the objective of sampling the field. 
Elite opinion, of course, reflected affiliation to either the pro-nuclear or anti- 
nuclear cause. Pro-nuclear "elite" opinion was represented by the following: 
1. A speech given by Sir Geof f rey Howe to an organisation called "Peace 
through NATO" in November 1984. 
1 
2. A speech given by Mr Francis Pym in November 1982 to the English7 
Speaking Union in Leeds, entitled: "The Alliance and Arms Control: Ten 
Misconceptions". 
3. An information sheet "Know the facts" produced by the Campaign for 
Defence through Multilateral Disarmament. 
Footnote 2 
Anti-nuclear "elite" opinion: 
1. A pamphlet by Betty England entitled: ". Nuclear disarmament for Britain - 
why we need action not words". 
2. "NATO Rules Ok? " a pamphlet (CND publication) by John Cox and Dan 
Smith (CND spokesmen). 
3. A speech by Denis Healey to the Fabian Society, 26 November 1985. 
These examples of "elite" opinion are, as we would expect from an "elite" 
sample closely allied to the information sources outlined above. 
They dif fer in the sense that they originate f rorn each representative rather 
than the in for mation-generating source itself. 
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5.12 PRO-NUCLEAR ATTITUDES 
It is evident from Table 2 that a wide range of the archetypal arguments were 
used by the subjects in this study. As a group the sample representing "mass" 
public opinion used a total of 20 arguments out of the available pool of 32, the 
"elite" sample made use of 26. This illustrates both the high degree of 
constraint within the group and their familiarity with the pre-existing 
arguments. 
Individually the 10 subjects in this "mass" sample used an average of 6 
arguments drawing upon three out of the four categories. The "elite', sample, 
as would be expected, used a higher proportion of the prescribed arguments - 
averaging 16 -and all three drew upon each of the four categories, illustrating 
their greater awareness of the arguments. But even within the elite sample 
utilisation of the set arguments varied. Pyrn for example utilised 20 in his 
capacity as Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, while 
Sir Geoffrey Howe -a later incumbent of this position - drew upon a mere 12. 
Although "elite" and "mass" samples used arguments from all four categories 
the elite sample were much more aware of the range of arguments within each 
particular category and often used a higher level of argument, for example 1: 3 
was expressed in the "mass" sample as: "The Warsaw Pact has lots more 
weapons than NATO ... 11. In the "elite" sample the argument was more specific: 
"Since 1977, in addition to its superiority in missiles and the supersonic backfire 
strike-bomber... " etc. (See Table 3). Despite these differences both the elite 
and the mass sample emphasised the arguments in the "multilateralism" 
category (3) over and above the remaining categories. Figure ý5 indicates the 
percentage of arguments used in each category by both groups: 
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FIGURE 5.5 
% of available arguments used by "mass" and "elite" groups 
1 
Soviet Threat Nuclear deterrent Multilateralism NATO 
Mass 7 22 29 16 
Elite 37 42 62 17 
Tables 4-6 give further examples of the way these arguments are expressed by 
both groups. 
5.13 ANTI-NUCLEAR ATTITUDES 
The sample representing mass public opinion against nuclear weapons revealed a 
poor knowledge of the archetypal arguments defined on pages, 216-#Yhis group 
used, on average, only 3 of the 25 available arguments and draw upon an 
average 2 categories. The most comprehensive range of arguments were drawn 
from category 3 -"Unilateralism. " 
Table 7 clearly shows the distribution of prescribed arguments used by the 
"elite" and "mass" public opinion in this study. It is clear that the elite sample 
used arguments across the wide range of categories and drew upon a higher 
proportion of archetypal arguments that were available - averaging 12 out of 
the 25 arguments tabulated and utilising, on average, 4 of the 5 categories. 
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FIGURE 5 *6 
% of available arguments used by "mass" and "elite" samples in each category 
1 2 3 4 
Nuclear Threat Nuclear Unilateralism Soviet 
"Deterrence" "Threat" 
Mass 7 8 8 8 
Elite 50 50 33 58 
Figure shows the percentage of the available arguments used by the elite 
and mass samples as a whole. It is evident that mass awareness of the 
archetypal arguments is poor, although, (see Appendix 1) the level of argument 
used by those with an awareness is high. See "no-defence" argument 2: 1 for 
example, expressed by a mass subject: "Can it really be said that Britain has a 
nuclear deterrent? To be effective as a deterrent Britain must be prepared to 
use its nuclear weapons .... if we did use our nuclear weapons, retaliation would 
totally destroy this country and almost all its inhabitants. " and the same 
argument, expressed by an elite subject: "The point is that Nato's deterrent 
threat is based on the premise that the Western world is willing to commit mass 







































































































5.14 MORAL ASPECT 
The failure to use many of the existing arguments by the mass sample is offset 
to some extent by their use of the "moral aspect. " Nine out of the ten subjects 
representing mass public opinion expressed objections to nuclear weapons on 
moral grounds. These were, as already noted, either on the grounds that it was 
immoral to squander money on these weapons when there are people starving in 
the world; or on the grounds that it is immoral to threaten innocent lives with 
these weapons of mass destruction. Examples of this aspect are given below: 
"The millions of pounds spent every year in the making of bombs and 
research behind the complex but totally pointless projects, could be put 
to many many good causes. With that money we could put a total stop to 
the starvation and malnutrition .... 11 
(637) 
"Instead of spending limitless money on nuclear weapons, we should try 
to improve the world not destroy it. " (A99) 
"The bomb is the most vile manifestation of what the latter half of the 
twentieth century has contributed to civilisation. The nuclear arms race 
has produced both a criminal waste of resources and, recently, a climate 
in which the horrific prospect of nuclear war -has become probable. " (780) 
"I cannot seriously believe that the majority of sane decent people want 
nuclear weapons. That they want to harm and destroy a world so 
beautiful. Surely the grisly results during world war two were enough to 
put anyone off nuclear weapons. " (335) 
That the bomb exists is obscene. That is exists in a society which claims 
to be civilised is ridiculous. " (779) 
Two out of the three subjects representing elite public opinion also used the 
moral argument but these, in accordance with the information sources, were 
not given such prominence as they were by the mass sample. See for example 
Betty England's pamphlet where she is writing about the reasons for a unilateral 
move by Britain: 
"But there are other reasons. There is the moral one, whose strength is not 
diminished by talking of a "gesture". 
-238- 
It is clear from this study that the immorality of nuclear weapons is a powerful 
argument against nuclear weapons amongst mass public opinion, and to a lesser 
extent amongst the elite but is not a prominent feature of the anti-nuclear 
source material used here. The moral aspect may''prove'to be the main 
motivating force amongst those rejecting nuclear weapons; it may also mark 
the dividing line between the pro- and anti-nuclear belief systems. The fact 
that this argument has been underplayed by those that generate the anti- 
nuclear material may be due in part to their reluctance to focus on anything 
remotely "emotional" preferring to take a more factual "scientific" line. In 
doing this it is likely they fail to strike a chord with much of the general public 
and furthermore fail to appreciate that the arguments that give rise to the 
belief in the "Soviet threat" are no less emotive. 
Amongst the pro-nuclear group, although they may express no moral revulsion 
towards nuclear weapons per se, many consider the growth of nuclear arsenals, 
East and West, as unacceptable and that the vast sums of money spent on 
updating these nuclear arsenals cannot be easily justified when there are 
already sufficient weapons in existence to blow up the world lIx" number of 
times. One further aspect of this study that bears mention is the question of 
the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). Amongst both the pro- and anti- nuclear 
mass opinion it was generally looked upon optimistically: 
"President Reagan's plans to develop laser and particle beam weapons 
should meet with all possible aid. If nuclear weapons can be knocked out 
before reaching their targets total multilateral disarmament will have been 
achieved. " (85) 
This desire to believe in the ultimate answer is reminiscent of the early days of 
nuclear weapons when they were seen as the panacea to end all wars. It is 
equally unlikely that SDI will fulfil this vision of security. 
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5.15 CONCLUSION 
Analysis of the data in this study indicates that the attitudes of the mass public 
and the elite are influenced to a great extent by their knowledge of the 
arguments generated by the pro- and anti-nuclear Information sources. When 
these sources produce clear cut, well-argued, well-presented arguments over a 
long period of time then they become part of the public's ideological 
inheritance. Because of the deadweight of these taken-for-granted arguments - 
which are barely subject to introspection or questions by the individual - it 
becomes natural for those who have little real knowledge and/or interest in the 
nuclear Issue to express mainstream ideology. But we suggest that it is not 
Increased knowledge of the Issue, which Gamson and Modiglianl suggest, or the 
type of knowledge they gather, as Putney and Middleton (op. cit. ) posit, but a 
far more superficial level of understanding of the issues and arguments 
embodied In the archetypal arguments we have defined that leads the majority 
of the mass public to follow mainstream ideology. 
Footnote 4 
The repetitious nature of the original arguments used by the pro-nuclear mass 
public suggests that the depth of their understanding of the issue goes little 
beyond that'of headline politics and gut reactions that do not engage deeper 
lines of inquiry. We can see this simple acceptance of the archetypal 
arguments in terms of Magglotto & Wittkopf's (op. cit. ) "Easy" issues which 
elicit gut responses rather than reasoned analysis. When it comes to the 
question of "Hard" issues the likely response of these individuals will be 
difficult to predict. Lacking the guidelines of group consensus as to the 
response expected the mass public may easily reveal their lack of contextual 
grasp of the system by contradicting themselves (see Converse, op. cit. ). ' These 
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contradictions are most likely to come to light in a standard questionnaire or 
opinions poll. 
_' structured The reason for the "'pro-nuclear" individuals' apparent high I 
belief system, then, can be understood in terms of the high level of group 
consensus and the tendency for these individuals to get their ideas into line with 
this group consensus, (Barton Parsons) and so with one another, producing 
individual as well as group consistency. 
The "anti-nuclear" group, lacking such levels of group consensus, similarly show 
at an individual level also a greater diversity of arguments to express their 
opinions supporting their basic attitudes. This apparent fact makes it 
impossible to categorise "pro-" and "anti-" nuclear individuals using Barton and 
Parsons' and Converse's "sophisticate" or "partyliner"/"ideologue by proxy". 
Although there is no question of defining the "unpoliticized" in this study - they 
were simply those students that were neither pro-, nor anti- nuclear weapons, - 
it becomes clear that "sophisticate" is not an appropriate means of categorising 
individuals in the nuclear defence debate: they are "party-liners" all. It may be 
expediant, however, to divide the "party-liners" into "implicit party-liner", and 
"explicit party-liner". The individuals who fish arguments more or less at 
random out of their particular ideological pool of arguments can be classified as 
an "implicit party-liner" whose responses are to a large extent automatic. The 
"explicit party-liner", on the other hand, uses the archetypal arguments in a 
constructive way, co-ordinating them into a well-constrained sequence of cause 
and effect that bear none of the hallmarks of contradiction that characterise 
the "implicit party-liner". However, owing to the lack of consensus within the 
"anti-nuclear" group it is difficult even then to determine the "implicit party- 
liner" because the likelihood is that they will have passed from the "implicit" 
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beliefs of mainstream ideology to a more critical view that may run counter to 
their previous direction. 
The existence of "archetypal" arguments identified in this chapter help to 
explain the contradictions recognised in Chapter 1. Individuals and group 
became confined in a way of thinking that may have no logical basis other than 
in implicit assumptions or belief patterns which: 
are too deep-seated to be easily questioned or criticised and indeed, with 
any people, may be too deep-seated, to be clearly identified and described. 
Perhaps with increasing dissonance between our ultimate goal (removing the 
threat of nuclear apocalypse) and the popular belief in the means of achieving 
this goal (multilateral disarmament or in Gallie's 
2 
analysis: Conflict Resolution 
Through Mutual Concessions) it will be possible to break out of this way of 
thinking that has created the present impasse. The increasing lack of 
confidence in US leadership perhaps indicates the possibility of increasing 
dissonance and the moving away from super-power allegiance and the 
recognition that the threat posed by nuclear weapons is greater than that of the 
"Soviet Threat"; that it threatens the Soviets as well as the west, when we 
consider the implications of a Nuclear Winter that could occur after the use of 
only a small portion of the existing stockpiles. 
Through the recognition of the power of the archetypal arguments for nuclear 
weapons and the realisation that the power of the anti-nuclear arguments, 
properly co-ordinated and argued, could begin to shake these unexplored 
assumptions that often rest on nothing more than articles of faith in the nuclear 
deterrence -changes of attitude could be brought about which could open up a 
much wider range of alternative futures than that offered by supporting nuclear 
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weapons. if not, there is only one future: we go on as we always have done 
until the weapons are eventually used. 
suggest, then, that the overwhelming support for nuclear defence, as 
evidenced in the polls, may be better explained in terms of public awareness of 
the arguments in favour of nuclear weapons than in their commitment to 
nuclear defence policy per se (the developments of which many of the subjects 
in this study were totally unaware of). The dominance of pro-nuclear 
arguments in the mass psycloAs a result of their high level of saliency and 
duration over the years since 1945. In the absence of any interest (and defence 
issues have always featured low in the public's assessment of "most important 
issue"), and knowledge, mainstream ideology is likely to dominate attitudes on 
nuclear issues. 
This chapter has clarified the content of 'anti-nuclear' and 
particularly 'pro-nuclear' belief systems and to some extent 
the sources of these arguments, used to express - attitudes 
towards nuclear defence. These findings suggest,, in 
conjunction with the theoretical work in Chapter Three, many 
reasons why people hold certain attitudes despite the 
existence of credible reasons for opposing nuclear defence. 
The function served by these attitudes may range from the 
instrumental, i. e. maximising the rewards of society (take, 
for example, the career-minded naval men, in Chapter Four or 
members of the Cabinet) to the value-expressive function 
which can be identified amongst members of political parties 
who see their support for nuclear defence as an expression 
of their Conservativeness. The ego-defensive function of 
pro-nuclear attitudes may also be a powerful reason for 
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rejecting information to the contrary and result in 
strengthening existing attitudes or avoiding the issue 
altogether. Perhaps, of all the functions considered in 
Chapter Three the knowledge function is the most important 
with regard to attitude change, and this is closely linked 
with the whole question of dissonance : when an individual 
receives contradictory evidence to his/her own belief system 
then, if he/she is not avoiding or denying the issue, he/she 
must assess it against old beliefs and adjust these 
accordingly. In doing this he/she may be compelled to seek 
further information in order to confirm or reject the new 
evidence. 
This chapter? then, fills us in on the fragments of attitude 
that the polls provide us with and helpsus to understand the 
ideological pressures of conformity operating within a 
belief system and within organisations of social systems 
which inhibit the process of attitude change. Further 
examples of attitudes developing from one system to another 
are studied in Chapter Seven. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. "Official", meaning governmental, or from government departments. 
2. This broadsheet actually falls somewhere between an information source 
and an expression of what, no doubt, this group see themselves as - the 
"informed public". As a group contribution it differs from the previous 
examples but as an expression of informed "elite" opinion it is comparable. 
3. Selection of these examples was not blind-checked by another reader, 
although a second opinion was sought on those that proved difficult to 
categorise. 
4? ' Putney and Middleton suggest that increased counter information to 
mainstream ideology will produce changes of opinion in the opposite direction. 
This we suggest may not necessarily be the case- (see earlier cha', oter) 
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P14APTIF: D 4 
STRUCTURE OF ATTITUDES 
- HOW RELEVANT ARE MATHEMATICAL MODELS? 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapters we have been concentrating on the content of belief 
systems with their constituent attitudes, opinions and assumptions. In Chapter 
Three with the discussion on balance, congruity and cognitive. consistency we 
came close to studying the structure of attitudes, which will be the concern of 
this chapter. Do models of attitude structure and the use of algebraic 
equations help us to understand the convolutions of an individual's belief 
system? In Chapter Two we considered the notion of 'constraint' and suggested 
that the 'elites', the informed public, are likely to have a more constrained, i. e. 
reasoned, better organised belief system than the generally uninformed public. 
Does the study of structure help to elucidate this hypothesis? Although 
previously II was convinced of the utility such models I have now became more 
critical of the methodology - most especially when it goes so far as using 
differential equations to explain emotional processes! -a method used by at 
least one psychologist. 
Heider's identification of three attitude elements and the balancing process 
between these provide us with the basics for understanding the structure of 
attitudes (Chapter Three). Developments of this method by, for example, 
Cartwright and Harary, 
2 Abelson and Rosenberg 
3 have broadened its use and 
application to cognitive processes. Of particular interest to us here is the use 
of Cognitive Mapping developed by Axelrod and colleagues 
4 
and more recently, 
Smaller. 5 Although the process of cognitive mapping has its genesis in Heider's 
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approach it is a vastly more complex system based on the causal assertions of 
subjects which are mapped out as a series of points and arrows. The points 
represent the persons concepts and the arrows the causal link between 
concepts. The system was originally developed by Axelrod and his colleagues to 
assist in management decision-making and was based on a complex set of rules 
for its implementation. Smaller 6 derived a simplified set of rules which, he 
maintains, in no way invalidates the procedure while making the whole process 
infinitely more manageable. 
The procedure is as follows: All the cause and ef fect concepts in the 
Footnote I document being mapped are listed on a coding sheet; each concept is 
given a code and each linkage a value depending on whether an increase in the 
cause increases or decreases the effect concept. The purpose of coding is to 
facilitate map construction. Take for example a simple statement such as: 
Nuclear weapons are necessary for deterrence without which there would 
be nothing to stop the threat of Soviet invasion. 
Coding and mapping for this statement can be found in Figure 6.1. The utility 
of this sytem of mapping lies in the possibility of comparing cognitive systems 
of different people and perhaps, more importantly for this study cognitive 
processes before and after attitude change. The former application has been 
used extensively by Smaller 
7 
and the latter shall be considered here after 
looking at the limitations of the process. 
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Figure: 6.1 
STATEMENT.: "Nuclear weapons are necessary f or deterrence, without 
which there would be nothing to stop the threat of Soviet 
invasion. " 
CODING LIST: 
Concept variable Code 
Nuclear weapons NW 
deterrence D 
threat of Soviet invasion 51 
CODING SHEET: 
Cause Linkage Effect Mapping List 
NW are necessary for D NW +D 
D stop (s) Sl D- ST 
COGNITIVE MAP 
NW D Sl 
This map indicates that an increase in concept NW increases concept D which in 
turn decreases concept SI. 
The major problems with cognitive mapping lie in procedural difficulties 
involved in drawing up the map : where the points are placed during the 
mapping are completly arbitrary which makes it difficult when it comes to A 
comparing maps of different people. The problem is minimised in Smaller's 
samples because he concentrates on elite belief systems, those who have some 
specialist knowledge of the issue, and therefore there is a high degree of 
consistency within the individual belief systems and among belief systems of 
like-minded people. A further limitation of the mapping is its unidimensional 
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nature which falls to convey the complex relationship between different idea- 
elements, cause and effect sequences that-are depicted. Perhaps a computer 
generated three dimensional mapping process would be more appropriate where 
the map could be rotated and viewed from different viewpoints and the 
relationship between idea-objects could be more complex. This leads us to a 
further point of criticism : the cognitive mapping process, at least as presently 
construed, falls to take into account strength of feeling or strength of 
attachment to each concept except in as far as the number of times an 
assertion is made is recorded. This is clearly important especially if we are 
looking at the possibilities of the belief system changing and wish to predict the 
likelihood of change taking place. In this respect use of direct scales for 
assessing attitude would be usef ul such as the Likert scale or Semantic 
differential scale. 
Finally the cognitive mapping process as it has been used up to now does not 
allow for the mapping of inferential beliefs. For example if someone states the 
need for nuclear weapons to deter the Soviet Union then we can infer from this 
belief that this person sees the Soviet Union as a source of threat and map it 
accordingly. In my experiments with this process I map these inferences with a 
dashed line. 
The possibility of using computers in mapping belief systems may improve the 
quality of the process. In fact quite a lot of work has been done with computers 
in understanding belief systems. Abelson and Carroll have attempted computer 
simulation of individual belief systems but it seems an enourmously complex 
process and pretty limited in application. Perhaps more interestingly Abelson 
and Reich 
8 have used computers to construct implicational molecules which 
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are a set of beliefs bound together by psychological implication. They identify 
the completion tendency which operates when: 
Given all sentences of a molecule except one, there is a tendency for this 
omitted sentence to be inferred. 9 
So, if we are told that A does X and X causes Y we are likely, Abelson and 
Reich suggest, to inf er that A wants Y. By means , of such 
"molecule 
completion" it may be possible for extra beliefs to be adduced f rom given 
beliefs - which could be a very useful addition to the cognitive mapping process. 
Some research has concentrated on this process (although it has been called a 
"syllogistic network") without the use of computers - see for example 
McGuire. 10 
McGuire and others have developed this process to take into account levels of 
conf idence in an individuals beliefs and Petty and Cacciopo (op cit) give an 
example of how this can be made into an equation: 
p(B) = p(B/A)p (A) + p(B/A)p(A) 
which could be based on the following syllogism : 
First premise: If Thatcher is re-elected health spending will 
decrease 
Second premise: Thatcher will be re-elected (A) 
Conclusion: Health spending will decrease (B) 
The probability of the conclusion is represented by p(B) and the probability of 
Thatcher being re-elected p(A). The first premise will thus be p(B/A), i. e. the 
probability of B given A. p(ý) is the probability of not A, p(B/, ý) is the 
probability of health spending being decreased if Thatcher is not elected. Each 
of these probabilities can be given a value, say from 0 to 10, and the likelihood 
that health spending will be decreased can be deduced. This whole procedure, if 
applied to the cognitive mapping process could greatly enhance its predictive 
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value but it would have 
administered. 
to rely on some sort of questionnaire being 
The theory of reasoned action, briefly outlined in Chapter Three may also serve 
some predictive purpose for understanding attitude change, it too relies on a 
mathematical formula and tells us something of attitude structure. The 
formula: 
N 
A=ý bi ei 
i=I 
can apply to attitudes towards issues, people or ideas or objects generally, b, in 
this case can represent beliefs a person holds about the object and e the 
evaluation of these beliefs and we can determine the individual's attitude by 
giving each element a value -1 refers to the specific belief numbers. We could 
determine a person's attitude towards the Conseiyative partly by looking at a 
number of beliefs and their evaluation of these for example: 
i Attitude towards the Conservative party 
Beliefs (b) Evaluation (bi) 
(E) (ei) 
1. Strong nuclear defence (+3) 
(+I)=+3 
2. Weakened NHS (+3) 
3. Control over Unions (+2) 
(+2)=+4 








So we deduce that this person's rating of the Conservative party is -5. Of 
course we would have to have some sort of scale to convert this into, say, 
voting intention for it to have any real meaning. This sort of calculation is all 
very neat and may indicate the underlying structure of a belief system but do 
we really benefit from reducing a person's attitude to mere numbers? It does 
seem rather unnecessary but it does add a further dimension to the features of 
the cognitive map. All the same it would be very difficult, on any important 
issue, to include even a majority of idea elements necessary to evaluate a 
single attitude with any degree of accuracy. 
6.2 APPLICATION OF COGNITIVE MAPPING 
Before dismissing the cognitive mapping process entirely let's see how useful it 
is in mapping one of the essays that were used for the analysis in Chapter Five. 
A follow-up of the original essay writers some 2/3 years later also allows us to 
evaluate the utility of this process when attitudes change. Below is the 
variables list of essay subject 701(A) 
Variables List 
Essay written by student, one of a sample of 800 identified as subject no. 701 
(A) 
Concept Variable Code 
the atomic bomb NW 
adverse effect -UTILITY 
atomic bombs NW 
defence D 
possibility of using them (NW) UNW 
without the bomb U 
power seeking nation ST 
self-respect SR 
terrible effect caused at Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki HN 
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-consideration bef ore use 
for a bomb to be used 
very severe situation 
the bomb 
greediness 
sign their own death warrant 
allowing these bombs to go off 
holocaust 
accurate detection of bombs 
USSR decide to take control of Britain 
Sold a couple to USSR 
large percentage of world in ruins 
rather find a solution to the problem 
use the bomb 
to ban the bomb 




took the bomb from Britain 
USSR heavier, mightier 
Britain as an easy target 
the bomb 
equal with USSR 
freedom and dignity 




























Cause Effect arrows List 
concept Linkage concept 
NW with -utility NW -utility 
NW for D NW +D 
NW unlikely UNW NW - UNW 
U we became vulnerable ST U+ ST 
U would loose SR U _SR 
HN will probably CON HN + CON 
CON 
I ----- - -- 
UNW CON - UNW 
C would have to be UNW C+ UNW 
NW result of G G +NW 
UNW by. allowing NH UNW + NH 
SA would AD SA + AD 
AD would RET AD + RET 
RET would leave NH RET + NH 
NH rather find NEG NH + NEG 
NEG than UNW NEG - UNW 
U rid of NW U _NW 
NW maintains P NW +P 
NW acts as BOP NW + BOP 
BOP ------ UNW BOP - UNW 
U became ST U +ST 
ST SA ST + SA 
U as an ST U+ ST 
NW we are once again BOT NW + BOT 
NW necessary for Fl) NW + Fl) 










UNW A rld 




From this stage we are now ready to draw up a cognitive map. It is important 
to realize that the map shown was the result of much trial and error, its f inal 
configuration was determined by the necessity of clarity and therefore the 
lengths of arrows and positioning of points is entirely arbitrary. (see Figure 
6.2. ) Multiple lines indicate-the number of times this assertion was made, + 
and - indicates positive and negative effect, and 0 signifies "will not promote" 
in accordance with Axelrod's (op. cit. ) coding rules. 
Footnote 2 The dashed line, 
as already explained, indicates an inferred belief and is not part of the ruling 
laid down by Axelrod however I feel it is an essential contribution to clarity. 
You will note that merging has been used in the analysis of "... some possibly 
repetitive concepts generated in coding to eliminate unnecessary ones by 
merging them into their more likely counterpart concept also found in the 
text". So, for example "holocaust" and "percentage of the world in ruins" are 
both coded NH. 
The coding for the same subject's follow-up essay is shown below: 
Variable list, Essay 720(B) 
Variable Code 
nuclear weapons NW 
competitive society CS 
technological society TS 
people's lives at risk -UTILITY 
power for individuals CS 
the bomb NW 
relatively unstable countries having the bomb UB 
use of weapon UNW 
evolution of society ES 
nuclear bomb NW 
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Variable Code 
those who want power CS 
technologically advanced society TS 
more powerful weapons NW 
innocent people's lives at risk -UTILITY 
threat of nuclear war TNW 
people's cooperativeness Co 
people's coerciveness Coe 
nuclear war TNW 
threat to people -UTILITY 
continuing threat of actual nuclear war TNW 
The coding for this second essay is 
Cause Effect arrows List 
concept Linkýýe concept 
NW inevitable factor of CS CS + NW 
NW inevitable factor of TS TS NW 
CS put at risk -UTILITY CS UTILITY 
CS put at risk -UTILITY CS UTILITY 
NW can now UB NW + UB 
UB who may UNW UB + UNW 
ES as there are CS ES + CS 
CS 
---- 
NW CS + NW 
TS because NW TS + NW 
NW are put at risk -UTILITY NW - UTILITY 
TNW do not become Co TNW - Co 
TNW but become Coe TNW + Coe 
TNW threatens people -UTILITY TNW -UTILITY 
NW 
---- 
TNW NW +TNW 






Cb )E CO UTILITY 
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The map in Figure 6.3 is drawn up from this coding. The cognitive map of the 
subject's first essay shows a fairly complex system linking nuclear weapons to 
preventing the use of nuclear weapons, detterence, balance of power and 
reducing the Soviet threat, inferred from nuclear deterrent. In this map 
nuclear weapons also increase the likelihood of peace and ensure freedom and 
democracy. In fact the nub of these causal relationships mirror quite closely 
the archetypal arguments, set out in the previous chapter, for supporting 
nuclear weapons. Compare this with the 'archetypal' cognitive map in figure 
6: 4 and we can see that there are five fundamental arguments taken from 




NW + BOP 
U+ ST 
ST 








NW + BOP 
U+ ST 
ST 
The likelihood of nuclear weapons being used increases the chance of nuclear 
holocaust, the threat of which increases the likelihood of negotiations, thus 
reducing the chance of nuclear weapons being used. The map of the causal 
assertions in the S's second essay is very dif f erent. Here the main argument is 
that nuclear weapons have negative utility, an inferred connection with the 
Fig*ure 6: 4 "Archetypal" coqnitive ma]2 
Coding: 
N= NATO unity RED 
ST = Soviet threat p= 
D= nuclear deterrence UTIL 
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threat of nuclear war which again has negative utility. Also the likelihood that 
unstable countries may acquire the bomb increased the possibility of nuclear 
weapons being used. The evolution of society leads, in this map, to competitive 
society which makes an increase in the number of nuclear weapons more likely 
and the technological nature of society also increases this possibility. The only 
suggestion in the f irst map that the subject may develop thinking along these 
lines is the link between mans greedines's which increases the development of 
nuclear weapons. 
6.3 CONCLUSION 
These maps may help us to understand the structural relationship between idea- 
elements in a belief system in a rudimentary way but they give no indication of 
the degree of attachment the individual has to each attitude-object or the 
extent to which the individual believes each assertion. How can we equate the 
assertions of different subjects when one subject may be well informed about 
the issue and make an assertion after careful consideration, and another 
merely'repeats, with little thought, an assertion that he/she has heard made by 
someone else? Cognitive mapping is all very well, but like the opinion polls, 
they merely scratch the surface and tell us nothing about the underlying 
reasons. Further development of this methodology, perhaps as suggested earlier 
using computer mapping, may yet prove fruitful. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. This may include documentary material, transcript of an interview or survey 
questionnaire. 
2. For full details of coding notes see Axelrod p. 291-332 
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CHAPTERSEVEN 
BRITISH ATTITUDE CHANGE: A CASE STUDY 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is divided into two sections, both of which focus on 
attitude change amongst the British public. In the first section we 
shall be testing out the process of attitude change hypothesised in 
Chapter 4, which was derived from the American sample. Does the 
process have a wider application or is it merely limited to the small 
population sampled in the US? We shall be analysing a small sample 
of the British public in terms of this model of attitude change. 
Following this we shall turn once again to the subject of Chapter I- 
the opinion polls - and using questions included in a Gallup Omnibus 
Survey, evaluate the qualitative study, that makes up the bulk of 
this thesis, in terms of quantitive data gathered from the polls. A 
Data f or this particular study was gathered by placing an 
advertisement in Sanity magazine requesting readers who had 
recently changed their attitude towards nuclear weapons - or could 
remember how the process took place - to contact me. They were 
then sent a prepared letter giving more details about what was 
requested, namely 1) what their attitudes were previously, 2) what 
brought about the change of attitude and 3) what their attitudes are 
now. Six responses were forthcoming, and these form the basis of this 
study. 
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7.2 JIM RODEN 
Jim Roden is similar in many ways to the two American subjects in 
Chapter 4, Captain B and Captain J. He joined the Royal Navy at the 
age of 15 and left as Chief Petty Officer after 25 years. Whilst still 
in the Navy he completed an Open University bachelors degree. 
Since leaving he gained an M. Sc. in Organisational Psychology and is 
now completing a Ph. D at UMIST. For Jim Roden attitude change 
towards nuclear weapons was part of a more general questioning of 
received beliefs that came about during his OU course. The pattern 
of change takes place in stages in accordance with the process 
outlined in Chapter 4. 
Stage 1: Uncritical. Jim Roden sums up his old attitude to nuclear 
weapons in the words of Hilaire Belloc's cautionary tale about Jim 
who ran away from nurse and was eaten by a lion, it ends: 
And always keep a hold on nurse for fear of f inding 
someone worse. 
He thought in those days that if they got rid of nuclear weapons then 
"all sorts of dangers would become more immediate and threatening! " 
He also believed that this country needed nuclear weapons: 
I never though they were good in any moral sense but I did 
think that they were needed. 
He visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a young seaman in 1962 and the 
fact that the two cities had recovered and seemed to be flourishing 
made it: 
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relatively easy to rationallse the use of the atomic bomb 
to end the war. It seemed to me that the bomb differed 
only in degree from conventional weapons. 
This, coupled with a belief that the British and Americans were, in 
some unexplained way, morally superior, formed the basis for his 
attitude that: 
it -was necessary and right for us to have the bomb as a 
defence against the communists who obviously wished to 
enslave us, and any people like the Japanese who were 
obviously inhuman! 
This attitude, he feels now, was reinforced in many ways. He has no 
recollection of ever hearing or reading about a contrary view during 
this period: 
we were superior people and it was as simple as that. 
During the Cuban missile crisis he was on a Frigate in the Arctic 
Circle at action stations; they were preparing for war and he can 
remember not a word of dissent being voiced. In retrospect he sees 
this as a kind of "mad religiosity" : 
We really believed in a manictfaen world split between the 
forces of good an evil and we were prepared to play our 
part for good, whatever the cost. 
Stages 2 and 3: Emerging awareness and information acquisition. It 
was during his OU course, where his major areas of study were moral 
philosophy and psychology, that he was forced to 'Ire-examine my 
conceptions of myself and the world". Although nothing in the course 
was specifically anti-nuclear it was the emphasis on taking nothing 
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for granted and learning to think for himself that was crucial to his 
developing attitudes. Roden was in a very isolated position because 
his shipmates tended to equate the social sciences with "lefty 
sociology" which meant: 
the change in my-thinking was slow and painful because I 
had to abandon all the comfortable old group certainties, 
and do so alone. 
Stage 4: Vacillation. At the time he also felt under pressure to keep 
his changing attitudes to himself in case he "came to be thought of as 
a security risk because I didn't accept the 'party line'. " To a degree, 
then, he still remained dominated by the system to all outward 
intents and purposes, although privately his attitude had changed and 
did not vacillate. 
Stage 5: New belief system Once having left the navy Roden's 
attitudes were able to develop unrestricted. His attitude now is that 
defence should be just defence: 
In other words, I can't see there is any advantage to be 
F ained from having a devastating offensive capability ýarticularly 
a nuclear one) but much to be gained from 
making our country (or Europe) difficult to invade, 
relatively self-sustaining and totally ungovernable other 
than by consent. 
This is a very radical change in attitude to his previous position while 
a naval officer and once again is characterised by a growing 
awareness, then critical appraisal of received mainstream ideology 
out of which develops a genuinely thought out attitude. The reasons 
he cannot now accept nuclear 'defence' rest on a number of points 
derived for the most part from his research. First, is his objection 
to the professed Christian beliefs of many of those who have their 
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f inger on the button and their belief in Armageddon and the Second 
Coming. Secondly, are the dangers inherent in decision-making under 
stress. He sees a danger in the seeming drive for I'self- 
aggrandisement" of politicians, and doubts the desirability of this in 
nuclear decision-makers. This, combined with enemy perception - 
encouraged by the press - which works to the government's advantage 
and equates belligerence with 'manhood' and nationhood. The 
impersonal nature of modern warfare also, he believes, increases the 
chance of these weapons being used - where aggressive actions are 
psychologically divorced from consequences. And f inally he is 
concerned about the potential for accidents to happen - regardless of 
'fail-safe' systems: 
I have worked in engineering and I don't believe that any 
safe-guards are idiot-proof! 
7.3 MARION ELLIS 
This second subject wrote a brief account of how her attitudes 
changed as a result of a proposal to dump nuclear waste at Fulbeck, 
near her home in Lincolnshire. We have no record of her attitudes 
prior to this but can suppose that the whole question of nuclear 
power, nuclear waste and even nuclear weapons was simply not an 
issue for her. But with the designation of Fulbeck as a proposed site 
for nuclear waste disposal it became a personal issue leading to her 
emerging awareness, (Stage2): 
I objected to that, [proposal to use Fulbeck as a dump] and joined LAND - Lincolnshire and Nottinghamshire against Nuclear Dumping. 
As a result of this she states: 
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I then read more about nuclear power and learned from 
listening to speakers .... (Greenpeace, F. O. E., Bruce Kent of CND about the links between nuclear power 
stations and nuclear weapons. 
This we can see as Stage 3, Information seeking, from which she 
progresses to Stage 5, Opposition: 
I see that one must object to it all. I am now totally anti- 
nuclear... 
Although this is a very brief account it indicates clearly the 
progression from a state of being uncritical to emerging awareness, 
as a result of the issue impinging on her personal life, to active 
opposition, and indeed the overflow of concern and oppposition to a 
related area - nuclear weapons. 
7.4 DOROTHY WESTWOOD 
Again we have to rely here on a brief account of the subject's process 
of attitude change but similarly the process is quite clearly laid out. 
To begin with (Stage 1) Dorothy Westwood says: 
I was not politically aware. The working classes voted 
Labour and most of the rest of us voted Conservative, so I 
voted Conservative. 
Although there is no reference here to nuclear weapons, this 
statement characterises a stage of accepting, at a superficial, non- 
critical level, the way things are and therefore a tacit acceptance of 
mainstream ideology. The process of change undergone by Dorothy 
Westwood is similar to that experienced by Jim Roden in that it was 
a growing awareness of taken for granted assumptions and implicit 
acceptances that acted as a catalyst to attitude change. in this case 
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it was the Suez crisis that acted as the initial spur, initiating the 
awareness stage (2): 
Suez woke me up with moral indignation and shame that 
our government could so defy the United Nations and send 
in the troops for commercial gain. 
This sense of moral indignation prompted her to start reading widely: 
"especially on social and political issues, " i. e. Stage 3 Information 
acquisition. She read M. I. T. 's 'A Blueprint for Survival', and she 
subscribed to The Ecologist on a regular basis: 
feeling that our greedy civilization was ruining the earth 
for all of us. 
She then joined the Conservation Society, the Ecology Party and 
other environmental societies and then, indicating the snowball 
effect of this increased awareness, her local Peace Group, C. N. D. 
and E. N. D. (Stage 5, opposition). We can see here that the 
information acquisition stage (Stage 3) can lead to emerging 
awareness of wider issues and greater potential for attitude change in 
an ever increasing field. Dorothy Westwood explains finally that her 
rejection of nuclear weapons is a result of her concern now for all 
life: 
My basic rejection of nuclear weapons and nuclear power 
derives from my concern for all life. We humans, as the 
most advanced form of life, Faive a duty to pass on our 
wonderful inheritance, undamaged, for future generations. 
The American Red Indians' attitude to the Earth is ideal. 
Nuclear weapons are the most widely destructive to all 
life, so CND must come first. 
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7.5 AIDEN JOLLY 
Alden Jolly makes a particularly interesting subject of study because 
the process of his attitude change Is not quite as straightforward as 
that of the other individuals studied - both here and in the US. 
Nevertheless we shall attempt to look at this process In stages. 
Stage 1: Uncritical stage This stage is not difficult to identify. 
Alden himself admits that he had no understanding of politics and 
describes himself at this stage as: 
a definite but Inchoate little Tory. ... I know what I didn't or shouldn't like but didn't really know or care that 
Healey was one thing and Heath another. I was dutifully 
and quite uncomprehcndingly scathing, If necessary, about 
Tony Benn. 
He first "discovered nuclear war" through science fiction, 
particularly two thrillers on accidental holocaust . 
'The Bedford 
Incident' and 'Fall Safe'. This was at the age of 10 or 11 and so, as he 
concedes, "not surprisingly, the message of both books escaped me". 
Later reading along the same lines made an enormous Impression on 
him: 
I was sure a war would eventually happen, and was both 
terrified and enthralled at the prospect. 
At this stage he was pro nuclear power: 
because It was clean, apparently renewable (in modern 
jargon) and very technologically impressive. I also 
believed that a nuclear deterrent was the only way to 
prevent war (of any kind) and I was still fairly interested 
in the hardware of war .... I used to go to the Farnborough air show with my father. 
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Stage 2 and 3: Emerging awareness and Information acquisition. He 
began to start thinking realistically about nuclear war after reading a 
copy of 'The Wargamel at school: 
having read it I began to appreciate for the first time 
what a nuclear war would actually mean rather than what 
it would do for the scenario of an exciting novel. 
He also began to change his attitude to nuclear power as a result of 
joining his school's Alternative Discussion Group. But his 
retrospective interpretation of this period was that it fitted in with 
his 'controversial' image and because it was "topical and trendy". He 
sees this stage as having been superficial: 
At this time, none of this went very deep - it was 
adolescence, plus the impact of reading, talking and so on. 
I adopted such attitudes without thinking and was hardly 
aware of the details of the issue involved. I didn't think 
of joining CND; I was aware of the movement only as a 
clever symbol and if told about it would probably have 
disagreed with it. I was afraid of seeming to be too 'out 
of line'. 
From his own analysis of this period we can almost equate it with his 
earlier uncritical state of being carried along by (pro-nuclear) 
mainstream ideology. Then he seems to be go along with the trend 
predominating in his present social group which in this case happens 
to have a generally anti-nuclear flavour. Other influences, however, 
were effecting him too. A visit to the Alternative Technology 
Centre in Wales, he thinks: 
made a great deal of difference to my understanding of 
nuclear weapons and power. Once I realised there was 
another way of say, heating a house, I gradually felt more 
zble to question received wisdoms, of all kinds. 
The Falklands war also brought increased awareness of political 
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issues. Up to this point he felt he had "learnt about various issues, 
but not made the connection between them". At this stage he says: 
I really began to sit down and work my way through the 
contradictions between what politicians say and what they 
do, and the way this is reflected in the doctrine of 
deterrence. From this stage on I was, in spirit, anti- 
nuclear and anti-Tory. The next stage in this progression 
was that I very slowly came to do something about what I 
was coming to believe. 
This whole stage of emerging awareness and information acquisition 
can all be interpreted in terms of the "sleeper effect". Information 
was coming in and being stored but not really being processed and the 
various bits remained unconnected. Suddenly an event like the 
Falklands war sets thoughts in motion. This newly emerging attitude 
was crystallised in his Oxbridge entrance general paper where he: 
answered a question on the validity of deterrence by 
suggesting it was impossible to build the things without at 
least having the intention to use them .... the very 
existence of mass destruction weapons is essentially 
genocidal, as the claim that one doesn't actually intend to 
use them renders them useless as a deterrent. 
Stage 5: New belief system and opposition to old. The real 
commitment to this emerging attitude came at University where he 
met like-minded people. He became a "fellow traveller with CND" 
and later joined a local CND group: 
I am involved in local CND, and go Cruise watching when 
the opportunity arises. .. I still write anti-nuclear songs - 
.. my attitudes to nuclear disarmament have become part 
of my way of life 
7.6 DALE DEMPSEY 
Dale describes himself as having been "very war orientated" up until 
recently: 
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From a very early age all I can remember being interested 
in was the army. At one point at the age of 61 can 
remember writing to Jimmy Saville asking him to 'fix it' 
for me to join up. 
He joined the Army Cadet force and his attitude towards peace 
protestors was that they were "a load of hippies, high on drugs and 
drink. " 
The changing point came when he happened to see a copy of Sanity, 
the CND Journal: 
fleetingly I glanced through it and some photos caught my 
eye. The photos were of people who had survived the 
Nagasaki atom bomb and were horrificly burned and 
scarred. Up until that point war was always glorious even 
when people were killed on the films and in the comics. 
But these photos were so horrific that I was rooted to the 
spot, sure I knew nuclear weapons existed but I didn't 
realise their terrible ef fect. I then sat down and read 
what was written. 
He was so appalled by all the facts and figures about people killed 
and wounded that he immediately sent off for CND membership and 
more information. Now Dale is both a member of national and local 
CND and also the Peace Pledge Union (PPU). He joined the 1987 
CND demonstration in London and there found out that peace 
protestors are not "hippies on drugs. " 
We can see from this account how Dale rapidly passes through the 
stages-of attitude change outlined in the Chapter4 . He previously 
subscribed to the archetypal idea of war as glorious, etc., but when 
he came into contact with information to the contrary he entered the 
stage of emerging awareness, with a rapid progression to information 
acquisition, and then a new belief system about war and weapons of 
war completely opposed to his previous attitude. 
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There were no reference-group constraints on this progress and 
therefore no stage of vacillation. Indeed, the fact his father was a 
member of CND and he encountered the new material when he was 
visiting his father suggests that already here was - if not a reference 
group -someone who could give support to his emerging belief system. 
/ 
These examples of attitude change, while not extensive, suggest that 
the model of attitude change outlined in Chapter 4 is proboM valid, 
although a number of interesting differences can be found despite the 
many similarities between the US 'Elite' sample and the present 
sample. First, it is apparent that we are talking about a much slower 
process of change amongst the 'elites' studied in Chapter 4. If you 
remember, it took Captain B 41 years to completely change his 
attitude and Admiral NE spent more than 40 years in the Navy while 
voicing covert criticisms of nuclear weapons. The reason for this, I 
suggest, is that the 'elite' individual is under such pressure to conform 
to the 'party line' espoused by the society of which he/she is a 
member - be it a political party, a powerful company, a closed 
society such as the civil service, or one of armed forces for example 
- and he/she is also shielded from contact with outside forces or 
groups espousing a different set of beliefs. This accounts for the 
'vacillation' (Stage 4 in the model) amongst the elites who feel the 
pressure from two sources of allegiance: their present reference 
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will exert pressure to conform in subtle ways but these are ambient 
rather than specific in nature, and there are other groups within an 
individual's social milieu to turn to. Non-elites are also more likely 
to come into contact with organisations espousing different beliefs 
which can facillitate Stages 2 and 3. The importance of these 
organisations as new reference groups with which the individual can 
identify whilst going through attitude change is also indicated in 
these samples; joining the FREEZE movement, CDI, CND, 
Greenpeace, FOE etc. all provided a new identity and source of 
approval through which the new belief system can strengthen. These 
studies suggest two further factors involved in the process of attitude 
change. First, there is the apparent importance of an event in 
triggering action to change: the launching of the Trident submarine 
led Captain B to voice his dissent and join the FREEZE movement; 
proposals to dump nuclear waste prompted Marion Ellis to become 
active; the Suez crisis caused Dorothy Westwood to becomed 
informed on social and political issues, and the Falklands War made 
Aiden Jolly start making connections between issues. Secondly, once 
the process of attitude change is set in motion the driving force is 
towards completion of the process - (allowing for escape at Stages 2, 
3 and 4). 
7.7 OPINION POLLS REVISITED.. 
After reviewing opinion polls over the last forty years or so in 
Chapter 1, it was decided that qualitative studies would be of greater 
value in understanding what people think about nuclear weapons and 
how their attitudes change. This, then, was the focus of the major 
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part of this thesis. Opinion polls may be of value however when used 
in conjunction with qualitative analysis: qualitative studies allow us 
to understand in greater depth how a few people think, whereas 
opinion polls give us a more generallsed view of how -many people 
think. In the last part of this chapter we return once again to opinion 
polls to seek a quanti'ýIive affirmation of the work carried out up to 
now. We shall be concentrating on one particular poll that was part 
of a Gallup Omnibus carried out between 9th and 14th April 1987 on a 
sample of 891. We are concerned here with four of the questions, see 
Tables 7: 1,7: 2t 7: 3, and 7: 4. 
7.8 INFOPMATION 
Table 7: 1 indicates how respondents deal with information about 
nuclear weapons and war. The great majority, 71%, read or watch 
such information if it comes their way. Only 8% actively seek such 
information, 13% actively avoid it and 6% never seem to come across 
it, which we may interpret as unconscious/unadmitted avoidance. 
Therefore 19% actively avoided information about nuclear weapons 
and war. There was no significant difference between male and 
female responses and little variation between age groups although the 
youngest (18-34) and oldest (65+) groups tend to avoid information 
slightly more than those'aged between 35 and 64. Classes ABC1 tend 
to seek out or read/watch information if it comes their way more 
than class C2, and groups DE are the least likely to seek out or 
read/watch information encountered. 
7.9 CHANGED ATTITUDES 
41% of the sample had changed their attitude in recent times. Of 
these, 16% had become more unsure but still in favour of nuclear 
weapons, 10% more opposed to nuclear weapons, 8% more in favourt 
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and 7% more unsure but still opposed. Those that were unchanged 
divided almost equally between those favouring and those opposing 
British nuclear weapons. The greatest change appears to take place 
amongst those who are in favour of Britain keeping nuclear weapons: 
this category reports being more unsure than those who oppose them. 
Women appear to be more unsure about their pro-nuclear attitudes 
than men, 19% as opposed to 13%. Incidence of attitudes changing 
tends to decrease with age: 52% of 18-34 year olds changed 46%, of 
35-44 year olds, 35% of 45-64 year olds and 33% of 65+. 
7.10 REASON FOR CHANGE 
Suprisingly, the most frequent reason given for attitude change was 
"becoming more informed about the issue --generally", at 27%, 
although it must be appreciated that a person's differentiation 
between information in general and biased information may be a 
subjective evaluaticlYased on an individual's attitude towards nuclear 
weapons policy. Receiving information in favour of or against 
nuclear weapons accounted for only 7% and 8% respectively. "Had a 
chance to think about the issue more" was the second most frequent 
reason for changing, at 19% followed by "other reason" 18%, and a 
high percentage ( 21%) who gave no answer. 
7.11 ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
The given choice of responses for the question: "What do you think 
about nuclear weapons in the long run? " limits the respondents to a 
very constricted expression of attitude which I feel tends to force 
responses on the respondents. Nevertheless, respondents were given 
a multiple choice on this and at least we are getting more detail 
about attitudes than heretofore. 48% of respondents believed that 
"some weapons are needed for deterrence but levels of weapons 
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should be drastically reduced"; there was general agreement among 
political parties, sex, age and social class; the only anomaly was 
Labour voters who supported a freeze over and above other options 
with cuts coming second. -The second most frequent answer, chosen 
by 42%, was "countries possess these weapons - whatever I personally 
do makes no difference. " Once again Labour voters proved the 
exception, this being their third most frequent response. The next 
most popular response was the "no first use" option, 35%, and the 
freeze option, also 35%. 
From this preliminary analysis, carried out by Gallup, we can draw 
some tentative, general conclusions. First it seems that most people 
will read or watch information on the nuclear issue, although nearly 
20% will avoid it. The responses also suggest that attitude change 
takes place more amongst those who are in favour of nuclear weapons 
than those against: they are becoming unsure of their attitudes and 
slightly more had -increased their opposition to Britain keeping 
nuclear weapons rather than increased support for this policy . The 
reasons for these changes seemgto be access to more information per 
se and having more time to think about the issue. Despite the fact 
that more people are in favour of Britain's nuclear weapons than 
opposed, there is agreement overall that weapons should be 
drastically cut whilst still allowing some for deterrence purposes. 
Nearly as many people, ' however, feel that they personally can do 
nothing to change the situation. FREEZE and no first use are also 
strongly supported. 
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As with all opinion polls these results give us very fragmentary 
information: which direction do people who actively seek 
information move in? Have people who have changed their attitudes 
from supporting nuclear weapons to being unsure done so because 
they happened to come across more information, or is it because 
they've had time to mull over all the pro's and con's in their own 
time? These questions can only be answered by looking at the raw 
data and carrying out a far more detailed analysis than pollsters are 
required to do. 
7.12 DETAILED ANALYSIS 
I was able to carry out this set of detailed analyses when Gallup made 
their data available to me. My main concern was to look at the 
relationship between responses to each of the four questions in Tables 
7: 1 to 7: 4. For this purpose the Chi-square test (x2) was used to test 
whether differences of response to combinations of questions were 
statistically significant, i. e. whether a significant difference existed 
between the observed number of responses in each combination and 
the expected number based on the null hypothesis. The null 
hypothesis states, for example, that there is no positive correlation, 
between seeking out information on the nuclear issue and becoming 
more opposed to Britain keeping nuclear weapons. 
7.13 CROSS-TABULATION OF ATTITUDE CHANGE BY 
INFORMATION 
On the basis of the null hypothesis we would expect to f ind no 
relationship between how people respond to information on the 
nuclear issue and how their attitudes change. First we have to 
Figure-7: 5 Crosstabulation of attitude chanqe by information. 
1 2 3 4 
Seek it out read/watch avoid never 
1 8 40 7 5 
more in favour 5.2 42.9 8.1 3.9 
2 16 58 14 3 
more opposed 7.9 65 12.2 5.9 
3 6 115 16 9 
more unsure/ 12.6 104.3 19.6 9.5 
but In favour 
4 4 so 6 3 
more unsure/ 5.4 45 8.5 4.1 
but opposed 
5 17 199 2S 10 
unchanged 21.7 179.3 33.7 16.3 
in favour 
6 24 142 36 is 
unchanged 18.8 155 29.1 14.1 
opposed 
7 1 24 14 12? 
















column total 76 628 118 57 878 
8.6% 71.4% 13.4% 6.5% 100% 
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establish the expected frequency between variables: this is done by 
multiplying the total number in each row by the total in each column 
- (see table 7: 5). For example, the expected frequency for seeking 
out information and becoming more in favour of Britain keeping 
nuclear weapons would be 
60 x 76 -5.19 
879 
We then use chi square to measure the dif f erence between the 
observed frequencies (Fo) and the expected f requencies(Fe): 
x2 (Fo-Fe) 2 
Fe 
The larger the difference between the two frequen(ý'Les the larger the 
value for chi square and the more conf ident we can be at rejecting 
the null hypothesis. For this cross-tabulation, Chi square was 
calculated at 69.499 significant at . 0001 meaning that one could 
expect to find x' this large or larger less than one time in every ten 
thousand. We can therefore reject the null hypothesis with a high 
degree of confidence: there is a relationship between how people 
respond to information and how their attitudes change towards 
nuclear weapons policy. Looking at Table 7: 5, which shows these 
results, we can see that people who seek out information become 
more in favour of Britain keeping nuclear weapons: expected 
frequency Fe = 5.2, observed frequency Fo = 8. 
However, the relationship between those who seek out this 
information and attitudes changing towards opposition to nuclear 
weapons is even more significant : Fe 7.9, Fo 16. Furthermore, we 
^i v% cl Ir t" ri 
>- CL 141 ., j "J 
Z CD r-i 
- < Vi 
LL! M% Co r4 CID 
ri -Z - 
rli 
" e p- C) 10 
ti Co CD e Co UN ry 
-i Co UN 
m «m 
cri rn u. 
p- Co UD e 
rn 
UN r4 
e Co cc r-i 
fn 
fe% Co Co 
w 1 CD 
L') Co en 
v% 121 91 Co M P- Co 
Co r4 tn r- ein ry en 
x Z -4 -4 -d en cy 
ui t 
6-. ZC 





L) x x Co UN M U% e u% 
0- b- _A . -4 -4 -4 e 
-i w CD 0w 
CL m 
0 *4 w CL 
%A < -1 0 c2 0- 10 0 -4 0 r4 en ty Z _j Z VI 14 C) Z < 
0. CD 
ýc : Z 
w CD 
x0 e2 m fl- e CK) V% 0 fn e 
0 4. - ý4 10 ein r4 
cz Z -i < b- w 
Z 
0x Co -4 tn %0 0 0, ý0 
Z) w K r4 .4 ýd -4 ýr 
ý! 
Z e- (D -i r4 
Co cl Z & -4 en Co ýo ry fi -Z 
0 r-i 
CL) 
e- tý cu Co ýT NU 
CD Co r4 r4 




c2 Z ac 
w CD K < 
U me b- ui Dw Dw Z 
W -i Co -i C: ) -i b- ce 0u u Li 
0@ 
b. - > (5 wD Ui LL Z wZ *j (3 2: Z <Z %A Z xDZ XZ Z= ztA 
LL - t^ 0 M DZ - tm &A -- 4A 
0. Z a. LD tA 2f 0 &A - LD W-ZWZ 
cz Z ui Z r- Z Z :2 Z* ZZ CZ b. - M c2 CD 
P :: ) ui - ui cý CD - :DZ: ) - DZ- - Z. ZC Cl. >- 0 le < Ci. > (x. w CL me <Z cm 9 
Z www ui w<w w tA ui c2 W tL) tr 
,n "'t ce Z -_x ce w 
Cif LL ui er ZW 2c 
.H l < «z C) -0 *äe 0 Ihe C: ) Ci. *Z CD 
CD u- w Z: t-) :EZ Z CL &A w0 ct w ce Z 
«. 3 ZZ .5 -4 0Z< je UJ-WW-O W -O w -D ZWWZWW 
Zw -i Z< Kl. Z -i < -- Z -i < CL <M -J < tA -J - o (ZOO>- < O-ib- < O -iý- < =Ou=00- w i -Z U- -uj )-- uj U- 11) )> 7) Li Z 
vli w U» Zw ce x w 6. - ex wx2: Z<ZZ0 
< a2 c CD ec M Ub = CD ýA M Z u- -->O Z 
tm 
`, C (r. 00 0 cm"% 
: Z) Li. M 
Z- CD - 
«K -i vi 
ui W% p- cu 0 e W% 10 
r4 CM r4 
Co PM 
ry - r4 
tA 
(A 
9 - ty 
-1 90 u% - ein r4 -- 
10 10 - 914 114 - 4. % 
Ir 
43 fli 0 10 0- m %3- 
CY, 




rm U% 10 CY, 0 ry e Co 
w 1 F- 
L') CO 
ui -0 e- Co e- UN 10 x: en ty -4 r4 
CD ty 
ic 
0- 10 Co p- -a ru NU 
x Z Co r4 ty r4 -4 
w ui ý4 
tn X 
F- X 





w W CL 
cl: Li C) r4 0 91 






oý CL, ýr ty N U% e tu in X «c 0 -4 
c2 
Z b 0- 
6- Co CD Z C) & e r- r4 V% fn 
c2 
m 0- %r r- Co r- l> tu - 
w 
0 
Z- c3 : 
w u 
54 w 
-i CD Z te CD b- 0 ui CD 
> %A CX. 2: Z- 
< Ze 0. - 
LL C: ) . &A 'D :2 W 
w Z U. w c3 D 
> -5 0ZD < c3 WW w< 92. - tm 
ct 3c cc « %A W-Z I CD Z OZWU)- u :2 
N t : 
ZW 




cc Z: x -i 
=- LL- ui 
< w<J : w<<6. - < _) ec «x w > Z: ti u > 2: ui w cl: b- LA 
-i cc -J w < --D ce .Z r-- Cw< 
C), al L2LL 
ui = UJ Z LL C- tu ZZ 
CL - cic - C) cc -m< 
Figure 7: 6 Crosstabulation of-attitude change by reason for 
attitude chanqe. 
more info more info general chance other 
in favour against info to think 
more in favour 13 10 3 18 10 
12.1 3.8 5.6 19 13. S 
2 
more opposed 22 0 11 27 21 
18.1 5.7 8.4 28. S 20.3 
3 
more unsure/ 23 10 11 45 37 
in favour 28.1 8.9 13.1 44.3 31.6 
4 
more unsure/ 14 3 8 22 8 
opposed 12.3 3.9 5.7 19.3 13.8 
5 
unchanged/ 1 0 1 1 2 
in favour 1.1 .4 S 1.8 1.3 
7 
don't know 0 0 0 2ý 4 














column total 73 23 34 115 82 327.0% 
22.3% 7.0% 10.4% 35.25 25.15 100% 
Fiqure 7: 7 Crosstabulation of information by'no first use. 
0 6 
Countries should at least reduce the 
dangers from nuclear weapons by 
moving to no first-use policy 
declarations and arrangements. 
(row total) 
seek it out 37 39 76 
49.1 26.9 8.6% 
2 
read/watch 398 231 629 
406.0 1 223.0 71.5% 
3 
avoid it 87 31 110 
76.2 41.8 13.4% 
4 
n ver seem to 46 11 57 
come across it 36.8 20.2 6.5% 
column total 568.0 312.0 880 
64.5% 35.5% 100% 
Figure 7: 8 Crosstabulation of information by Freeze. 
0 One sensible step_is to freeze all 
nuclear weapons possession at 
existing levels. 
(row total) 
seek it out 44 32 76 
49.0 27.0 8.61 
2 
read/watch it 393 236 629 
405.3 223.7 71.5% 
3 as 30 110 
avoid it 76.0 42.0 13.4% 
4 
never seem to 42 15 57 
come across it 36.7 20.3 6.5% 
column total 567 313 880 
64.4% 35.6% 100% 
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can see a higher than expected relationship - between 
reading/watching if it comes your way and becoming unsure about 
opposing nuclear weapons We = 45.0, Fo = 50). But there is an even 
greater change amongst those in favour who are becoming unsure We 
.= 104, Fo = 115). Seeking out information tends to strengthen 
attitudes, and especially reinforces anti-nuclear attitudes. 
The trouble with the reason-for-changing response is that there is no 
way of knowing if the people becoming more pro or anti already felt 
strongly pro or anti. Avoiders are more likely than the frequency 
predicted to answer 'don't know% 
7.14 CROSS-TABULATION OF REASON " FOR CHANGING 
ATTTTI ir)F RY ATTTTT mE CHANGE I 
Again the point of this exercise using chi square was to determine the 
relationship between each variable. The results were not conclusive : 
chi square was 34.437, -significant at . 0233, which means the null 
hypothesis - there is no relationship -between reason forattitude 
change and the direction in which attitudes change - cannot be 
rejected with any great confidence. The differences between 
expected and observed frequencies point to the possibility of some 
relationship. Briefly they suggest: 
1) Information supporting or opposing nuclear weapons policy tends, 
as one might expect, to strengthen existing attitudes but also leads to 
some uncertainty about these attitudes in other people. 
2) Becoming generally more informed leads to some uncertainty 
about existing attitudes. 
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3) Having a chance to think about the issue leads to uncertainty 
amongst those in favour of Britain keeping nuclear weapons. 
See Figure 7: 6. 
, 
7.15 CROSS-TABULATION OF-INFORMATION BY ATTITUDE. 
Cross-tabulation of how people respond to information about nuclear 
weapons (Figure 7: 1) by what they think about nuclear weapons in the 
long run (Figure 7: 4) was carried out in nine stages; information was 
cross-tabulated by each of the nine responses in the attitude question 
separately. Only with responses 6 to 9 could the null hypothesis be 
rejected. Correlation with number 6: ' "countries should at least 
reduce the dangers from nuclear weapons by moving to no-first-use 
policy declarations and arrangements", differed most significantly 
from the expected frequency. Chi-square was 19.6488 at a 
significance, of . 0002. We can see from Figure 7: 7 that it is only 
amongst the seekers out and read/watchers that the observed 
frequency is greater than expected; this was true of all responses 
between 6 and 9. Those who seek out information on the nuclear 
issue or who read/watch it when they come across it are more likely 
to support, (besides a no first use policy), a nuclear freeze (response 
7), drastic cuts (response 8) and to recognise the danger from 
accidental use. 
7: 16 COffCLUSION 
From these statistics we can draw a number of conclusions. Those 
who actively seek information about nuclear weapons and nuclear war 
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are more likely to change their attitudes in the direction of opposing 
nuclear weapons. Those who read/watch it if it comes their way are 
likely to become unsure about their attitudes, especially if they are 
pro-nuclear to begin with. This suggests, in accordance with the 
model for attitude change outlined in Chapter Four that those who 
actively seek information are testing out old beliefs through 
information acquisition (Stage 3a) and are therefore more likely to go 
on to develop a new belief system. Those who don't actively seek the 
information but will read/watch it can be seen as entering the 
'emerging awareness' Stage 2, but of course at this stage there is a 
good chance of the information being rejected (Stage 3b). 199 
subjects (see Figure 7: 5) who read/watch information did not change 
their attitude from being pro-nuclear to start with (this is 19% more 
than the expected frequency). Out of the 631 (71%) who read/watch, 
more than half (341) did not change their attitude. These are 
perhaps people who reject any new information and won't be shaken 
from their existing beliefs. There is no means of knowing whether 
this is for ego-defensive reasons or any of the other possibilities 
outlined in Chapter 3. 
Footnote I 
It would appear then, that exposure to information on the nuclear 
issue tends to change attitudes in the direction of opposing British 
nuclear weapons: more information tends to bring into question long 
standing assumptions and implicit truths with which we are all 
inculcated. The American interviews showed how this process 
worked, as did the accounts of those who responded to the Sanity 
advertisement, and here more precise analysis of an opinion poll 
further supportsthe evidence. . 
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Footnotes 
1. Cross-tabulations with more than 2 variables proved inconclusive 




Before coming to any concluding comments it will be useful, in view of the wide 
area of research covered, to summarize each chapter in turn, pulling out the 
salient points. 
Chapter 
, cne established 
the extent of existing information about public 
attitudes towards nuclear defence. We learned that this information was 
fragmentary and often apparently, contradictory : while the great optimism for 
peace that was first engendered by nuclear weapons has faded and anxiety 
about the likelihood of nuclear war has increased there still'remains a majority 
in favour of Britain retaining a nuclear defence. This commitment seems to be 
on the basis of the devil you know is better that the devil you don't know than 
on any real enthusiasm for nuclear weapons per se. Further contradictions lie 
in public acceptance of defence policy and their rejection of a defence policy 
that aims to use nuclear weapons first in response to a conventional attack - 
and yet this is the basis of current defence policy. A further development of 
attitudes suggested by the polls are the changing attitudes towards the Soviet 
Union and the United States : they appear to be becoming more critical of the 
latter and more sympathetic to the former -particularly over the last two 
years. It would seem that the world is changing but it needs a changed set of 
attitudes to appreciate the new situation and the problem then is that of public 
perceptions catching up with reality, before this process is completed we can 
perhaps expect contradictions and incongruities. 
The second chapter sought to understand the basis of such patterns of change. 
Many of the theories reviewed depended on a cyclical approach, suggesting 
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alternating periods of interventionism and non-interventionism, each new period 
reacting against the policies of the previous political period. It was also 
suggested that the attitudes of the younger generation modify with age, 
becoming more in line with mainstream ideology with ageing, although Lipset 
and Ladd suggest that this is a relative shift and that in fact each succeeding 
generation starts of from a slightly more liberal position than the previous 
generations. The study of the polls over the last thirty years, covered in 
Chapter One, suggest we may be witnessing this sort of historical slope of 
political attitudes in Britain. The dynamics of this movement can be 
interpreted in terms of 'paradigm shift', a process whereby an existing set of 
beliefs is brought into question when their basic assumptions and implicit 
laws are no longer adequate to explain and encompass the present situation. 
The development of mainstream ideology - i. e. the existing set of beliefs held 
by the majority on this subject - tend to impede the process of attitude change, 
whereas &cess to new information is likely to facilitiate this process. The A 
difference in belief -system between elites and non-elites was also suggested in 
this chapter : elites will tend to exhibit greater consistency within their belief 
system as a result of greater exposure to and participation in the issues 
involved, i. e. a greater awareness of and adherence to mainstream ideology. 
Non-elites tend to be less constricted by such pressures due to lower level of 
knowledge of mainstream thinking and ideological constraints. 
While the second chapter took a generalised view of attitude change at a molar 
level, Chapter Three took a closer look at the molecular level, how attitude 
change takes place in the individual. The f irst concern was, why people hold 
particular attitudes to begin with, what function do they serve? Attitude 
change was then considered on the basis of these primary functions. The main 
prerequisite for attitude change is new information and the problem of getting 
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this across to the public was examined. Once this new information has been 
realised and incongruities are found with the existing beliefs this either results 
in attitude change, with the reformulation of the belief system to incorporate 
the conflicting information, or a rejection of the information in favour of the 
existing belief system. The importance of the subjective norm in this process 
cannot be over-emphasized. Individuals generally experience pressures to 
confrom to the way of thinking that dominates their particular reference group; 
when the implicit assumptions of this group are questioned by new information 
the direction of pressure will be towards preserving the status quo. This 
emphasised the importance of new reference groups in the process of attitude 
change which allow the individual to find support and approval congruent with 
the new belief system. As far as getting new information across to a ta rget 
population is concerned the first necessity is to make sure the information is 
readily available and secondly, bearing in mind the different functions attitudes 
serve, to make sure it is more easily assimilated by targetting it at specific 
sections of that public. 
With this background in theoretical work ChapterFour provided a case study of 
modified attitudes amongst a qrc&A, p of American elites - at last we were 
looking at cases of attitude ch ange in the real world, not induced in artificial 
circumstances under laboratory conditions. 'The transcribed interviews with 
these subjects provided invaluable insights into the processes taking place 
during developments in attitudes and out of the analysis of these interviews 
emerged a preliminary model of attitude change which incorporated the vital 
elements of attitude change at the theoretical level, encountered in the 
previous chapters. 
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At this stage in Chapter Five, some background work was carried out on the 
context of pro-and anti-nuclear belief systems. This emphasised the domination 
of public attitudes by a stock of long-standing arguments for nuclear weapons 
that was found to-occur with monotonous regularity. It was also found that 
elites were, as predicted by material covered in Chapter Two, more cognizant 
of these arguments than non-elites. The predominance of mainstream ideology 
for the support of nuclear weapons, as the basis of these 'archetypal arguments' 
was explained, in terms of familiarity and implicit acceptance of long-standing 
beliefs about nuclear weapons that originated at a time when nuclear weapons, 
strategy and international political affairs were somewhat different from now. 
The basis for the lesser support for Britain giving up her nuclear weapons was, 
it was suggested, due to the lack of currency in anti-nuclear arguments both 
historically and in terms of literature and information readily available to the 
public at any given time. Thus, in accordance with some of the theoretical 
work in Chapter Two, it was suggested that increased knowledge of the issue of 
nuclear defence was likely, in view of the dominance of such available 
information by pro-nuclear arguments to increase support for nuclear 
weapons/the prevailing mainstream ideology. It was suggested again that more 
information being made available to the public putting across pro-disarmament 
the 
arguments at levels that reached different strata of A public, would 
be 
the first step towards increasing pro-disarmament support. 
Chapter six was a brief excursion into the possibility of using mathe matical 
formulae and cognitive mapping processes - to understand the structure of 
belief systems. These were largely rejected on the basis that they contributed 
nothing to understanding the working of belief systems. They relied too much 
on a logical, sequential unrealistic form of mental operations that may suffice 
in theory but have no relevance to real life. 
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The seventh chapter returned to the question of attitude change in the real 
world and analysed the responses of a small sample of British non-elites in order 
to test out the model of attitude change set forth in Chapter Four. As a result 
of this it was suggested that an important difference existed between elite and 
non-elite attitude change. Elites, it would seem from this study, are likely to 
go through a long process towards attitude change due to the pressure upon 
them to confirm to the party-line espoused by their reference, group. The 
relatively closed society in which most elites function serves to insulate them 
both from attitude influences that may cause disruption to the belief system 
predominanting and from forces within the individual that may cause her/him 
to doubt and question many of the implicit beliefs and laws, on which the belief 
system -indeed the whole group's -existence ultimately depends. Amongst non- 
elites the process from introduction to new material/ideas through information 
seeking to the new belief system is likely to be a smoother process and for non- 
elites new membership groups are more easily available for the necessary 
support and sense of identification that helps the process. At each stage in the 
process of change outlined in the model, it must be remembered, there is the 
opportunity for the individual to reject the new information and either revert 
back to the original belief system or embargo the issue entirely, concentrating 
on other areas of interest. 
The final section of Chapter Seven returned, because the opportunity was made 
available, to opinion polls. Detailed analysis of poll questions on attitude 
change indicated that with the increased availablities of pro-disarmament 
information in more recent years, access to information about nuclear 
weapons/nuclear war tends to bring into question long-standing assumptions and 
implicit truths with which we have all been inculcated, in accordance with the 
model for attitude change which has been proposed. 
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Einstein's much cited quote about everything having changed since the advent 
of nuclear weapons apart from our way of thinking emphasises the need for us 
to change our way of thinking about nuclear weapon. Doing this is, I believe, 
about becoming aware of what we think and questioning the validity of long- 
held assumptions and implicit truths. This work indicated that non-elites may 
find this process easier than elites. Future research must therefore 
concentrate on elites, how they function within their group, what sort of 
pressures they are under to conform ýoyaltyto the system, degrees of latitude 
permissable and problems 4ýf role/rule governed behaviour within a closed 
system. Attention also needs to focus on agents of change that have succeeded 
and those that have failed. Elite decision-makers need to be the target for 
more research because they, for the most part, are the architects of social 
change and if ways can be found to facilitate change amongst them then the 
process of social change is likely also to be enhanced. 
APPENDIX 1 
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TABLE 3 SOVIET THREAT ARGUMENTS (1) 
EXAMPLES OF MASS OPINION 
1: 1 "Make no mistake the Russians are dedicated to the spread of communism 
worldwide. It's their ultimate aim laid down in the communist 
manifesto ... 11 
(B229) 
1: 3 "The Warsaw Pact has lots more weapons than NATO ... 
(99) 
1: 7 "Just have a think what would happen if we had no nuclear weapons. What 
do you think Russia would do, their big chance to wipe us off the map and 
maybe wipe the whole of Europe off the map. " (426) 
1: 9 "The invasion of Afghanistan reveals the real threat which Russia hangs 
over undefended nations. " (646) 
ELITE OPINION 
1: 1 a huge and antagonistic power which makes no secret of its 
hostility .... This hostility is part and parcel of the Soviet Union's Marxist- Communist creed. " (Pym) 
1: 2 "The threat posed by Soviet military power is not a product of the fevered 
imagination of military planners. It is a fact for all to see. " (Pym) 
1: 3 "Since 1977, in addition to its superiority in conventional weaponry, the 
Soviet Union has deployed SS-20 missiles and the supersonic Backfire 
Strike-bomber. This has tipped what was a rough East-West balance in 
Europe, firmly in Russia's favour. 11 (CDMD) 
1: 5 "The Soviet rulers have built themselves the largest most formidable 
military machine the world has ever seen. They are still expanding it ... 11 (Pym) 
1: 7 .... The Soviet Union has ruthlessly exploited the weakness of its 
neighbours. 11 (CDMD) 
1: 9 "As the Soviets' unprovoked attack against Afghanistan makes clear, we 
are all potential targets of Soviet attack. " (CDMD) 
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TABLE 4 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE (2) 
EXAMPLES OF MASS OPINION 
2: 1 "Personally I think nuclear weapons should remain on British soil in order 
to deter the Soviet Union and its hypocritical communist regime from 
over-running Europe, placing us under a totally corrupt and repressive 
regime. " (314) 
2 :2 "The bomb has kept the peace since the last war, and will go on as long as 
the missiles and bombs are updated. " (314) 
2: 4 "The bomb is in all effects the ultimate peacekeeper. One country will 
not risk attack for fear of severe retaliation. " (578) 
2: 7 "The main reason that we have a free country today is probably due to the 
fact that we have our nuclear defences. " (495) 
2: 8 "We have the bomb and we must remember that its purpose is to deter and 
not to destroy. " (237) 
2: 10 "Nuclear weapons are here and cannot be disinvented. As long as their 
existence is guaranteed, the means for preventing their use must be 
maintained, modernised and deployed when and where needs be. " (800) 
2: 11 "1 am sure that nuclear war will not occur as long as the present condition 
exists. There are numerous safeguards to prevent a bomb being set off 
accidentally so it is virtually impossible for it happen. " (744) 
ELITE OPINION 
2: 1 "It is because our potential enemies know that the NATO alliance has the 
means and the will to defend itself that they concluded there is nothing to 
be achieved by the threat or the use of force. " (Pym) 
2: 2 "The peace of Europe has now held for 39 years. Common sense suggests 
that deterrence has played a big part in securing that. " (DMD) 
2: 9 "Our purpose is to prevent war .... None of our weapons will ever be used 
except in response to attack" (Howe) 
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TABLE 5 MULTILATERALISM (3) 
EXAMPLES OF MASS OPINION 
3: 1 "1 believe that multilateral disarmament would be the best that could 
happen to aid peace. " (277) 
3: 2 "Steps forward have been made in the reduction of missiles. " (124) 
3: 3 "If such (unilateral) disarmament were to take place the nuclear balance 
would decisively tip in favour of the Soviet Union and given such an 
advantage the Eastern bloc could destroy Western democracies. " (787) 
3: 4 If Russian sees a chance of NATO's missiles being reduced due to internal 
pressure, then it is highly unlikely that she is going to make any real 
gestures of arms reductions .... 11 
(578) 
3: 5 "Negotiation means bargaining, and means having something to bargain 
with. If a Labour Government was now in power pledged to unilateral 
disarmament the current American-Soviet talks in Geneva on theatre 
nuclear weapons would either never have been started, or would be 
proceeding disastrously with the western Alliance forced into fatal 
compromise. " (715) 
3: 7 "Some campaigners would say that we could get rid of our weapons .... This annoys me because we would be shoving the responsibility for our 
main defence on America just because some people don't have the courage 
to fight for themselves or for their country. " (713) 
ELITE OPINION 
3: 1 "The only way to reduce nuclear or conventional weapons without putting 
our security in jeopardy is for East and West to act together by 
agreement. " (PYM) 
3: 2 It is an approach that has worked in the past. Multilateralisation has 
successes to its credit. " (Pym) 
3: 3 "But freezing or aggravating imbalances would make the danger of war 
greater, not less. " (Howe) 
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2: 9 "The best way of deterring an adversary from threatening to use nuclear 
weapons against us is to retain our own nuclear weapons ...... if (Pym) 
2: 10 "Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented. Our task must be to ensure a 
system for living in peace and freedom in which nuclear weapons are 
never used either to destroy or blackmail. " (CDMD) 
7. 
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3: 4 "Unilateral disarmament removes the other side's incentive to ne otiate 
reductions. " 
Mwe) 
3: 5 11.... if we .... make unilateral reductions .... we shall reduce our security, increase the risk of war and reduce the chances of negotiating balanced 
arms reduction. " (PYM) 
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TABLE 6 NATO (4) 
EXAMPLES OF MASS OPINION 
4: 1 "NATO was formed because of Russian expansion in the 1940's and 1950's. 
Since then Russia has not ventured further West. This has been due to 
NATO .... 11 (578) 
4: 2 ".... we must be willing if necessary, to go ahead with cruise missiles, in 
that the whole of NATO can express to the Soviet Union that we are 
united in defence. " (715) 
4: 5 "Arms reductions can only occur if Russia faces a NATO which is stron 
and united. " (5781 
I 
ELITE OPINION 
4: 1 .... the overriding priority of the North Atlantic Alliance, is to keep the 
peace - peace with freedom. That is what NATO was set up to do some 
30 years ago, and that is what it has done. " (Pym) 
4: 2 "1 see the Atlantic partnership as an arch with two pillars . ..... Only if its 
supports are firm can we collectively provide the defence effort 
necessary to protect peace and freedom .... 11 (Howe) 
4: 3 "But we, and our people must be clear that American presence has not 
been imposed on an unwilling Europe. " (Howe) 
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TABLE8 THE NUCLEAR THREAT (1) 
EXAMPLES OF MASS OPINION 
1: 1 "Nuclear weapons do not help us. The upwards spiral of the arms race 
puts us all in danger ..... (283) 
1: 2 "If a war began with the use of conventional weapons then it would almost 
inevitably accelerate onto a nuclear scale (779) 
1: 4 "The most alarming development of all, then, is this change in thinking 
away from a policy of deterrence towards a nuclear war fighting policV. 36) 
ELITE OPINION 
1: 2 "Given present military strategy it seems unlikely that war could be kept 
conventional ... in terms of stopping an offensive. The soldiers would be fighting with a nuclear graveyard at their backs. " (Cox-Smith) 
1: 4 "The strategy, therefore now has nothing to do with deterrence. It is a 
strategy for fighting a nuclear war .... 11 (England) 
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TABLE 9 NUCLEAR DEFENCE (2) 
EXAMPLES OF MASS OPINION 
2: 1 "Can it really be said that Britain has a nuclear deterrent? to be effective 
as a deterrent Britain must be prepared to use its nuclear weapons.... if 
we did use our nuclear weapons retaliation would totally destroy this 
country and almost all its inhabitants. " (686) 
2: 2 "When someone talks of "deterrence" it is easy to forget that that single 
word implies, the distinct possibility of a total nuclear exchange resulting 
in the extinction of ourselves as a species and most likely any other livin 
thing .... 11 (7 7165 
ELITE OPINION 
2: 1 "The point is that NATO's deterrent threat is based on the premise that 
the - Western world is willing to commit mass suicide as well as mass 
murder. " (Cox-Smith) 
2: 2 "Nuclear war .... would destroy all social and political institutions, 
attackers and defenders, friends and foes, the good and the bad. No cause 
or ideology could survive or justify such destruction. " (Cox-Smith) 
2: 3 "The strategy .... is a strategy not for deterring or avoiding war but for fighting and trying to win one . ... 11 (England) 
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TABLE 10 UNILATERALISM (3) 
EXAMPLES OF MASS OPINION 
3: 1 "World-wide multilateral disarmament must be our ultimate goal but we 
must recognise that someone has to begin the process ..... 11 
(736) 
3: 2 "Our best defence is not to make ourselves a military target; by removin I 
nuclear weapons for the sake of world peace. " (6861 
3: 4 "However much faith you place in the theory of deterrence between the 
superpowers, it is impossible to imagine such a theory providing any 
security in a world with a least 20 nuclear, powers. " (736) 
3: 5 "We can hardly be blamed for waning support of the nuclear disarmament 
talks .... we have been confronted with no agreements, no reductions, indeed the stockpiles grow steadily and now the tranquillity of outer space 
is threatened. " (631) 
ELITE OPINION 
3: 1 "Our central demand is British renunciation of nuclear weapons, seen as a 
first step to worldwide nuclear disarmament. " (Cox-Smith) 
3: 2 "Britain is, without a doubt, in danger of Soviet attack as long as it 
remains a nuclear arsenal. " (England) 
3: 3 "But as a non-nuclear-weapons state we could not only give useful support 
to the movements of peoples for a European nuclear-free zone .... we 
could add our strength to all those countries .... which have so insistently demanded unilateral nuclear and general disarmament. " (England) 
3: 4 "This is a very short-sighted argument because it makes a case not only 
for Britain but for many other countries to have nuclear weapons. " 
(England) 
3: 5 "People who put their faith in multilateral disarmament only can have no 
idea how long this is likely to take. For about ten years in the 1950s and 
1960s there were serious negotiations .... The negotiations finally came to 
nothing. " (England) 
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TABLE 11 THE SOVIET THREAT (4) 
EXAMPLES OF MASS OPINION 
4: 3 9 don't think Russia is the big bad wolf people say she is, America is just 
as bad if not worse .... 11 (111) 
4: 3 "The Alliance has become obsessed with anti-Soviet feeling. They have in 
their own words decided to see Marxism-Leninism crushed from the face 
of the Earth". (88) 
4: 3 "Of course communism seems evil and oppressive but capitalism isn't 
always perfect. And both ideals are just as bad as each other when it 
comes to the issue of the Bomb. " (453) 
ELITE OPINION 
4: 1 "There is another, major, issue to be considered in comparison between 
the forces of the Soviet Union and NATO. The Soviet Union faces more 
than one political enemy .... 11 (Cox-Smith) 
4: 2 "The government also quotes the big preponderance of Soviet tanks - 2.8 
to one on the central front in Europe -as proof of offensive plans. They do not say that so far as aircraft are concerned the pattern is different 
(England) 
4: 4 this does not mean it has any intention of attacking the capitalist 
states in Western Europe. " (England) 
